COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71410 RITA A. LEVENSON, ET AL. : ACCELERATED CASE : Plaintiffs-Appellants : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION ORANGE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT : : Defendant-Appellee : PER CURIAM DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: MARCH 20, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. CV-303080 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiffs-Appellants: ZEEV FRIEDMAN (#0019414) RONALD A. APELT (#0046621) Friedman & Hoffman 3 Commerce Park Sq., Ste.720 23200 Chagrin Boulevard Cleveland, OH 44122 For Defendant-Appellee: MARILLYN FAGAN DAMELIO (#0015242) MICHAEL F. CUNNINGHAM (#0063716) 323 Lakeside Ave. West - Suite 410 Cleveland, OH 44113 - 2 - PER CURIAM: Plaintiffs-appellants, Rita and Charles Levenson, ("appel- lants"), appeal an order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Orange City School District ("appellee"). Appellants assign the following error for our review: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT- APPELLEE ORANGE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THAT R.C. 2744.03- (A)(5) DOES NOT CONFER SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE FOR NEGLIGENTLY MAINTAINING A SIDEWALK AT ITS ORANGE HIGH SCHOOL. Finding appellants' appeal to lack merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. I. On February 17, 1995, appellant Rita Levenson ("Mrs. Levenson"), attended her daughter's theatrical performance at Orange High School, a facility owned by appellee. While approaching the high school to attend her daughter's performance, Mrs. Levenson slipped and fell on ice which had accumulated on the walkway located between the high school and the high school parking lot. (Affidavit, Rita Levenson). As a result of her fall, Mrs. Levenson fractured her right ankle. On February 9, 1996, appellants filed a complaint with the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas alleging that appellee negligently failed to maintain the sidewalks and premises at Orange High School, located at 32000 Chagrin Boulevard, Pepper Pike, Ohio. - 3 - Appellants also set forth a claim for loss of consortium. On July 2, 1996, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. Appellants filed their brief in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment on July 29, 1996. On September 16, 1996, the trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment. II. In their sole assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee. In particular, appellants assert that the trial court erred in granting appellee political immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that the availability of statutory immunity raises a purely legal issue which is properly determined by a court prior to trial. Nease v. Medical College Hosp. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 396, 400. On the other hand, once an immunity defense is deemed available as a matter of law, its applicability to the actions of the parties become fact specific, e.g., the negligence issue in this case. In reviewing a lower court's decision granting a motion for summary judgment, appellate courts must follow the standard contained in Civ.R. 56(C) which provides as follows: Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the [evidence], timely filed in the action, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *** A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from such evidence *** and only therefrom, that reasonable minds can come to - 4 - but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, such party being entitled to have the evidence *** construed most strongly in his favor. An appellate court must independently review the record to determine if summary judgment was appropriate. Therefore, an appellate court affords no deference to the trial court's decision while making its own judgment. Schwartz v. Bank One, Portsmouth, N.A. (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 806, 809; Morehead v. Conley (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 409, 411-412. R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) states that: [E]xcept as provided in division (B) of this section, a political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to persons or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental *** function. (Emphasis added.) Thus, R.C. 2744.02(A) grants immunity from tort liability to political subdivisions generally, unless the facts of a claim come under one of five exceptions contained in R.C. 2744.02(B). Only if the facts conform to those provisions is the political subdivision vulnerable to liability. Consequently, when the facts do not fall under any of the exceptions, the court need not proceed further. If the political subdivision is vulnerable to tort liability, then the court will look to R.C. 2744.03 to determine if any of its defenses apply. R.C. 2744.01(F) includes school districts within the definition of a "political subdivision." The definition of - 5 - "governmental function" includes "[t]he regulation of the use of, and the maintenance and repair of, roads, highways, streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, aqueducts, viaducts, and public grounds." R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(e). Therefore, appellee's maintenance of a sidewalk adjacent to, and leading up to Orange High School constitutes the performance of a governmental function by a political subdivision. In the present case, appellants argue that R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) applies to this case. R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) provides: (4) Political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property that is caused by the negligence of their employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental function ***. Appellant's argument focuses mainly on appellee's duty and responsibility for keeping sidewalks adjacent to the Orange High School free from the natural accumulation of ice and snow. In particular, Mrs. Levenson, in her affidavit attached to her brief in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment, stated that her fall on the walkway was caused by an accumulation of ice and snow on a depression which she asserts was in the walkway. It is well-settled that there is no general duty upon an occupier of premises to protect a business invitee against dangers which are known to such invitee or are so obvious and apparent to such invitee that he may reasonably be expected to discover them and protect himself against them." Sidle v. Humphrey (1968), 13 - 6 - Ohio St.2d 45, syllabus. "The dangers from natural accumulations of ice and snow are ordinarily so obvious and apparent that an occupier of [the] premises may reasonably expect that a business invitee on his premises will discover those dangers and protect himself against them. Id., syllabus at two. Therefore, an owner and occupier has no duty to remove natural accumulation of ice and snow from private walks and steps on the premises. Id., syllabus at three. In the case sub judice, we find that appellants failed to show that an issue of fact existed regarding whether the alleged depression in the walkway caused Mrs. Levenson to fall. Rather, Mrs. Levenson, in her affidavit, stated that she fell on ice which had accumulated on the walkway. Thus, appellee owed Mrs. Levenson no duty to remove the ice which had accumulated from the walkway. Since the facts of this case, seen in a light most favorable to appellants, do not fall within any of the exceptions to the general grant of sovereign immunity found in R.C. 2744.02, we need not decide whether the defense in R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) applies. Though the trial court granted summary judgment on that basis, this court affirms for different reasons. "An appellate court must affirm a trial court's judgment if upon review any valid grounds are found to support it." Miller v. Wadsworth City Schools (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 278, 282; See also Joyce v. General Motors Corp. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 93, 96. We therefore hold that the trial court properly found appellee to be immune from liability under - 7 - R.C. Chapter 2744, albeit for different reasons. Accordingly, appellants' appeal is overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 8 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, CHIEF JUSTICE ANN DYKE, JUDGE LEO M. SPELLACY, JUDGE N.B. This is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(B) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .