COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 71021 MAUREEN GRAVES : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION MARCO E. GRAVES : : Defendant-appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OF DECISION : MARCH 27, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas, : Domestic Relations Div., Case No. D-237109 JUDGMENT : Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Richard E. Hackert, Esq. Marco E. Graves, Esq. 1030 Euclid Avenue, Suite 605 O'Rourke & Associates Co., Cleveland, Ohio 44115-1504 L.P.A. 981 Keynote Circle, Suite 2 Cleveland, Ohio 44131-18842 Of Counsel: Michael Molnar, Esq. 4168 Rocky River Dr. Cleveland, Ohio 44135 -2- ROCCO, J.: Defendant-appellant Marco E. Graves appeals from a judgment of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. The trial court's order granted the complaint for divorce filed by plaintiff-appellee Maureen Rice-Graves, ordered a distribution of marital and non-marital assets between the parties, and required appellant to pay appellee $714.00 per month for the support of the parties' two minor children. Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate's recommendation as to the amount of his child support obligation, in its rulings on his objections to the magistrate's report, and in its refusal to consider his affidavit attached to his objections. Upon a review of the record, this court finds no error, therefore, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. The parties were married in 1985. Two children were born during the marriage, one in 1989 and one in 1992. The record reflects the parties separated in November of 1994. At that time, appellee filed her complaint for divorce. In June 1995, a hearing was held on appellee's Motion for Support Pendente Lite. The referee (now magistrate) issued her report in August 1995. Therein, she noted the parties had submitted temporary support worksheets and had entered into certain stipulations concerning their incomes and expenses. She then set forth the testimony adduced at the hearing, and eventually determined appellant should pay $461.34 per month per child as support until the date of the final hearing. Since the parties -3- filed no objections to the referee's report, the trial court adopted it in September 1995. In November 1995, appellant filed a motion to modify the child support obligation. In December 1995, on three separate days, a magistrate held a hearing on both appellee's complaint for divorce and appellant's motion to modify. The record reflects these proceedings were recorded, first by a court reporter and then by a reporting service. In February 1996, the magistrate issued a nineteen-page decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law. In her decision, the magistrate indicated in detail the evidence upon which it was based, including the testimony, the exhibits, the shared parenting plan entered into by the parties, and the stipulations of the parties. The magistrate determined appellant was entitled to a modification of the child support obligation. In arriving at this conclusion, the magistrate set forth both appellant's revised annual income (at $28,836) and appellee's revised annual income (at $28,000), stated that appellee should be responsible for the children's medical coverage, computed the annual cost of child care, and determined that under the statutory guidelines, appellee's share of the annual child support obligation was 49% while appellant's was 51%. The magistrate then stated: -4- The parties jointly filed a plan for shared parenting which provides for the children to reside with their father on alternate weekends from Friday at 4:00 P.M. until Monday morning at 8:00 A.M., and also to be with their Father every Tuesday from 4:00 P.M. until Wednesday morning at 8:00 A.M. In addition, Father will have the children on alternating holidays, one week at Christmas and six (6) weeks during the summer. The primary difference between Father's possession time under this plan and what it would be under the Court's Standard Visitation Order is that there is an extra overnight on the weekend visits as well as one overnight in the middle of each week (At the same time, one Friday evening provided by the standard order is eliminated under the parties' plan). The addition of the six overnights each month warrants at most a minor deviation from the child support as calculated according to the schedule to account for the extra meals Defendant will have to provide. The Magistrate finds that Defendant should pay $700.00 per month instead of the $725.65 per month indicated on the worksheet. (Emphasis added.) The magistrate further found appellant owed appellee approximately $5,000 in unpaid child support to date. The magistrate thereafter set forth an extensive review of the evidence presented in order to explain her apportionment of the parties' assets. Finally, she stated her final decision on the issues. In pertinent part, the magistrate granted appellee's complaint for divorce, granted appellant's motion to modify child support, awarded a judgment to appellee for arrearage in support pendente lite, and ordered a property division. The worksheets the magistrate used to compute the parties' respective child support obligations were attached to her report. Both parties filed objections to the magistrate's report. In his objections, appellant requested the trial court to "furnish transcripts of the Temporary Alimony Hearing used by the magistrate in reaching her Decision and of the hearing before the Magistrate." -5- Appellant also attached his affidavit recounting his recollection of certain testimony given at the December 1995 hearing as an "alternative." On May 24, 1996, the trial court issued a judgment entry stating in pertinent part as follows: (1) appellee's objections to the magistrate's report were overruled; (2) appellant's objection to the child support order was overruled; (3) appellant's objection to the magistrate's order allowing appellant a tax exemption for one child only if child support obligations were current was overruled; and, further (4) the remainder of appellant's objections were overruled because they were "either directed to and/or dependent upon factual findings by the Magistrate and *** [appellant] has failed to provide the Court with a transcript of the evidence submitted. The affidavit of [appellant] submitted with the objections cannot be used when a transcript is available." The trial court directed appellee to prepare a judgment entry in accordance with the magistrate's decision as modified. Subsequently, the trial court signed the judgment entry on June 25, 1996. Appellant thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal of the order in this court. Appellant presents three assignments of error for review, the first of which follows. THE MAGISTRATE ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN THE CALCULATION OF THE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT. -6- Appellant argues that in calculating his child support obligation, the magistrate ignored the express provision of R.C. 3l09.04(K) and R.C. 3113.215, substituted local guidelines for the statutory requirements, and failed to adequately consider the facts of this case. Appellant contends, therefore, that under these circumstances, the trial court's adoption of the magistrate's figures constituted an abuse of discretion. This court does not agree. R.C. 3l09.04(K)(6) indicates that when a shared parenting plan is adopted by the court in order to allocate parental rights and responsibilities, each parent is considered to be a "residential parent." R.C. 3113.215, for its part, deals specifically with the allocation of the responsibility of child support between parents in a domestic relations action. The relevant portions of this statute state: (2) In determining the amount of child support to be paid under any child support order, *** * * * (c) The court shall not order an amount of child support that deviates from the amount of child support that would otherwise result from the use of the basic child support schedule and the applicable worksheet in division (E) of this section, through line 24, or in division (F) of this section, through line 23 unless both of the following apply: (i) The court, after considering the factors and criteria set forth in division (B)(3) of this section, determines that the amount calculated pursuant to the basic child support schedule and pursuant to the applicable worksheet in division (E) of this section, through line 24, or in division (F) of this section, -7- through line 23, would be unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child; (ii) The court enters in the journal the amount of child support calculated pursuant to the basic child support schedule and pursuant to the applicable worksheet in division (E) of this section, through line 24, or in division (F) of this section, through line 23, its determination that that amount would be unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child and findings of fact supporting that determination. (3) The court, in accordance with division (B)(1) and (2)(c) of this section, may deviate from the amount of support that otherwise would result from the use of the schedule and the applicable worksheet in division (E) of this section, through line 24, or in division (F) of this section, through line 23, in cases in which the application of the schedule and the applicable worksheet in division (E) of this section, through line 24, or in division (F) of this section, through line 23, would be unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child. In determining whether that amount would be unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child, the court may consider any of the following factors and criteria: * * * (d) Extended times of visitation or extraordinary costs associated with visitation ***. * * * (p) Any other relevant factor. * * * (C) *** If the parents have split parental rights and responsibilities, the child support obligations of the parents shall be offset, and the court shall issue a child support order requiring the parent with the larger child support obligation to pay the net amount pursuant to the child support order. *** It is well-settled that the procedure for computing child support obligations set forth in R.C. 3113.215 is mandatory and must be complied with fully. Marker v. Grimm (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 139; Rock v. Cabral (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 108; McQuinn v. McQuinn -8- (1996), 110 Ohio App.3d 296; Harbeitner v. Harbeitner (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 485. Appellant asserts the provisions of section (B) of the statute conflict with section (C), and urges this court to adopt the construction used by the court in Weddell v. Weddell (June 29, 1994), Montgomery App. No. 14274, unreported, viz., to hold that the magistrate erred in failing to give him an "automatic credit" for the time his children reside with him. There are three problems with appellant's assertion, however. First, R.C. 3109.04(A)(2) states that even when a shared parenting agreement exists, the amount of child support shall be determined in accordance with R.C. 3113.215, which includes its basic schedules and model worksheets. Second, pursuant to R.C. 3113.215(B)(3), the trial court may deviate from the amount of support dictated by the schedule and worksheet, provided the procedure has been followed and provided the relevant factors, which of course would include the time the children reside with each parent, are considered. Thus, analytical gymnastics are not required in order to "reconcile" the different sections of the statutory scheme. Cf. Pauly v. Pauly (Apr. 26, 1996), Lucas App. No. L-95-293, unreported. Third, the record in this case reflects that while the magistrate fully complied with the statutory requirements, she also considered the length of time the children resided with appellant in determining the child support obligation. She set forth the facts which led her to deviate from the guidelines, and she -9- concluded by giving appellant a credit for the time the children spent with him. LaLiberte v. LaLiberte (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 207; see, also, Waldron v. Waldron (Nov. 18, 1992), Wayne App. No. 2729, unreported. A review of the record thus belies appellant's arguments with respect to his first assignment of error, since the record demonstrates the magistrate complied with the statutory provisions, used the local guidelines in the manner in which they expressly state they were intended, i.e., only as guidelines subject to statutory requirements and, finally, considered the facts of the case prior to making her recommendation. Harbeitner v. Harbeitner, supra; cf. Gatliff v. Gatliff (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 391. An award of child support will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Booth v. Booth (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 142; Schultz v. Schultz (1996), 101 Ohio App.3d 715. Moreover, in domestic relations actions, trial courts have broad discretion when fashioning a decree which is equitable based on the facts and circumstances of the case. Eickelberger v. Eickelberger (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 221. The record in this case fails to demonstrate the trial court erred in adopting the magistrate's recommendation concerning the amount of appellant's child support obligation. Therefore, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. Appellant's second and third assignments of error are interrelated and are thus addressed together as follows: -10- II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING ARBITRARILY TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS NOS. 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, AND 14 TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION WHEN THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED OTHER OBJECTIONS WHICH WERE EQUALLY DEPENDENT ON EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THAT MAGISTRATE. III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THOSE PORTIONS OF THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION THAT WERE THE SUBJECT OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS NOS. 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, AND 14. Appellant argues that in ruling on his objections to the magistrate's decision, the trial court decided "to pick and choose upon (sic) an arbitrary basis which Objections to consider and which not to consider." In an apparent contradiction, appellant thus contends both that the trial court had an insufficient evidentiary record upon which to base its rulings and that some of the rulings demonstrate a consideration of evidence before the magistrate. From a review of appellant's arguments with respect to these assignments of error, it seems clear the gravamen of appellant's criticism is that the trial court would not consider the affidavit he attached to his objections. With regard to objections to a magistrate's report, Civ.R. 53(E) provides: (6) Factual findings. *** The court may adopt any finding of fact in the referee's report without further consideration unless the party who objects to that finding supports that objection with a copy of all relevant portions of the transcript from the referee's hearing or an affidavit about evidence submitted to the referee if no transcript is available. *** (Emphasis added.) -11- In this case, the record demonstrates the hearing before the magistrate was recorded and thus available for transcription. Appellant acknowledges that many of his objections "were dependent upon evidence presented to the magistrate." Under these circumstances, it was appellant's burden to provide the trial court with a transcript in their support. Chaney v. East (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 431; 155 N. High Ltd. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 253; Pappenhagen v. Payne (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 176. Appellant, however, requested the trial court to furnish a transcript without explanation of why he was unable to pay for the costs of providing it and without suggesting a method of repaying the court for those costs. Cf. In re Swain (1991), 68 Ohio App.3d 737; Eash v. Eash (1984), 14 Ohio App.3d 298. A review of the record in this case reveals the report of the magistrate contained a detailed recitation of the evidence presented at the hearing and the facts upon which she based all of her conclusions. The trial court clearly had a sufficient basis upon which to base an independent analysis of the issues and to apply appropriate rules of law in reaching its judgment decision. Therefore, the trial court did not err in sustaining some of appellant's objections but overruling others. Harbeitner v. Harbeitner, supra; High v. High (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 424. For the foregoing reasons, appellant's second and third assignments of error are also overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. -12- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant her costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES M. PORTER, P. J., AND TERRENCE O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR JUDGE KENNETH A. ROCCO N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc. App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E), unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A) is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .