COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71469 STATE OF OHIO : : ACCELERATED DOCKET : PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : CHARLES TRAPP : OPINION : : PER CURIAM DEFENDANT-APPELLANT : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: JULY 10, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR-313432. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-appellee: Stephanie Tubbs Jones Cuyahoga County Prosecutor David Zimmerman Assistant County Prosecutor The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-appellant: James A. Draper Cuyahoga County Public Defender Robert M. Ingersoll Assistant Public Defender 100 Lakeside Place 1200 West Third Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1513 Charles Trapp #302-839 North Central Corr. Inst. P.O. Box 1812 Marion, Ohio 43301-1812 - 2 - PER CURIAM: An accelerated appeal is authorized pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 25. The purpose of an accelerated docket is to allow an appellate court to render a brief and conclusionary decision. Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 158; App.R. 11.1(E). Defendant-appellant Charles Trapp appeals from his conviction for felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11, with a firearm specification. The appellant was sentenced to a term of incarceration of three to fifteen years for felonious assault, plus an additional term of three years actual incarceration on the firearm specification to be served prior to and consecutive with the underlying sentence. In this appeal the appellant contests the validity of his guilty plea. The appellant sets forth one assignment of error: CHARLES TRAPP WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A TRIAL, WHEN THE TRIAL COURT ACCEPTED HIS GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT ASSURING THAT MR. TRAPP KNEW THE NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS OFFENSE OR THAT MR. TRAPP'S PLEA WAS MADE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY. The appellant contends that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered because the court erred when it failed to explain to him the nature and circumstances of the offense as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). It is uncontested that the court complied in every other way with the mandates of Crim. R. 11. - 3 - In State v. Calvillo (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 714, 719, this court held: In determining whether a guilty plea is voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly made, courts look to the totality of the circumstances. State v. Carter (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 34, 14 O.O.3d 199, 396 N.E.2d 757; State v. Billups (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 31, 11 O.O.3d 150, 385 N.E.2d 1308. In State v. Rainey (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 441, 3 OBR 519, 446 N.E.2d 188, paragraph one of the syllabus the court held: "In order for a trial court to determine that a defendant in a criminal case understands the nature of the charge to which he was entering a guilty plea, it is not always necessary that the trial court advise the defendant of the elements of the crime, or to specifically ask the defendant if he understands the charge, so long as the totality of the circumstances are such that the trial court is warranted in making a determination that the defendant understands the charge." (Emphasis added in Calvillo.) See also State v. Hargis (Feb. 25, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 61890, unreported; State v. Hunter (Jan. 25, 1996), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 68447, 68448, 68449, 68450, 68451, 69303, unreported; State v. Sliman (Oct. 10, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 69917, unreported. In the case sub judice, it is clear from the record that neither the trial court nor the prosecutor detailed for the appellant the elements of the crime he committed. However, at the plea hearing, the State indicated to the Court that in exchange for the appellant's plea of guilty, it was agreed that count two of the indictment for attempted murder in violation of R.C. 2903.03 and 2923.03, with firearm and violence specifications, would be - 4 - dismissed, and that the violence specifications would be deleted from the indictment for felonious assault. Prior to outlining the potential sentence, the prosecutor noted that "The first count of the indictment, felonious assault against the victim, Kevin Lynch, ..." (T. 3.) Next, counsel for appellant indicated to the court: On behalf of Mr. Trapp, that is a correct statement of the plea negotiations. I have had a chance to discuss this matter with my client in a lot of detail. He understands what he is doing here. He understands by entering a plea, he has to go to prison, your honor. He understands what the evidence would be. I have discussed everything with him, made no threats, no promises to get him to change his plea. ... I think he knows exactly what he is doing here. (T. 4-5.) The court responded: "Thank you, sir. Mr. Trapp, do you understand the statements made by the prosecuting attorney and your attorney?" (T. 5.) The appellant responded in the affirmative. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the trial court was not unwarranted in making the determination that the appellant understood the charge against him. This understanding is demonstrated by considering five statements in the record: 1) the prosecutor specifically named the victim; 2) appellant's counsel indicated to the court that he had entered into detailed discussions with the appellant; 3) appellant's counsel indicated to the court the appellant knew what evidence would be presented against him; 4) the trial court addressed the appellant and asked if he understood the statements made by the prosecutor and his own - 5 - counsel; and 5) in response to the court's inquiry the appellant indicated that he did understand. These statements, when taken as a whole, demonstrate that the appellant understood the nature of the charges against him, and thus, the plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and in full compliance with Crim.R.11, the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Ohio. The appellant's assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 6 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, C.J. ANN DYKE, J. KENNETH A. ROCCO, J. N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .