COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71427, 71428 and 71429 DEBORAH WINGFIELD : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : and -vs- : : OPINION CLEVELAND CLINIC FOUNDATION : : Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT December 11, 1997 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. CV-289562 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCE: For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee Deborah Wingfield: Cleveland Clinic Found.: RICHARD H. DRUCKER, ESQ. JEFFREY J. WEDEL, ESQ. 1468 W. 9th Street Squire Sanders & Dempsey Suite 810 4900 Key Tower Cleveland, Ohio 44113 127 Public Square Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1304 For Defendant-Appellee Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation: JEFFREY B. DUBER, ESQ. Assistant Attorney General State Office Bldg., 12th Fl. 615 West Superior Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1899 2 PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J.: Deborah Wingfield, plaintiff-appellant, appeals a jury verdict that denied her workers' compensation for a sprained and strained back and a herniated disk at the L-5. Cleveland Clinic Foundation ( CCF ), defendant-appellee, her employer, cross-appeals the decision of the jury granting her workers' compensation for a dislocated shoulder injury and the trial court's denial of its directed verdict. Wingfield assigns the following errors for our review: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENTERED JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT AND ORDERED THAT THE APPELLANT DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE OHIO WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND FOR A BACK STRAIN AND SPRAIN AND A HERNIATED DISC AT THE L-5 WHEN THE APPELLANT ESTABLISHED BY THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT SHE SUSTAINED THESE MEDICAL INJURIES AS THE DIRECT AND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF A COMPENSABLE INCIDENT AT THE PLACE OF HER EMPLOYER, THE CLEVELAND CLINIC FOUNDATION. CCF assigns the following three errors on cross-appeal: I. A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF AN EMPLOYER IN A WORKERS' COMPENSATION TRIAL IS APPROPRIATE WHEN NO MEDICAL EVIDENCE IS OFFERED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A MEDICAL INJURY. II. THE COURT ERRED BY IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON A SHOULDER DISLOCATION CONDITION, WHERE NO EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED SUPPORTING SUCH AN INSTRUCTION. III. THE JURY VERDICT ALLOWING A RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND FOR A LEFT SHOULDER DISLOCATION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. Having reviewed the record and the legal arguments of the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The apposite facts follow. 3 On October 11, 1990, Wingfield claimed she fell and sustained a dislocated shoulder, a sprain and strain to her back, and a herniated disk at L5-S1. The fall occurred at CCF's Melon Center, her place of employment. CCF recognized her workers' compensation claim for a minor trauma to her left shoulder but denied the other claims. The Industrial Commission agreed with CCF and Wingfield filed her appeal to the court of common pleas. At the trial, Wingfield testified that she slipped and fell backwards while exiting an elevator. She hit her left shoulder on the elevator and her back on the floor. She testified she heard a loud pop when she hit her shoulder. She stated it felt as if the shoulder came out of its socket. The pain, she described, was so severe that she was unable to move. Within hours of the fall, she was treated by CCF's Primary Care Department Physician, Dr. Kenneth Vaughn. Dr. Vaughn testified that she complained of pain in her left shoulder. Upon examination, he found she had some discomfort with her left arm behind her back. He was unable to recall any additional information concerning the shoulder injury. Apparently, some of the words from his notes were omitted. However, he was able to conclude that she had minor trauma to the left shoulder. He prescribed a sling to immobilize the area to allow it to heal faster. He concluded that this patient had a shoulder injury that seemed aggravated by certain movements. Dr. Vaughn also stated Wingfield did not complain about her back. He opined that if she had an injury he would expect there to 4 be symptoms of that injury. He said if a disk is herniated it would show simultaneous pain. He also stated that pain in the shoulder area or the neck area is not indicative of a back injury. Six weeks after this examination, Wingfield was seen by another CCF Primary Care doctor, Dr. Ann J. Hritz. In her deposition, Dr. Hritz testified that Wingfield complained of upper back pain and shoulder pain on her first visit. Dr. Hritz also testified Wingfield's first complaint to her of low back pain was on January 11, 1991. Dr. Hritz questioned whether the low back pain was a result of her fall and ordered a Magnetic Resonance Imaging ( MRI ). According to Dr. Hritz, the MRI revealed that there was a minimal bulging asymmetric, *** and that this was associated with minimal displacement of the left S-1 nerve root, but that there was no direct impingement or pinching of the nerve, and that there was there was no evidence of a complete herniation. (Dr. Hritz Depo. Tr. 29) Dr. Hritz stated there was no causal relationship between her fall and the bulging found in the MRI. Dr. Hritz also opined that the fall did not cause dislocation to Wingfield's left shoulder. Wingfield continued to complain about her back and sought further medical attention in February 1991 from Dr. Edgar Jackson at University Hospital. Dr. Jackson testified that Wingfield complained of pains in her left leg, lower back, and shoulder. She indicated to him that she had fallen at work and was experiencing pain. Dr. Jackson did not review CCF records but did refer her to a neurosurgeon, Dr. Russell Hardy. Both doctors concluded that 5 Wingfield suffered a herniated disk at L5-S1 and opined that it was connected to the fall. Dr. Jackson gave no opinion as to the dislocated shoulder but did opine that the shoulder was tender. All of the medical experts testified that if a herniated disk was caused by Wingfield's fall, there would have been symptoms immediately after or within twenty-four to forty-eight hours after the fall. At the close of Wingfield's case, CCF moved for directed verdict based upon the lack of any medical evidence supporting a dislocated shoulder. The court denied the motion. The motion was renewed at the end of all evidence and was again denied. The jury determined that Wingfield was entitled to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund for her dislocated shoulder but denied her other claims. The substance of Wingfield's assignment of error is that the jury lost its way. She argues that the greater weight of the credible evidence offered at trial supported her position. We disagree. In considering whether the judgment of the trier of fact is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is important that the court of appeals be guided by a presumption that the findings of the jury are correct. Seasons Coal Co. Inc. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77. To be entitled to workers' compensation benefits, an employee must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he sustained an injury during the course of his employment, that the injury arose from his employment, and that, as 6 a direct and proximate result of that injury, he was harmed or disabled. Cook v. Mayfield (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 200, 204. Wingfield fails to connect her back injury to her fall. While Wingfield began experiencing back pain after she fell, there is no evidence supporting her claim that the fall caused her back injury. The medical experts testified there would have been immediate symptoms if the fall had caused her back injury. The evidence showed that immediately after her fall, Wingfield only complained about her shoulder. Dr. Vaughn examined her the day after she fell. He testified that Wingfield did not demonstrate any symptoms related to a low back injury. According to the evidence, Wingfield did not seek medical treatment for low back pain until three months later in January 1991. The verdict is not manifestly contrary to the natural and reasonable inferences of the evidence. Thus, Wingfield's assigned error is overruled. Because of the argument of manifest weight of the evidence by CCF, we will address its assigned errors out of numerical sequence and discuss assignment of error three first. In this assignment of error, CCF argues the manifest weight of evidence supports its contention that Wingfield did not dislocate her shoulder at the time of the fall. Thus, CCF argues the jury lost its way. We also disagree with CCF. The jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence that Wingfield dislocated her shoulder at the time of the fall. She testified that she heard a loud pop at the time of the fall. Dr. 7 Vaughn who treated her after the fall stated she showed discomfort when he rotated her left arm behind her back. He stated he prescribed a sling to aid in healing the shoulder and that there was a definite aggravation of the shoulder. He also admitted that parts of his notes were lost. He also never stated that her shoulder was not dislocated. The jury should be given great deference in these cases and only if it appears that the jury has lost its way should a review court substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Weight of the evidence concerns the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387. In Thompkins, the court cautioned that this discretionarypower to grant a new trial on manifest weight should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the decision of the jury. Id. Here, we cannot say that it does. Consequently, CCF's third assigned error is overruled. In its first assignment of error, CCF claims the trial court erred when it denied CCF's motion for direct verdict. CCF argues no medical evidence was offered to establish the existence of a shoulder dislocation. CCF further argues that the only evidence addressing a dislocated shoulder was Dr. Hritz's testimony. A motion for a directed verdict is to be granted only if, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, reasonable minds could come to 8 but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted, and that conclusion is adverse to that party. Douglas v. Ohio Bureau Of Workers' Compensation (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 454, 463. If the reviewing court finds that the non-movant has presented evidence on all elements essential to establish her cause of action, the reviewing court must affirm the trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict. Pierce v. Trimble (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 690, 695, citing Strother v. Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 285. Wingfield presented evidence showing she fell and injured her shoulder while in the course of her employment. Wingfield testified that when she fell, she heard a loud pop and was unable to move. Dr. Vaughn, who examined her the day after her accident, prescribed a sling to immobilize her shoulder to prevent aggravation. We conclude that when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Wingfield, reasonable minds could conclude Wingfield suffered from a shoulder dislocation. CCF's first assignment of error is overruled. In its second assignment of error, CCF argues the trial court erred by improperly instructing the jury on a shoulder dislocation injury. CCF claims that since no evidence of shoulder dislocation was presented, the trial court should not have instructed the jury on such injury. Instructions to a jury should be a `plain, distinct and unambiguous statement of the law as applicable to the case made before the jury by the proof adduced.' Hess v. United Ins. Co. Of America(1991), 74 Ohio App.3d 667, 675 (quoting Marshall v. Gibson 9 (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 10, 12). In considering whether the particular portions of the trial court's instructions were improper, the instructions must be viewed in their entirety. Id. citing Schadev. Carnegie Body Co. (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 210. The jury instructions are as follows: *** The defendant admits that [Wingfield] was an employee, at the time and that she was in the course and scope of her employment at the time she fell. *** The defendant, Cleveland Clinic Foundation admits the plaintiff suffered an injury, minor trauma to the shoulder. The defendant denies that the plaintiff sustained any further or any other injury. *** The plaintiff claims therefore that an incident, the fall that occurred at the Cleveland Clinic on October 12th, 1990, resulted in injuries to her consisting of a herniated disk at L-5 S-1. *** Whether it is herniated or whether its going to be bulging that's for the jury to determine, and a left shoulder dislocation. *** Now, she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she developed either the bulging disk at L-5 S-1 or the herniated disk at L-5 S-1 and/or the left shoulder dislocation. And that they were, or any of the three of them were directly and proximately caused by the incident on October 12th, 1990 when she fell. *** [Tr. 227-230 (emphasis added)] Our review of the jury instructions reveals no error by the trial court. The trial court plainly stated that it was up to the jury to decide whether Wingfield sustained the injuries she claimed. We conclude the jury instruction was not misleading or prejudicial to CCF. See Hess, citing Laverick v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., Inc. (1988), 43 Ohio App.3d 201. The second assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. 10 herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. DYKE, J., and PATTON, J., CONCUR. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the .