COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA No. 71178 STATE OF OHIO : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-appellee : : AND vs. : : OPINION CALVIN JONES : : Defendant-appellant : : : SEPTEMBER 25, 1997 DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OF DECISION : : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS : Criminal appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CR-330017 : JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For defendant-appellant: For plaintiff-appellee: JOHN B. GIBBONS, ESQ. STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, ESQ. 2000 Standard Building Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 1370 Ontario Street CHRISTOPHER L. FREY, ESQ. Cleveland, OH 44113 Assistant County Prosecutor Justice Center, 8th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113 PATTON, J. A jury found defendant Calvin Jones guilty of one count of trafficking cocaine in an amount exceeding one hundred times the 2 bulk amount, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(9). In this direct appeal, he complains of (1) the admission of unduly prejudicial statements, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence, and (3) the weight of the evidence. We find no error and affirm. Defendant's arrest on trafficking charges arose from a joint effort between local law enforcement agencies and the city of Los Angeles Police Department. A Los Angeles police detective assigned to drug surveillance duty with a package delivery service noticed a package with a return address showing the sender lived in Inglewood, an area with high drug activity. The package carried a Cleveland mailing address, and this aroused the detective's suspicions because he knew that Cleveland is a target city for drugs shipped from Los Angeles. Further investigation revealed a phony return address on the package, so the detective called in a narcotic detection dog. The dog alerted the police to the presence of drugs inside the package. The detective obtained a search warrant and opened the package. He found a small stereo unit with four bricks, each containing one kilogram of cocaine hidden inside the stereo. The detective contacted a city of Beachwood police officer who began coordinating a controlled delivery of the package to the Cleveland address. The Los Angeles detective repacked the drugs and sent them to Cleveland police officers. Area officers unpacked the package, secured its contents and placed a small wire thread across the top of the package. The wire thread sent a constant 3 electronic signal which, upon being broken, would signal the officers that the package had been opened. Officers established positions near the address while a Drug Enforcement Agency investigator posing as a package delivery person delivered the package. The package listed the recipient as James Johnson. Because the package was too heavy to hold, the investi- gator placed the package on the ground, making sure that the ground covered the name of the addressee. A child answered the door and called defendant. Defendant signed for the package by signing as James Johnson. The officers waited for over an hour without any signal that the package had been opened. Defendant then left the house and began to drive away. Police officers intercepted defendant and arrested him for violation of the drug law. After being apprised of his rights, an officer asked defendant if he wished to talk. Defendant stated, the dope in the box doesn't belong to me. He told the officer he had been paid $200 to accept the package and page the actual recipients, two Jamaican drug dealers. The police searched defendant's house and found several plastic bags containing cocaine residue, scales, and other drug paraphernalia, all of which tested positive for the presence of cocaine. I The first assignment of error complains that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting one of the officers to testify to the statements defendant made shortly after his arrest. 4 Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion by admitting these statements because their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value. Defendant does expressly point to the offending statements, other than to say they were statements made after he had been brought back into the house. We presume the offending statements related to the following testimony: *** we began our discussion about, you got the package here. Who else are you working with? At that time, he informed me that the package was to be delivered there. I says, well, what were you supposed to do when you get the package? I was supposed to beep this number. I said, okay. Who is supposed to come. I said, how do you know two Jamaicans are involved and they were in a brown car outside? They saw the bust go down, he says. They are not going to come. They know I have been busted already ***. These statements were prejudicial any admission to complicity in a scheme to traffick cocaine worth nearly $500,000 in street value would tend to show criminal culpability. In order to have the evidence excluded, however, defendant had to show that the probative value of the testimony had been substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to him. See Evid.R. 403(A); State v. Allen (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 633. Defendant argues the officer failed to set forth the substance of this conversation in his report. We reject this argument because the record indicates defendant had access to the statements involved, thus any prejudice would not have been unfair. See State v. Clark (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 389, 418-419. The state's 5 response to defendant's request for discovery indicated that defendant made the following oral statement: DEFENDANT stated he was to receive two hun- dred dollars ($200.00) to accept the package, a male by the name of James Johnson was men- tioned. A male was to pick up the package. The DEFENDANT stated he was unaware of the contents of the package. This response to discovery did not differ in any material respects from the testimony given by the police officer, perhaps other than to mention the nationality of the persons who allegedly were to retrieve the package from defendant. The officer's trial testimony corresponded to the state's response to defendant's discovery to such a degree that defendant cannot show unfair prejudice; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony. The first assignment of error is overruled. II The second assignment of error complains that the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion for acquittal filed pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A). Defendant maintains the state failed to prove all the elements of drug possession, arguing the cocaine's mere presence in his house cannot suffice to establish that he knowingly possessed the cocaine. The syllabus to State v. Bridgeman (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 261, states: Pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), a court shall not order an entry of judgment of acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each 6 material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As a reviewing court, we examine the evidence in a light most favorable to the state to determine if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of an offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If so, we must find no error in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal. Id.; State v. Wolfe (1988), 51 Ohio App.3d 215, 216. R.C. 2925.03(A)(9) states that no person shall knowingly possess a controlled substance in an amount equal to or exceeding one hundred times the bulk amount. Knowingly is defined in R.C. 2901.22(B) as acting when a person *** is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist. Possession is defined in R.C. 2925.01(L) as having control over a thing or substance but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found. The trial court did not err by refusing to grant defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the state, permitted the jury to infer both defendant's knowledge that the package contained cocaine and his possession over the package. The state proved the element of possession by showing that defendant accepted delivery of the package by signing someone 7 else's name and safekeeping the package. The DEA investigator testified that when he delivered the package he purposefully placed the package on the ground so that the mailing address would be obscured. Even though defendant could not see the name of the addressee, he nonetheless signed the name James Johnson. We have found that signing another's name when accepting delivery of a package may constitute proof of possession sufficient to satisfy that element of trafficking. See State v. Smith (June 15, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67524, unreported. Likewise, the state produced sufficient evidence to satisfy the element that defendant knowingly took possession of the cocaine. Defendant's remarks that he had been paid $200 to accept the package created the inference that he knew the package might contain contraband. We addressed a very similar argument in State v. Laudato (Mar. 28, 1991), Cuyahoga App. No. 58211, unreported, where Laudato accepted delivery of a package sent by courier from the city of Los Angeles claiming he thought the package contained nut samples that he was to hold for a friend. We rejected Laudato's argument that he did not knowingly possess the contra- band, finding the circumstances such that the jury could infer knowledge under the circumstances. Moreover, the evidence that defendant possessed drug parapher- nalia, including scales and crack pipes, created the inference that he had been involved in drug trafficking. In United States v. Martin(C.A.6, 1994), 25 F.3d 293, the Sixth Circuit held that drug paraphernalia found in Martin's room can clearly be viewed as 8 indicative of an intent to distribute. Id. at 297. We likewise find the discovery of drug scales, pipes, plastic vials and plastic bags constituted evidence that established defendant's knowledge of the contents of the package. The second assignment of error is overruled. III The third assignment of error complains that the jury's verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant merely restates the argument made in the previous assignment of error. Having reviewed the record in its entirety, we cannot say that the jury clearly lost its way in reaching its verdict. State v. Dehass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230. The third assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. 9 It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DYKE, P.J. O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR. JUDGE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .