COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NOS. 71321, 71322 & 71323 STATE OF OHIO, : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION REGINALD WARNSLEY, : : Defendant-Appellant : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : MAY 15, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Criminal appeals from : Common Pleas Court : Case Nos. CR-315927, : CR-316351, and CR-319093 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: Michael A. Sullivan Assistant County Prosecutor The Justice Center - 8th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For defendant-appellant: Reno J. Oradini, Jr. 5454 State Road Parma, Ohio 44134 -2- NAHRA, J.: Appellant, Reginald Warnsley appeals his convictions after trial for aggravated robbery, R.C. 2911.01, and aggravated burglary, R.C. 2911.11 in Case No. CR-316351, and for robbery, R.C. 1 2911.02, in Case No. CR-315927. Appellant was sentenced to five to twenty-five years incarceration in Case No. CR-316351 on each count and to three to fifteen years incarceration in Case No. CR- 315927, all sentences to be served concurrently. At trial, the state called five witnesses: Adelaide Carter, the victim of burglary and robbery in her apartment; Esther Flosse, the victim of a purse-snatching; Cleveland Police Officer Von Crossland; Cleveland Police Officer Michael Simon; and Cleveland Police Detective Maurice Hamilton. Adelaide Carter, age 97, testified that at about 6:40 AM on September 16, 1994, appellant knocked on her apartment door, identified himself as Reggie, pushed her to the floor, ran into her bedroom, removed a purse from a chair, and discarded it on the davenport as he ran out. She also testified that she had known appellant for over two years, had hired him in the past to clean windows, and that she recognized his voice. Esther Flosse, age 86, testified that at about 8:30 AM on September 16, 1994, she was walking on W. 116th St. and Clifton Boulevard on the way to her bank. She said she was approached by a 1 Appellant does not appeal his conviction in Case No. CR- 319093 for a violation of R.C. 2913.03, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. -3- man whom she thought was going to ask for directions, but that the man hit her, grabbed her purse, and then jumped into a blue car. She said that she then went into a nearby grocery store and asked for help. She also testified that she was able to identify the man who grabbed her purse later that day from photographs she viewed at the police station. Officer Crossland testified that on September 16, 1994, he saw a man running on Clifton Boulevard who then jumped into a blue car. Officer Crossland said that he was told by an RTA employee that the man had just snatched a woman's purse. He went in search of the car and found it about two and one-half minutes later. He approached the car on foot when it was stopped at a traffic signal and saw the driver and appellant thumbing through a pocketbook. After he showed his badge, the driver sped away through the light. Officer Crossland then pursued the vehicle, radioed for assistance, 2 and stated that appellant and Carlton Taylor were arrested. Officer Simon testified that he was present when appellant was arrested and that appellant stated that he knew he was "in trouble because of what Carlton had done." Detective Hamilton testified that in the course of his investigation of the incident, he 2 In Case No. 315927, appellant was also indicted for a violation of R.C. 2921.331, failure to comply with order or signal of a police officer. The charge was dismissed by the court at the close of evidence. -4- ascertained that appellant was the record owner of the car 3 appellant and Carlton Taylor were arrested in. At the close of the state's case, appellant moved the court for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29. The court denied the motion. Appellant presented three witnesses on his behalf: Carlton Taylor; Ruby Dunn, appellant's grandmother; and himself. Carlton Taylor testified that he drove appellant to the west side in appellant's car, that appellant asked him to park by a bank, and that appellant snatched a woman's purse. Taylor stated that he pleaded guilty to a robbery charge for his involvement in the purse snatching. He also testified that he did not spend the previous night in appellant's apartment. Ruby Dunn, who lives in the same apartment building as Adelaide Carter and appellant, testified that on the morning of the burglary, appellant stayed in her apartment the previous night. She also testified that Carlton Taylor had stopped by her apartment that morning. Appellant testified that he did not commit the burglary in Adelaide Carter's apartment and that Carlton Taylor planned and carried out the purse snatching without his knowledge or consent. He admitted that he threw Flosse's purse and its contents out of his car in order to get rid of the evidence of the purse snatching. 3 In Case No. 319093, appellant was originally charged with a violation of R.C. 2913.51, receiving stolen property motor vehicle. -5- I. Appellant's first assignment of error reads: I. THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL PURSUANT TO CRIM. R. 29 BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT. Crim.R. 29 provides that the court "shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses." When an appellate court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, that court is bound to examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find all elements of the crimes charged to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, syllabus paragraph 2. In Case No. 316351, appellant was convicted of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. R.C. 2911.11, burglary, provided that: (A) No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in an occupied structure, as defined in section 2909.01 of the Revised Code, or in a separately secured or separately occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit therein any theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or any felony, when any of the following apply: (1) The offender inflicts, or attempts or threatens to inflict physical harm to another; *** R.C. 2911.01, aggravated robbery, provided that: (A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised -6- Code, or in fleeing immediately after such attempt or offense, shall do either of the following: *** (2) Inflict, or attempt to inflict serious physical harm on another. In this case, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed these crimes by entering Adelaide Carter's apartment, pushing her to the floor and removing a purse from her bedroom. The eyewitness identification of appellant by a person who has known him for over two years, when believed, is sufficient. R.C. 2911.02, robbery, provided that: (A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after such attempt or offense, shall use or threaten the immediate use of force against another. In Case No. 315927, a rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant participated in the robbery of Esther Flosse. Appellant was in the car when Taylor snatched Flosse's purse and knocked her to the street. He assisted Taylor in searching through the purse and wallet and threw the purse and its contents out of the car to avoid having evidence of the crime in his car. For these reasons, appellant's first assignment of error is not well taken. II. Appellant's second assignment of error reads: II. APPELLANT'S CONVICTIONS ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. -7- A claim that a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence requires the appellate court to examine the evidence critically by weighing the evidence and inferences thereof and determining "whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered." State v. Mann (1993), 93 Ohio App.3d 301, 310, 638 N.E.2d 585, 590, discretionary appeal not allowed, 70 Ohio St.3d 1412, 637 N.E.2d 9 (quoting State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio St.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720.) In its review, the court should consider whether the evidence is credible, contradicted, reliable, certain, or logical and whether a witness was impeached and the extent of a witness's interest in testifying. State v. Mattison (1985), 23 Ohio App.3d 10, 490 N.E.2d 926, syllabus. In his defense in Case No. 316351, appellant offered his own testimony and that of his grandmother. Appellant's grandmother could not recall the timing of events on the morning of the burglary of Adelaide Carter's apartment, nor the events that occurred later that day. The trier of fact could conclude that appellant did not provide a reliable alibi. Additionally, the evidence indicates that appellant is suffering from an illness which impedes his physical abilities. However, it is still credible to infer that appellant could push a door open and knock a 97 year old woman to the floor in an attempt to burglarize her home. -8- In his defense to rebut the state's prosecution in Case No. 315927, appellant offered his accomplice's testimony and his own. His accomplice testified that appellant was the actual purse snatcher, in contradiction to appellant's testimony. Obviously, both men's testimony is self-serving. The trier of fact could rely on the testimony of Officer Crossland to determine that appellant participated in Taylor's robbery. For these reasons, we find that appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant's second assignment of error is not well taken. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in Case Nos. 315927 and 316351. -9- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PORTER, P.J., and DYKE, J., CONCUR. JOSEPH J. NAHRA JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .