COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71201 CLEVELAND POLICE PATROLMEN'S : ASSOCIATION : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION CITY OF CLEVELAND : : Defendant-appellant : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : JUNE 19, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. 299,840 JUDGMENT : ENTRY OF LOWER COURT : VACATED AND FINDING OF : ARBITRATOR REINSTATED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: PATRICK A. D'ANGELO Attorney at Law Marshall & D'Angelo 113 St. Clair Avenue, #440 Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1214 For defendant-appellant: SHARON SOBOL JORDAN Director of Law CLAUDETTE WALCOTT, Assistant Room 106 - City Hall 601 Lakeside Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114 - 2 - PRYATEL, J.: Defendant-appellant City of Cleveland ("City" or "appellant") appeals from the decision of the trial court that granted the Application for Vacation of Arbitration Award filed by the Cleve- land Police Patrolmen's Association ("C.P.P.A." or "appellee") on September 18, 1995. I. Statement of Facts This matter originated from a judicial review of an arbitra- tion award resulting from a four-step grievance procedure as established in Article XXII of the effective Collective Bargaining Agreement between the City of Cleveland and the Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Association. In June, 1994, the 109th Academy Class (through the C.P.P.A.) filed a grievance against the City, stating in pertinent part that errors had occurred in the paychecks of the trainees and members of the recently-graduated class that violated Article XXVI of the labor contract between C.P.P.A. and the City. The grievance claimed that "these officers should have been paid at the rate of Patrol Officer IV after the completion of week #16 of their training program as stated in the pertinent contract Article." An arbitration was conducted on June 12, 1995. - 3 - Paragraph 53 of the Agreement states: Trainees. Trainees may be hired by the City under a special expedited training program not to exceed a sixteen (16) week period at a rate of eight dollars and fifty cents ($8.50) per hour. Upon completion of the training course said trainees shall attain the rank of Patrol Officer IV for a thirty six (36) week period. Trainees shall receive all benefits provided for in the Contract from date of hire. After completion of the fifty-two (52) weeks provided for in this paragraph, progression through other ranks shall continue at one (1) year intervals in accordance with past practice. The City adduced evidence on the police officer training classes and the rates of pay and classifications of trainees and officers. Post-hearing briefs were filed. The opinion and award denying the C.P.P.A.'s grievance was issued on September 18, 1995. The C.P.P.A. filed an application to vacate the arbitration award in common pleas court on December 11, 1995. On March 22, 1996, the City submitted an application for an order confirming the arbitration award and opposing the C.P.P.A. application to vacate. On August 7, 1996, the trial court, without opinion, granted the C.P.P.A.'s application for vacation of the arbitration award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10(D) and remanded the grievance to the American Arbitration Association. II. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in vacating the award of the arbitrator under R.C. 2711.10(D), which limits a judicial review of arbitrators to a claim that an arbitrator - 4 - exceeded his authority or so imperfectly executed it that a mutu- al, final and definite award upon the subject matter was not made. Specifically, appellant contends that the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the contract and that, as a result, the arbitra- tor did not exceed his authority under R.C. 2711.10(D), leaving no basis for the lower court's vacation of the arbitrator's decision. Appellee also asserts that the lower court's decision is not a final, appealable order because of its remand to arbitration. Alternatively, appellee contends that if we find the decision to be a final, appealable order, then the arbitrator both exceeded his authority and failed to make a final and definite award on the subject matter submitted for review. A. Preliminarily, appellee argues that the matter before us is not a final, appealable order; hence, the appeal must be dis- 1 missed. Appellee's argument is without merit. Where only one claim is presented and that claim is fully resolved, then a final, appealable order exists for consideration. Cleveland Police 1 Appellee's reliance on Stewart v. Midwestern Indem. Co. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 124 is misplaced. In Stewart, the plaintiff alleged that the arbitrator ruled on her claim for damages but failed to address her husband's separate claim for consortium. The trial court vacated the award and ordered the parties to re- arbitrate the issues. On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, that court stated that the decision of the arbitrator was incomplete and, hence, not a final appealable order. This is hardly a comparable situation. - 5 - Patrolmen's Association v. City of Cleveland (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 248, 254-255. Accordingly, we find that the arbitrator resolved the sole issue presented to him; hence, the trial court's decision to vacate the award was both final and appealable despite the court's remand to the American Arbitration Association. B. The City of Cleveland timely appeals and raises one assign- ment of error: BECAUSE THE ARBITRATOR'S DECISION CLEARLY DRAWS ITS ESSENCE FROM THE CONTRACT, THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE BASIS FOR VACATING THE ARBITRATOR'S AWARD UNDER O.R.C. 2711.10(D). In this appeal, we are called upon to determine whether the record before us supports the conclusion of the court below that the arbitrator's decision was required to be vacated pursuant to the statutory mandate of R.C. 2711.10(D); that is, the arbitrator either exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual final and definite award upon the subject matter was not made. The Ohio Supreme Court has placed certain restrictions on a reviewing court's authority to vacate an arbitrator's award pursu- ant to R.C. 2711.10(D) because the integrity and purpose of the arbitration system of dispute resolution would be seriously under- mined in the absence of such restrictions. Findlay City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Findlay Edn. Assn. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 129, 131. Given the presumed validity of an arbitrator's award, a - 6 - reviewing court's inquiry into whether an arbitrator exceeded his authority within the meaning of R.C. 2711.10(D) is limited. Id. The reviewing court must look to whether the arbitrator's award "draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement and is not unlawful, arbitrary or capricious." Id. If the award is determined to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, then the reviewing court's inquiry, for purposes of vacating an arbitrator's award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10(D), is at an end. Id.; Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Assn. v. Cleveland (1990), 70 Ohio App.3d 157. R.C. 2711.10 states in pertinent part that: *** the court of common pleas shall make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration if: * * * (D) The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. Whether the trainees should have been paid at the Patrol Officer IV rate for the weeks beyond the sixteen weeks provided in the Agreement was the issue before the arbitrator. Through three witnesses, the City presented evidence that the State of Ohio adopted mandatory police training, which the police academy was required to follow. Lt. Bratz, a twenty-two-year veteran of the Cleveland Police Department, is currently the Officer In Charge of the Cleveland - 7 - Police Training Academy where he has been in charge of the Train- ing Section of the Police Academy for eleven years. He testified that he was responsible for the preparation of the curriculum of the training course for each academy class from the 101st to the 112th. The state-mandated number of hours impacts the hours and weeks of training received by police recruits; in addition, Cleveland provides training in non-mandatory areas identified as Departmental Topics. The academy classes for which he prepared the curricula were based upon a normal training period, not a special, 2 expedited training program. A state examination of police officers was initiated on January 1, 1989. Prior to that, the program necessitated two hundred eighty hours of police training. In 1991, Ohio increased the number of mandatory training hours to four hundred fifty. At the time of the training of the 109th Academy Class, Ohio required the recruits to obtain five hundred sixty-seven hours of police training. Commander Regetz, a fifteen-year veteran of the Police Department and Commander of the Bureau of Human Resources, stated that in 1981, he participated in the only expedited training pro- gram of which he was aware, which lasted only seven and one-half weeks because more police were needed on the streets. Commander Regetz testified that he was responsible for departmental notices, including those relating to the Police Academy Training Programs. 2Described in the record (which was unrebutted) as "a short- ened and abbreviated program." - 8 - Such notices included the dates on which the recruits would start and finish the academy programs and were directed to all police department units, as well as available to all employees. Finally, James Martin, a twenty-five-year veteran of the City Department of Public Safety, testified that he was responsible for the classification and payroll adjustments of the recruits. For twenty-five years, the same standard had applied: the records were adjusted to reflect the Patrol Officer IV status only after the completion of the training academy. Both Lt. Bratz and Commander Regetz revealed that union officials attended the graduation of the Police Academy Training Programs over the years, where the number of hours of training was announced. In support of its case, the C.P.P.A. presented testimony of its President, Robert Beck, who stated that (1) all of the train- ing responsibility was left to the police department, (2) the union had not filed grievances on the length of prior Police Academy classes even though each class since the 101st Academy Class had exceeded sixteen weeks, (3) the union had not negotiated the Police Academy training issues with the City during its bargaining proceedings since before the 1989 negotiations, (4) he routinely received departmental notices indicating the names of the cadets in the academy training classes and the dates and hours of the academy training classes, and (5) both he and John Kincaid attended the - 9 - graduation ceremonies for the classes from the 101st to the 108th Academy Class. From the testimony adduced at the hearing and the exhibits presented, the arbitrator concluded that Paragraph 53 of Article XXVI of the Agreement referred to a "special expedited training class" that was separate and apart from the normal training pro- gram, as constituted for the 109th Class. The award further stated that the "department never intended to pay and the union never intended to negotiate a rate for the trainees equal to Patrol Officer IV." It was apparent that the State of Ohio, the City of Cleve- land and the C.P.P.A. shared a common concern (in coping with the rising tide of crime): that the cadets must be given a thorough training to improve their skills and abilities to confront arson- ists, drug addicts, car thieves and, now, domestic disturbances, etc. To that end, a Collective Bargaining Agreement was entered into by the City and the C.P.P.A. Paragraph 53 of the Agreement, of pertinent importance, pro- vides: Trainees may be hired by the City under a special expedited training program not to exceed a sixteen (16) week period at a rate of eight dollars and fifty cents ($8.50) per hour. Upon completion of the training course said trainees shall attain the rank of Patrol Officer IV for a thirty six (36) week period. Trainees shall receive all benefits provided for in the Contract from date of hire. After completion of the fifty-two (52) weeks provided - 10 - for in this paragraph, progression through other ranks shall continue at one (1) year intervals in accordance with past practice. We note that the trainees "may" be hired by the City (permis- sive), not "shall" be hired by the City (compulsory), "under a special expedited training program," described in the record (and not rebutted) as a "shortened and abbreviated program." Since the City was not required to accept the permissive plan of a "shortened and abbreviated program," the City disregarded that approach as insufficient and inadequate and supplanted it with the Police Training Academy that mandates the enrollment of all trainees in all classes in its comprehensive training schedule. In the Academy, all trainees must (1) attend all sessions, (2) complete all courses mandated by the State and City, and (3) pass a comprehensive examination before becoming a Patrol Officer IV. Thus, the Academy program is not "shortened and abbreviated" as countenanced in the Agreement; hence, it (the Academy) better met the expectations for a thorough, comprehensive approach to improve the skills of the cadets. When agreeing to submit their disputes to final and binding arbitration, the parties bargained for the arbitrator's interpre- 3 tation of the contract. See Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. 3 The function of the court is very limited when parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to an arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining whether seeking arbitration is making a claim that, on its face, is governed by the contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract interpretation for the arbitrator. United Steel Workers of America v. American Mfg. Co. (1960), 363 U.S. 564, 568. - 11 - XXII. The arbitrator's interpretation must prevail regardless of whether his interpretation was the most reasonable under the circumstances. Hillsboro v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 174, 177-178. "An arbitrator is within his powers if the award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." See Findlay, supra. "We determine that an award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement when we find a rational nexus between the agreement and the award." Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation v. Mahoning Cty. Cmr. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 80. The arbitrator found that Paragraph 53 of the Agreement referred to "special expedited training" and not to the standard training program that the 109th Class attended; hence, Paragraph 53 did not govern the training schedule and the pay scale for those cadets. We have reviewed all the evidence, as well as these undisput- ed facts: (1) In 1981-82, several hundred officers were training in only a seven-and-one-half- week program "to get them out onto the streets." (2) All of the training responsibilities were left to the police department (per President Beck). (3) Since 1989, the training program for the 101st to the 109th Classes has been sev- enteen, eighteen and nineteen weeks in length--an increase in time that the union had not opposed. - 12 - (4) Since 1989, trainees have been paid $8.50 throughout the entirety of the training program. (5) The training program has increased in length because the State of Ohio has increased its mandated curriculum from two hundred eighty hours to five hundred sixty-seven hours. (6) In 1989, Ohio mandated that the trainees pass a state test. (7) The union negotiated labor contracts in both 1992 and 1993 without objecting either to the length of the training or the rate of compensation. Finally, we are mindful that Union President Robert Beck admitted that cadet training is a management prerogative and that the Union had never previously "grieved" or negotiated Academy training issues. Taking all these factors into consideration, we find that: (1) The award of the arbitrator drew its essence from the contract. (2) There was a rational nexus between the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the award. (3) The arbitrator did not exceed his power or so imperfectly execute it that a mutual final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. R.C. 2711.10(D). Thus, we sustain the sole assignment of error that there was no legitimate basis for vacating the arbitrator's award. R.C. 2711.10(D). - 13 - Accordingly, we vacate the finding of the lower court and reinstate the finding of the arbitrator in his denial of the grievance. - 14 - It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee its costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DAVID T. MATIA, P.J. and DIANE KARPINSKI, J. CONCUR JUDGE *AUGUST PRYATEL *SITTING BY ASSIGNMENT: August Pryatel, retired Judge of Eighth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Supreme Court of Ohio. N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E), unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .