COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71084 CITY OF BROOK PARK : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION PAUL E. ZAHN : : Defendant-appellant : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : APRIL 17, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Criminal appeal from : Berea Municipal Court : Case No. 96-TRD-01329-01 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: NEAL M. JAMISON Assistant Law Director 6161 Engle Road Brook Park, Ohio 44142 For defendant-appellant: GEORGE L. NYERGES Attorney at Law 2012 West 25th Street, #803 Cleveland, Ohio 44113-4189 PRYATEL, J.: Defendant-appellant, Paul E. Zahn, appeals the decision of the Berea Municipal Court finding him guilty of operating his vehicle in excess of the posted speed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The record reflects that appellant, a part-time taxicab driver, was returning to Hopkins International Airport in the early morning hours of April 23, 1996, when he was observed driving at a high rate of speed while traveling west on Snow Road by Brook Park Police Officer Mark Cavanaugh. Ptl. Cavanaugh, traveling east on the same road, testified that the radar detection equipment he was operating documented that appellant was traveling at 58 miles per hour on a road with a posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour. He further testified that he calibrated the radar equipment at the beginning of his shift and that the equipment was found to be in proper working order. Of the eighteen years he has been a police officer, Ptl. Cavanaugh has operated radar detection devices for fourteen of those years, having been trained and certified at the State Highway Patrol Academy in Columbus. Appellant was issued a citation for speeding in violation of Section 333.03 of the Brook Park Codified Ordinances, to which he entered a plea of not guilty. At the bench trial held on July 8, - 3 - 1996, he was found guilty and fined $25 plus costs. He timely 1 appeals, asserting three errors for our review. I. Appellant's first and second "assignments of error" are related and state: I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMIT- TING INTO THE RECORD TESTIMONY OF AN UNQUALIFIED POLICE OPERATOR OF A NON- CERTIFIED RADAR UNIT, AFTER TIMELY OBJECTION. II. WHETHER THE PROSECUTOR IN A SPEEDING CASE WHERE RADAR IS USED HAS TO PRODUCE THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE TO THE COURT AFTER TIMELY OBJECTION TO PROVE THAT THE RADAR UNIT AND THE OPERATOR HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED BY THE OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH FOR USE IN A COURT ROOM. Succinctly, appellant challenges the admissibility of Ptl. Cavanaugh's testimony on the basis that the officer was unquali- fied to render an opinion as to whether appellant was speeding because the officer produced no evidence that he, or his radar detection equipment, was certified by the Ohio Department of Health. While the Ohio Department of Health regulates many health- related areas, appellant has not drawn to our attention which 1 Appellant's brief does not contain a statement of the assignments of error as required by App.R. 16(A)(3). Nonetheless, we will treat his statement of the issues as errors for purposes of this appeal. See North Coast Cookies, Inc. v. Sweet Temptations, Inc. (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 342, 344; see, also, Mathis v. Cleveland Public Library (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 168, fn. 2. - 4 - specific regulation governs radar detection equipment or opera- tors. Nor has our independent research been able to identify any such regulation. Consequently, appellant's position on this issue is unsupported. To the contrary, the testimony of a trained police officer who has been involved in numerous traffic arrests is sufficient to sustain a conviction for speeding. State v. Ferrier (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 124, 126-127; Cincinnati v. Dowling (1987), 36 Ohio App.3d 198, 200; see, also, State v. Wilson (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 1, 4. Nor was it incumbent upon the prosecution to introduce documentary evidence that Ptl. Cavanaugh was a certified operator of the radar detection equipment he employed or that the equipment itself was certified. Accordingly, appellant's first and second assignments of error are not well taken. II. Appellant's third "assignment of error" states: WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN THE FINDING OF GUILTY WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED. In this assignment of error, appellant contends that his conviction cannot be sustained by the weight of the evidence. A reviewing court will not reverse a verdict where there is sub- stantial evidence upon which the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that all the elements of an offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d - 5 - 169, syllabus; see, also, State v. Smith (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 284, 289. In determining whether a trial court's decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the following factors are guidelines to be taken into account by the reviewing court: (1) The reviewing court is not required to accept as true the incredible; (2) whether the evidence is uncontradicted; (3) whether a witness was impeached; (4) what was not proved; (5) the certainty of the evidence; (6) the reliability of the evidence; (7) whether a witness' testimony is self- serving; (8) whether the evidence is vague, uncertain, conflicting or fragmentary. State v. Mattison (1985), 23 Ohio App.3d 10, syllabus; State v. Wilson (June 9, 1994), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 64442, 64443, unreport- ed. In making this determination, however, the appellate court must accord deference to the factfinder's conclusions regarding the credibility of the witnesses as the factfinder is in a better position to observe the witnesses' demeanor. State v. DeHass (1969), 10 Ohio St.2d 230. Moreover, the decision to reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight of the evidence is to be exercised with extreme caution and only in the exceptional case - 6 - where the evidence weighs manifestly against conviction. See Wilson, supra. Upon review of the record, we find that any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of speeding were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimony adduced at trial revealed that appellant's speed, as monitored by radar detection equipment and by visual observation, was in excess of the posted speed limit for the area of travel. It, therefore, cannot be said that appellant's conviction for speeding is against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, appellant's third assignment of error is not well taken. The judgment of the Berea Municipal Court is affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Berea Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DAVID T. MATIA, P.J. and ANN DYKE, J. CONCUR JUDGE *AUGUST PRYATEL *SITTING BY ASSIGNMENT: August Pryatel of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Supreme Court of Ohio. N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E), unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .