COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71100 SHIRLEY CHARLES : : Plaintiff-Appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU OF : WORKERS' COMPENSATION, ET AL. : : Defendants-Appellees : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION APRIL 3, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas Case No. 290454 JUDGMENT Affirmed DATE OF JOURNALIZATION APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: For Defendants-Appellees Admin., Bureau of Workers' Compensation TERRY JENNRICH, ESQ. and Industrial Commission of Ohio: Geraci & LaPerna Co., L.P.A. 2020 Carnegie Avenue BETTY D. MONTGOMERY Cleveland, Ohio 44115 Attorney General DENNIS REHOR, Assistant JAMES P. MANCINO, Assistant Attorneys General State Office Bldg., 12th Floor 615 West Superior Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1899 For Appellee Cleveland Board of Education: JUANITA BRYANT, ESQ. 1380 East Sixth Street Cleveland, Ohio 44114 - 3 - JAMES M. PORTER, P.J., Plaintiff-appellant Shirley Charles appeals from the judgment of the trial court following a bench trial in which the court held that plaintiff's injuries did not result from a work related condition and she was not entitled to participate in the State Workers' Compensation fund. Plaintiff contends that the trial court's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and contrary to law. We find no error and affirm. Plaintiff was a 54 year old cook employed by the Cleveland Board of Education. She fainted while preparing lunch to serve the elementary school children on September 15, 1994 at about 1:00 p.m. As a result of fainting, she fell to the floor of the school kitchen and suffered a sprain and strain of her cervical spine, strain and sprain of her lumbar spine, sprain and strain of her right hip, head injury, and contusion of right zygoma (cheek bone). Plaintiff claimed there was no ventilation in the third floor kitchen and no windows and that the kitchen was very warm that day. Her co-worker, Peggy Davis, corroborated this. Plaintiff and her physician attributed her fainting spell to excessive heat in the kitchen on that day. After her fainting, plaintiff went to the Cleveland Clinic on September 15, 1994, where she related in her history that, on the day she fainted, she: woke this a-m with symptoms of "cold" runny nose, cough; a fever, symptoms - 4 - -- in work where it was very hot---- felt lightheaded and nauseated---- went outside ---- felt better. Her medical history also indicated that she suffered from arthritis, hypertension, was being treated for bronchitis and, from the records of the Cleveland Clinic, she was taking the following medications: Surfak; Bellergal-S; Tylenol/Codeine #3; Adalat CC; and Motrin. Plaintiff claimed she stopped taking her blood pressure medicine a week before the incident because it made her feel ill. Her CT Scan also showed severe cerebral atrophy (brain shrinkage). She was also morbidly obese. Dr. Kevin Triangle testified via his deposition on behalf of the defendants and opined that plaintiff's injuries were not caused by her employment. After discounting excessive heat as a condition causing the fainting spell, Dr. Triangle stated: *** Procardia or Nifedipine or Adalat, all names for the same medication, have definitely been associated with hypotensive episodes where people basically stand up and fall or they are currently standing and they fall. That drug by itself. On top of that, she was taking a belladonna alkaloid, which has phenobarbital in it, which also can lead to drowsiness and can lead to -- promote this kind of ability to pass out. On top of everything else, she had a respiratory infection and just as everybody knows and everybody has probably experienced in their life, if you have either a piarhemia or a bacterial infection, you can become lightheaded, because basically you have an infection and there tends to be pulling of the blood. - 5 - She had three good reasons for passing out unrelated to the work situation, and the work situation as far as I can tell there's nothing to indicate there was any abnormality which would have contributed to her passing out, so for these reasons it appears with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that her problems are related not to any issue at the workplace, but rather to her preexisting medical problems and the medication she was taking for these problems. (Triangle Depo. at 20-21). In finding for the defendants, the trial court stated: Plaintiff has not shown by the greater weight of the evidence that her injury was the result of an accident or workplace injury brought on by external circumstances arising out of her employment. Plaintiff presented no credible evidence other than her testimony documenting unusually high workplace temperatures or any evidence supporting the theory that the temperature in the building on that day was higher than she had endured in her years of employment as a cook for the Board of Education. Further, the hospital records reflect that the Plaintiff related that she had a near fainting spell that morning before she reported to work. She was on multiple medications and evidenced at least one physical condition apart from claimed workplace heat that might explain fainting equally as well as the Plaintiff's version. (Journal Entry at 1). Plaintiff's two assignments of error will be addressed together as they both relate to the trial court's finding that plaintiff was not eligible to participate in the workers' compensation fund. - 6 - I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT WAS CONTRARY TO LAW. In Stiller v. Leaseway of Ohio, Inc., et al. (Sept. 12, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 70031, unreported at 3, we recently stated the law as follows: Plaintiff needs to establish that his condition was proximately caused by his work- related injury. "Injury," for workers compensation purposes; includes an aggravation of a pre-existing condition as well as a condition directly caused by the work related injury. Schell v. Globe Trucking, Inc. (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 548 N.E.2d 920. Proximate cause must be established by the reasonable probability, not mere possibility of expert medical testimony. Shumaker v. Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 367, 369, 504 N.E.2d 44. Therefore, plaintiff may establish that a causal connection exists by showing that his present medical condition was either an aggravation of a pre-existing condition caused by, or a direct result of, the work related injury. Thus, medical expert testimony regarding the causal connection based on a reasonable medical certainty is admissible if not essential. It is apparent from the record that there was conflicting medical testimony as to the cause of plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff's physician attributed the fainting spell to excessive heat in the kitchen; defendants' expert attributed it to the combination of medications and respiratory condition that was afflicting plaintiff. The credibility of the witnesses and the resolution of conflicting evidence was for the trial court to - 7 - resolve as the finder of fact. As this Court held in Police Patrolmen's Assoc. v. Voinovich (1984), 15 Ohio App.3d 72, 75: The weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses is primarily a function for the trier of the facts. State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231. Thus, in reviewing a bench trial, an appellate court will uphold the trial court's evaluations unless it appears the record is insufficient to support a reasonable person in concluding as the trial judge did. We have reviewed the entire record and do not find the trial court's judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence or contrary to law. Assignments of Error I and II are overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 8 - It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. O'DONNELL, J., and ROCCO, J., CONCUR. JAMES M. PORTER PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement .