COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71175 ANDRZEJ S. OSIATYNSKI : : Plaintiff-Appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION CAROL SCHWARTZ : : Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: APRIL 3, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. CV-290034 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiffs-Appellants: CHARLES GRUENSPAN (#0009852), 900 Three Commerce Park Square 23200 Chagrin Boulevard Cleveland, Ohio 44122 For Defendant-Appellee: HARVEY KUGELMAN (#0022625) 800 Standard Building 1370 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 - 2 - SPELLACY, J: Plaintiffs-appellants, Andrzej S. Osiatynski and Charles Gruenspan ("appellants"), appeal the trial court's granting of an award of attorney fees to defendant-appellee, Carol Schwartz ("appellee"), pursuant to Civ.R. 11. Appellants assign the following errors for our review: I. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT- APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES. II. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF- APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. III. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF- APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLEE AND COUNSEL. IV. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISQUALIFY ITSELF FROM THIS CASE. Finding appellants' appeal to lack merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. I. In May 1995, appellant Andrzej S. Osiatynski ("Mr. Osiatynski") and appellee were estranged spouses involved in domestic relations litigation in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. On May 25, 1995, Mr. Osiatynski filed an eight count complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, alleging abuse of process, malicious prosecution, slander, invasion of privacy, trespass, conversion, tortious interference - business, and tortious interference - parent/child relationship. - 3 - On September 15, 1995, Mr. Osiatynski filed notice of interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for production of documents. On October 27, 1995, appellee filed notice of interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production of documents. Mr. Osiatynski responded to appellee's interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for production of documents on January 10, 1996. On January 26, 1996, Mr. Osiatynski's counsel, appellant Charles Gruenspan filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. The trial court granted Mr. Gruenspan's motion on April 24, 1996. Prior to granting Mr. Gruenspan's motion to withdraw as counsel, the trial court stated that on April 22, 1996, a hearing would be conducted on the following issues: 1) Whether Plaintiff's complaint constitutes a violation of Rule 11 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure; 2) Whether the filing and prosecution of Plaintiff's action, and Plaintiff's subsequent course of conduct in litigation, constitutes frivolous conduct pursuant to Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure Section 2323.51; 3) Whether Defendant is entitled to recover her attorney fees and costs as a result of the actions of Plaintiff and his counsel; 4) Whether Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. (Judgment Entry, April 15, 1995). On April 22, 1996, the trial court conducted a hearing on the issues stated supra. During this hearing, the trial court concluded that appellants' conduct in answering only three of - 4 - appellee's twenty-one requested interrogatories was in violation of Civ.R. 11. (Tr. 34). Following the hearing, appellee filed a motion for attorney fees on April 24, 1996. On April 29, 1996, appellants filed a motion for relief from judgment and for sanctions pursuant to Civil Rule 11 and ORC Section 2323.51. On July 26, 1996, appellants filed a voluntary notice of dismissal. On July 29, 1996, the trial court granted appellee's motion for attorney fees in the amount of five hundred eighty-seven dollars and fifty cents ($587.50) and denied appellants' motions for relief from judgment and for sanctions. (Judgment Entry, July 26, 1996). II. For purposes of this appeal, appellants' first and third assignments of error will be addressed together. Appellants contend that the trial court erred both in denying their motion for sanctions against appellee, as well as in ordering them to pay attorney fees in the amount of $587.50. Initially, we will address appellants' contention that the trial court erred in denying their motion for sanctions against appellee and appellee's counsel. The decision to impose sanctions under Civ.R. 11 is left to the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown. Millis Transfer, Inc. v. Z & Z Distrib. Co., (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 628, 631, citing State ex rel. Fant v. Sykes (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 65. An abuse of - 5 - discretion constitutes "more than an error of law or of judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable * * * ." Berk v. Matthews (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 169, citing State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157. Civ.R. 11 provides in pertinent part as follows: Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. * * * The signature of the attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. * * * For willful violation of this rule an attorney or pro se party, upon motion of a party or upon the court's own motion, may be subjected to appropriate action, including an award to the opposing party of expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing any motion under this rule. "The rule places the burden for the truthfulness of the pleadings on the attorney -- where the responsibility belongs. * * * " Staff Note, Civ.R. 11. The purpose of the rule is to deter pleading and motion abuses and to assure the court that a pleading was filed in good faith, with good grounds to support it. Newman v. Al Castrucci Ford Sales, Inc. (1988), 54 Ohio App.3d 166, 169. In the present case, the trial court denied appellants' motion for sanctions against appellee and appellee's counsel without stating its reasons with regard to the merits of the case. We presume the trial court concluded that appellee and her counsel did not employ the type of conduct which constitutes a willful violation of Civ.R. 11. We further find that appellants did not - 6 - present this Court with evidence that appellee or her counsel willfully violated Civ.R. 11. Accordingly, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied appellants' motion for sanctions against appellee and her counsel. Next, we will address appellants' contention that the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for attorney fees. At the April 22, 1996, hearing, the trial court stated: COURT: All right. Well, I'm finding that on my own motion under Rule 11, I'm finding that this response is a violation of Rule 11, and I will award attorney's fees, including the time for this hearing, against Mr. Osiatynski. Subsequently, on July 29, 1996, the trial court granted appellee's motion for attorney's fees and awarded appellee $587.50. A trial court has wide latitude in imposing sanctions against an attorney for violation of Civ.R. 11, including imposition of attorney fees against the attorney, as opposed to his client. Sweeney v. Hunter (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 159, 161, citing Stevens v. Kiraly (1985), 24 Ohio App.3d 211. A sanction may only be found to be improper where it is imposed in the exercise of an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Id. In the case before us, the evidence clearly demonstrates that Mr. Gruenspan answered appellee's interrogatories in bad faith and without good ground to support his answers violating of Civ.R. 11. In particular, the trial court concluded that Mr. Gruenspan violated Civ.R. 11 in answering only three of twenty-one interrogatories submitted by appellee. Although the record does - 7 - not contain the interrogatory answers submitted by appellants, the transcript of the hearing held by the trial court on April 22, 1996, reveals that Mr. Gruenspan, in answering the first three interrogatories, made each specific section of his answers a subpart, therefore concluding that he had in essence answered forty interrogatories instead of three. Thus, the evidence is clear that Mr. Gruenspan's actions in answering appellee's interrogatories clearly violated Civ.R. 11. Based on the above, we find that the trial court did not err in granting appellee attorney fees. Furthermore, as stated supra, we find that the trial court did not err in denying appellants' motion for sanctions. Accordingly, appellants' first and third assignments of error are overruled. III. In their second assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred in overruling their motion for relief from judgment. Civ.R. 60(B) states, in part: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the - 8 - judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from judgment. * * * . "To prevail on [a] motion under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2), or (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken." GTE Automatic Electric v. ARC Industries (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 150. In the case sub judice, on July 29, 1996, the court denied appellants' motion for relief from judgment without stating its reasons. We conclude that the trial court properly denied appellants' motion for relief from judgment in that appellants did not assert, nor did our review of the record reveal that appellants have a meritorious defense as required by GTE. (See, Discussion II, supra). Accordingly, appellants' second assignment of error is overruled. IV. In their fourth assignment of error, appellants assert that the trial court erred in failing to disqualify itself from the case. In particular, appellants contend that the trial court participated in ex parte communications with appellee regarding substantive issues in this case. - 9 - A complete review of the record in the present case does not reveal that the trial court conducted an ex parte hearing with appellee. Thus, in the absence of an adequate record, which is the appellants' responsibility, we are unable to evaluate the merits of appellants' fourth assignment of error and must presume the trial court's actions in refusing to disqualify itself from the case were appropriate. See App.R. 9; Volodkevich v. Volodkevich (1989), 48 Ohio App.3d 313, 314. Accordingly, appellants' fourth assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 10 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants her costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. ANN DYKE, J. and KENNETH A. ROCCO, J. CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY JUDGE N.B. This is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(B) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .