COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 70926 IN THE MATTER OF: CADDIE NATH, : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellee : and : OPINION : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : JUNE 12, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Common Pleas Court -- : Juvenile Court Division : Case No. 9014272 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: Lynn Ballard Department of Children and Family Services 3955 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44115 For defendants-appellants: Arvind Nath, Pro Se Paige Nath, Pro Se 12001 Clifton Boulevard Lakewood, Ohio 44107 -2- NAHRA, P.J.: Appellants', Arvind Nath and Paige Nath, parents of Caddie Nath, appeal the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court's decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction over this cause. Caddie Nath, age 10, has lived with her maternal aunt and uncle, Virginia and Christopher Yost, since December, 1993. She was placed in their custody at that time with appellants' consent by order of the Circuit Court for Calvert County Maryland. In 1994, the Yosts petitioned the Maryland court to allow them to move Caddie from its jurisdiction to Boise, Idaho. The Calvert County court approved the petition and continued to exercise jurisdiction. However, after the Yosts moved to Idaho, the Maryland court indicated that another jurisdiction, Ohio, would be a preferable forum to continue the proceedings. In 1996, Arvind Nath twice petitioned the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court for custody of his daughter. Arvind Nath's first petition for custody was dismissed for his failure to prosecute under Civ.R. 41(B)(1). His second petition was dismissed after the magistrate made findings of fact and recommendations which were adopted by Juvenile Court Judge Sikora. Appellants appeal from this May 31, 1996, order, which reads in part: The Magistrate finds that the child has lived in Idaho for at least twelve months and that Idaho is the child's home state. *** The Magistrate finds that the child and her legal custodians live in Idaho where evidence of her present care, protection, training and personal relationships would be available. -3- The Magistrate finds that the Father, in pro se pleadings, alleges that the child has been medically, physically and educationally neglected and has been beaten, humiliated, intimidated and exploited in the legal custodians' home in Idaho. The Magistrate finds that it would be in the child's best interests for the State of Idaho to assume jurisdiction over the child. The Magistrate finds that the state of Idaho has jurisdiction over the child pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act as set forth in Ohio Revised Code 3109.22. The magistrate also recommended that the court decline to exercise its jurisdiction over the case. 1 Appellants have made seven assignments of error . Assignments of error numbers 2, 3, 4, and 7 specifically address the issue of whether the court erred by declining jurisdiction. Ohio adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA"), R.C. 3109.22 et seq., in order to protect the best interests of children through better cooperation with other states to resolve custody issues. See, In Re: Guardianship of Wonderly (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 178, 180, 423 N.E.2d 420, 422; State ex rel. Aycock v. Mowrey (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 347, 349, 544 N.E.2d 657, 660. R.C. 3109.22 allows a court with jurisdiction over parenting determinations to exercise its jurisdiction when certain conditions are met. The conditions listed are broad and allow several states 1 Appellant's assignments of error are listed in the appendix. -4- to assume jurisdiction over the same matters. In this case, three states: Ohio, Idaho, and Maryland, could assert jurisdiction over this custody dispute pursuant to the UCCJA. See, R.C. 3109.22. Because of this, the UCCJA does not mandate that a court exercise its jurisdiction, rather, the exercise of jurisdiction is left to the discretion of the court. R.C. 3109.25 provides in part: (A) A court that has jurisdiction to make an initial or modification decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a parenting determination under the circumstances of the case and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. (B) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the court's own motion or upon motion of a party or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the child. (C) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if it is in the interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it may take into account, but is not limited to, any of the following factors: (1) If another state is or recently was the child's home state; (2) If another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or with the child and one or more of the contestants; (3) If substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available in another state; *** (E) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or may stay the proceedings upon condition that a custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another named state or upon any other conditions that may be just and proper, including the condition that a moving party stipulate his consent and submission to the jurisdiction of the other forum. -5- *** (Emphasis added.) Although the lower court did not explicitly state that it was an inconvenient forum pursuant to R.C. 3109.25, its order implicitly finds this by determining that Idaho is a better forum to continue this proceeding. Appellants make the following arguments concerning the juvenile court's decision to decline jurisdiction: (1) The court erred by not conducting a hearing prior to declining jurisdiction (appellants' assignment of error no. 2); (2) The court erred by not following In Re: Capton (Aug. 9, 1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 58825, unreported (appellants' assignment of error no. 4); (3) Idaho is not a better forum to make a parenting determination as substantial evidence of their parenting skills is available in Ohio (appellants' assignment of error no. 3); (4) The court erred by concluding that simply because Caddie resides in Idaho, it is a better forum when the underlying issue of the natural parents' fitness as parents has not yet been determined (appellants' assignment of error no. 3); and (5) Ohio's decision to decline jurisdiction places an undue hardship upon the appellants (appellants' assignment of error no. 7). As to appellants' contention that the court did not hold a hearing regarding the jurisdictional issue, the record indicates that the magistrate made findings of fact with respect to the jurisdictional issues. We have held that although an evidentiary hearing is preferred in determining jurisdictional issues under the UCCJA, it is not necessary where there is an adequately developed -6- record with which the issues may be decided. Mayor v. Mayor (1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 789, 595 N.E.2d 436. We recognize that in Bowen v. Britton (1993), 84 Ohio App.3d 473, 616 N.E.2d 1217, the Pike County Court of Appeals found it necessary to remand a case for the court to hold a hearing where the court's jurisdiction was challenged. However, the Bowen court also found that the lower court erred by determining that it did not have jurisdiction for the sole reason that another state had issued a custody decree and made a parenting determination under the UCCJA. Moreover, the Bowen court noted that a court is generally not required to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine its jurisdiction but may do so on the pleadings, or upon summary judgment. Bowen, 84 Ohio App.3d at 477-78, 616 N.E.2d at 1220. The record in this case contains facts sufficient for the court to determine whether or not to exercise jurisdiction. Appellants have neither proffered evidence, nor do they indicate in their brief any material outside the record which would tend to contradict the existing record or discredit the lower court's decision. For these reasons, although a formal evidentiary hearing is preferable, see, Mayor, supra, we do not find error on the part of the court below in determining its jurisdiction without conducting a formal hearing. Appellants arguments' that the court erred by finding Idaho to be a better forum relies on the misconception that the parenting determination and the determination of jurisdiction are analyzed in the same manner. However, these are distinct issues to be -7- separately analyzed. See, Heimberger v. Heimberger (Dec. 31, 1986), Cuyahoga App. No. 51407, unreported. The primary focus in determining the best forum to adjudicate custody is to select the forum which is in the best interests of the child. Id. (Citing In Re: Guardianship of Wonderly, supra.) Although in this case the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court could exercise jurisdiction, as was done in In Re Capton, supra, it is not mandated to do so if it finds that it would be in the best interests of Caddie that another court assume jurisdiction. See, R.C. 3109.25. Where a court has discretion to exercise its jurisdiction, a reviewing court will only overturn that court's decision where it is a clear abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State ex rel. Aycock v. Mowrey, 45 Ohio St.3d at 352, 544 N.E.2d at 662; Kirby v. Nakanishi (Dec. 20, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 68671, unreported. An abuse of discretion is more than an error of law or judgment, it implies that the court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (Citations omitted.) In determining that Idaho would be a better forum, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that Idaho would be more convenient because: 1) Idaho is Caddie's home state, R.C. 3109.25(C)(1); 2) Caddie's guardians, with whom she has lived since 1993, have no connections with Ohio and now reside in Idaho, R.C. 3109.25(C)(2); and 3) substantial evidence of Caddie's "present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available" in Idaho, R.C. 3109.25 (C)(3). Because the -8- court could so find, we cannot say that its declination of jurisdiction in this matter was "unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable." Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219, 450 N.E.2d at 1142. Appellants also argue that the court did not adequately consider the hardship on appellants in this matter in travelling to Idaho to prosecute this matter. This issue, although relevant, see, e.g., Squires v. Squires (1983), 12 Ohio App.3d 138, 468 N.E.2d 73, is to be considered together with the other factors set forth in R.C. 3109.25. In considering such other factors as set forth in R.C. 3109.25(C)(1)(2) and (3), we cannot say the court abused its discretion in declining jurisdiction. Accordingly, we find no error in the court's decision to forego jurisdiction in this case and overrule appellants' assignments of error nos. 2, 3, 4, and 7 Appellants' assignments of error numbers 1, 5, and 6 are rendered moot and need not be addressed. See, App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Affirmed. -9- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATTON, J., and ROCCO, J., CONCUR. JOSEPH J. NAHRA PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the clerk per App.R. 22(E). See, also, S.Ct.Prac.R. II, Section 2(A)(1). APPENDIX Appellants' assignments of error read: 1. MAGISTRATE YEOMAN ENGAGED IN EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS. 2. THE LOWER COURT REACHED ITS DECISION WITHOUT HOLDING A HEARING AS REQUIRED BY LAW, F.L. 1664 (SIC), WHEN THE CASE INVOLVES A DECISION THAT WOULD SEPARATE PARENTS FROM THEIR CHILD OR PROLONG SUCH A SEPARATION. 3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY DECLINING JURISDICTION SIMPLY BECAUSE CADDIE RESIDED IN IDAHO RIGHT NOW WHEN THE FOCUS OF INQUIRY IS SUPPOSED TO BE THE NATURAL PARENTS (SIC) FITNESS AS PARENTS AND NOT THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE SUITABILITY OF CADDIE'S CURRENT PLACEMENT. SINCE THE NATURAL PARENTS LIVE IN OHIO, THE ISSUE OF THEIR FITNESS CAN BEST BE ADJUDICATED HERE WHERE MOST OF THE PERTINENT WITNESSES RESIDE. 4. THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY NOT HEEDING THE CONTROLLING PRECEDENT OF ARCHEY V. LAUGHING WHICH FOUND THAT JURISDICTION RESTED PROPERLY IN OHIO ON FACTS VERY SIMILAR TO OUR CASE HERE. 5. THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT THE EARLIER MARYLAND COURT ORDER WAS IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT WHEN MARYLAND IMPROPERLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION IN THE FIRST PLACE. 6. THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY UPHOLDING THE MARYLAND COURT ORDER WHEN NO HARD EVIDENCE OF ABUSE OR NEGLECT WAS PRESENTED AS REQUIRED BY LAW, SEE IN RE: JOSEPH G., 617 A.2D 1086 MD.APP. 1993 AND IN RE: JERTRADE O., 56 MD.APP. 99, WHENEVER A CHILD IS TO BE SEPARATED FROM HER PARENTS. 7. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLINING JURISDICTION AND .