COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NOS. 70892 & 70893 STATE OF OHIO, : : Plaintiff-Appellee : JOURNAL ENTRY : and vs. : OPINION : MARK REDWINE, : : Defendant-Appellant : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : OCTOBER 9, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: : Criminal appeals from : Common Pleas Court : Case Nos. CR-316921 and : CR-314751 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: Kestra Smith Crutcher George J. Sadd Assistant County Prosecutors The Justice Center - 8th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For defendant-appellant: Mark Redwine, Pro Se #303-692 N.C.C.I. P.O. Box 1812 Marion, Ohio 43301-1812 2 NAHRA, P.J.: Appellant, Mark Redwine brings this delayed appeal following his entry of no contest and guilty pleas in Case Nos. 314571 and 316921, respectively. In Case No. 314571 appellant entered a plea of no contest on each of the three counts of the indictment, drug trafficking, drug abuse and possession of criminal tools. The court sentenced him to a term of 2 to 10 years incarceration on count one, 1 to 1/ years incarceration on count two and 2 to 3 years on count three, the sentences to be served concurrently. In Case No. 316921 appellant entered a plea of guilty on each of the three counts of the indictment as amended by the court as follows: drug abuse, possession of criminal tools and having a weapon under disability. The court sentenced him to a term of 1/ indefinite years of incarceration on count one as amended, a term of 1/ indefinite years incarceration on count two, and a term of 3 years definite incarceration on count three as amended. The court ordered that these sentences be served concurrently to each other and with the sentence imposed in Case No. 314571. Mandatory fines were waived by the court upon appellant's showing of indigence. I. Appellant's assigned appellate counsel filed a brief in which he determined that there were no non-frivolous issues for appellate review in accordance with Anders v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 738. Appellant filed a brief pro se in which he asserts three assignments of error. Appellant's first assignment of error reads: 3 THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, MARK REDWINE WAS DEPRIVED OF THE REASONABLE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT ALL STAGES OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. BEING DENIED A GUARANTEED RIGHT UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I S10 AND S16, OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. (SIC). Appellant argues that because he was not afforded the right to counsel of his choice and was assigned counsel at his preliminary hearing in Case No. 316921, his subsequent conviction in that case is rendered invalid. In support of his argument, appellant attached the transcript of the preliminary hearing in Cleveland Municipal Court on October 14, 1994. At that hearing, the following dialogue took place between the court, Assistant County Prosecutor Glickman, and Mr. Otis Ray: Mr. Ray: He wants to hire a lawyer. Judge, he said, he hasn't had time to hire a lawyer. He really wants to hire one, Judge. Mr. Glickman: I have a detective that's been sitting here. THE COURT: We are going to go forward. We have a police officer. It is set for a preliminary examination, sir. Once this preliminary examination if the Court binds you over, you should have time to hire an attorney. And also, you have the opportunity from the exam to have a preliminary hearing transcript and for purposes of the hearing, the Court is going to ask Mr. Otis Ray to represent you. Mr. Ray is one of the finest attorneys in the building. Let's go forward. Appellant argues that because he was not afforded an opportunity to retain counsel of his choice, his later entry of a plea of guilty in Case No. 316921 must be reversed. Specifically, appellant claims that he was prejudiced because the testimony of the arresting officer used to establish probable cause at the preliminary hearing contained two discrepancies . Appellant first 4 complains that the arresting officer stated that the license number of appellant's car was VWN858 where appellant states that the actual license number of his car was VWN898. Appellant next complains that the arresting officer testified that the police made a controlled purchase of cocaine from him on September 29, 1994 and that he was not later indicted for that crime. We note first that appellant was released on a surety bond on October 8, 1994 and the preliminary examination was scheduled for October 14, 1994. Additionally, even had appellant been able to retain his own attorney for the purposes of the preliminary hearing, no attorney could discredit the testimony of the arresting officer regarding future events; i.e., whether he would subsequently be indicted. Accordingly, appellant's only claim of prejudice is that the arresting officer did not state the correct license registration number of his car at the preliminary examination. At the preliminary examination, the court determines whether there is probable cause to support the complaint filed. In this case, the court was to determine whether there was probable cause to support a charge of drug abuse. The slight error in the license number was not significant in making this determination. R.C. 2925.11 states in part that: (A) No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance. *** Cocaine is a controlled substance. 5 The testimony of the arresting officer was that appellant admitted to the ownership of razors which had cocaine residue on them. A finding that probable cause existed for the charge of drug abuse was proper. The discrepancies in the arresting officer's testimony were not determinative of the issue decided at the hearing. Finally, a defendant's plea waives his right to a claimed deprivation of rights at the preliminary hearing stage. State v. Spates (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 269. II. Appellant's second and third assignments of error are related and will be addressed concurrently. Appellant's second assignment of error reads: THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, MARK REDWINE WAS DEPRIVED OF THE REASONABLE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL AND WAS DENIED A GUARANTEED RIGHT UNDER THE SIXTH A[N]D FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I SECTIONS 10 AND 16, OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. (SIC). Appellant's third assignment of error reads: TRIAL COURT ERRED TO ACCEPT MR. REDWINE'S PLEA OF GUILTY, WHERE MR. REDWINE WAS NOT ALLOWED TO RETAIN COUNSEL OF HIS CHOICE AT A CRITICAL STAGE THEREFORE WAS THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF HIS CHOICE AT ALL STAGES OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, (PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION), IN VIOLATION OF CRIM.R. 11. TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED TO ACCEPT MR. REDWINE'S PLEA OF GUILTY WHICH WAS INDUCED AND WAS NOT VOLUNTARILY, INTELLIGENTLY AND KNOWINGLY MADE TO RENDER SUCH CONVICTION VOID PURSUANT TO CRIM.R. 11 AND VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I SECTIONS 10 AND 16, OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. (SIC.) Appellant argues that his counsel was ineffective and that he was coerced into entering a plea. Specifically, appellant claims 6 that his counsel failed to inform him of affirmative defenses, did not inform him of his constitutional rights, did not inform him of his right to appeal, and did not advise him of the consequences of the effect of his plea. Because of these failures on the part of counsel, together with the claimed coercion, appellant argues that the court erred by accepting his pleas in Case Nos. 314571 and 316921. After review of the transcript provided upon appeal, we find that the trial court did not err in accepting appellant's pleas of no contest and guilty in these cases. The court strictly complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C) in accepting appellant's pleas. For this reason, appellant's third assignment of error is overruled. Appellant's second assignment of error, that he was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of counsel is not well taken. Appellant's specific alleged errors that he was not informed of his constitutional rights and that counsel did not tell him the consequences of his pleas are rendered moot in this case as the court fully informed appellant of his rights and of the consequences of his pleas. Additionally, failure to inform of the right to appeal after a plea does not invalidate the plea. Appellant has brought an appeal. Appellant's remaining claim of ineffective assistance of counsel consists of the alleged facts that he was coerced by his attorney into entering his pleas and he was not apprised of affirmative defenses. Prior to the court's acceptance of 7 appellant's pleas in these cases, the following dialogue took place: THE COURT: Mr. Redwine, other than those things that have been stated in open court and on the record, has anyone, specifically,promised you anything or has anyone in any way threatened you in order to get you to give your guilty plea this afternoon? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. The record indicates that appellant was not coerced. Appellant claims that had his counsel advised him of affirmative defenses, he would not have entered a plea of guilty. See, Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52; State v. Xie (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 521 (Defendant must show that but for counsel's errors the defendant would not have entered a guilty plea.) Appellant has not demonstrated that the failure of counsel to inform him of affirmative defenses in this case would have affected the outcome of these proceedings, especially in light of the fact that appellant has failed to identify any affirmative defenses to the charges in this case which are supported by the record. For these reasons, appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. 8 It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. O'DONNELL, J., and ROCCO, J., CONCUR. JOSEPH J. NAHRA PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R.22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .