COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71059 STATE OF OHIO : JOURNAL ENTRY : AND Plaintiff-appellee : OPINION : -vs- : : ANTHONY L. TAYLOR : : Defendant-appellant : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: OCTOBER 9, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR.-318574 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, ESQ. JOHN P. PARKER, ESQ. CUYAHOGA COUNTY PROSECUTOR The Brownhoist Building BY: JOHN R. MITCHELL, ESQ. 4403 St. Clair Avenue ASSISTANT COUNTY PROSECUTOR Cleveland, Ohio 44103 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 2 DYKE, J. Appellant, Anthony Taylor, pled guilty to two counts of involuntary manslaughter. Appellant appeals his conviction on the grounds that he was denied his right to counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm. Appellant retained Harvey Bruner to represent him in this case. The case was set for trial on March 27, 1995. At a pre- trial on March 6, 1995, defendant made a motion for a new attorney. The proceedings during this pretrial are not a part of the record. The court denied defendant's motion. On March 22, 1995, Attorney Bruner filed a motion to withdraw. Bruner stated appellant would not cooperate, appellant felt Bruner was incompetent, and Bruner and appellant had irreconcilable differences. Appellant also did not pay the agreed attorney fee. On March 27, the court received a letter from appellant's wife, requesting a new attorney. Appellant's wife said appellant believed Bruner was not investigating the case and was not providing fair representation. On March 27, Bruner stated on the record that appellant had no confidence in Bruner representing him. The last time Bruner attempted to talk to appellant, appellant refused to speak to him. Bruner resented having to represent appellant, because appellant accused him of not preparing or investigating the case. Bruner interviewed all the witnesses, and was prepared to go to trial. Appellant stated he had fired his lawyer for failure to hire an investigator. 3 The trial court denied counsel's motion to withdraw. The court advised appellant to cooperate with his attorney. The court proceeded to hear the plea agreement. Appellan t allegedly caused the death of two police officers while engaged in a high speed chase with police. The prosecution offered to amend the two counts of involuntary manslaughter, to death caused during a misdemeanor, rather than a felony. The potential sentence for these counts as charged was 10 to 25 years. As amended, the potential sentence was 2 to 10 years. The prosecution would nolle the third count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer. All the charges in case number 318524 would be dropped, including failure to comply with a police order, carrying a concealed weapon, possessing a weapon while under a disability and drug trafficking. The agreed sentence would be four to ten years on each of the two counts of involuntary manslaughter, to be served concurrently. Appellant discussed the plea bargain with Attorney Bruner. Bruner told the court that appellant wished to plead guilty. The court advised appellant of his rights and the consequences of his plea, pursuant to Crim. R. 11(C). Appellant indicated he understood the consequences of his plea, and pled guilty to the two counts of involuntary manslaughter, as amended. Appellant's sole assignment of error states: THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. 4 When a defendant enters a guilty plea, he waives all appealable errors which may have occurred at trial, unless such errors are shown to have precluded the defendant from voluntarily entering into his or her plea, pursuant to the dictates of Crim. R. 11(C). Statev. Kelley (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 127. Appellant does not argue that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. Appellant could argue that he felt he had to plead guilty, because he felt his counsel was incompetent. It is questionable whether appellant could succeed with this argument, because the record indicates he knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty. In any case, the trial court did not err in denying the motions to substitute counsel. The motion to substitute counsel was made three weeks before the trial, and would necessitate a continuance of the trial. The right of a defendant to a continuance upon the withdrawal of counsel is not absolute, and the decision to grant such a continuance rests with the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Dukes (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 263, citing Thurston v. Maxwell (1965), 3 Ohio St.2d 92, 93. The administration of justice must be balanced with the defendant's right to counsel. Id., State v. Edsell (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 337, State v. Marinchek (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 22. This rule applies to substitution of retained counsel, as well as appointed counsel. See State v. Dukes, supra. The court must grant the motion to substitute if (1) the defendant has a substantial complaint concerning his attorney and the judge has no reason to suspect the defendant's bona fides, or 5 (2) the court discovers a justifiable dissatisfaction with defense counsel. State v. Pruitt (1984), 18 Ohio App.3d 50. In this case, the judge suspected the bona fides of defendant's complaint concerning counsel's lack of preparation. The judge determined that appellant was receiving excellent representation. If the record indicates no neglect on the part of counsel and no reason why the present attorney should be discharged, the court need not grant a continuance to replace the defense attorney. See Edsall, supra at 341. The trial court abuses its discretion by denying a motion to substitute when the record showed a complete lack of cooperation by the defendant, such that the attorney could not prepare for trial. Dukes, Pruitt, supra, State v. Bronaugh (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 307. In this case, appellant sufficiently cooperated such that his attorney could prepare for trial. As appellant would receive fair representation, the trial court's interest in the expedient administration of justice outweighed appellant's right to counsel of his choosing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to substitute counsel and the motion to withdraw as counsel. Accordingly, appellant's assignment of error is overruled. The decision of the trial court is affirmed. 6 It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. O'DONNELL, J., AND PATTON, J., CONCUR. ANN DYKE JUDGE N.B.This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App. R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App. R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .