COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 70854 STATE OF OHIO : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellee : : and -vs- : : OPINION LAWRENCE MURAWSKI : : Defendant-Appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT JULY 17, 1997 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. CR-329660 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: ____________________________ APPEARANCE: For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: STEPHANIE TUBBS-JONES, ESQ. JAMES A. JENKINS, ESQ. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 2000 Standard Building TIMOTHY G. DOBECK, ESQ. 1370 Ontario Street Assistant County Prosecutor Cleveland, Ohio 44113 8th Floor justice Center LAWRENCE MURAWSKI, Pro Se 1200 Ontario Street 323260 (L-412), S.O.C.I. Cleveland, Ohio 44113 P. O. Box 45669 Lucasville, Ohio 45669-0001 - 2 - PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J.: Lawrence Murawski, defendant-appellant, appeals a decision by the trial court convicting him of murder, aggravated murder with mass murder and felony murder specifications, and aggravated burglary with specifications and sentencing him accordingly. Murawski assigns eight errors for our review.1 Having reviewed the record of the proceedings and the legal arguments of the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The apposite facts follow. On March 3, 1995, Lawrence Murawski was having drinks with his friend, Scott Schrader, at the home Murawski shared with his girlfriend, Donna Yates, and her three children. The two men began discussing an accusation made by Yates, that she had been raped by David Manley. The alleged rape occurred more than a year earlier. As Murawski was talking, he became angry. The two men went outside onto Murawski's front porch and saw Manley returning to his home across the street. Murawski grabbed a six-inch knife and announced that he wanted to go confront Manley about the rape. The two men went across the street to the home of Deloris Naples, where Manley was staying. They knocked on the door and Naples answered it. Schrader told Naples they wanted to talk to Manley and Naples allowed them inside. Once inside the home, they confronted Manley in the living room and asked him about the rape of Yates. Murawski said you know you did it. An argument ensued and Schrader punched Manley twice in the head, knocking him to the 1 See Appendix. - 3 - floor. After Manley fell, Murawski stabbed him several times in the back. Naples begin to yell stop and attempted to help Manley, but was grabbed by Schrader who applied a choke hold and exerted pressure on her neck. He twisted her to the left, then heard a snap as her neck broke. Naples became limp in his grasp. Murawski cut her throat and Schrader released his grip. Naples fell to the floor and Murawski stabbed her in the back. Schrader and Murawski removed the victims' clothes and took them across the street to Murawski's house. Murawski placed the clothes into a garbage bag. Schrader and Murawski changed their bloody clothes. Thereafter, Murawski went to sleep in his bedroom while Schrader went to sleep on the floor of the front room of the home. The victims' bodies were discovered the following day. On March 4, 1995, police interviewed Murawski about the crime. Murawski told police that, at approximately 5:30 am, he was taking out his trash and saw a white male in a white car leave the scene saying, I got him or I got even with him. On March 14, 1995, police spoke to Schrader who denied knowing anything about the crime. Police spoke to Murawski again on May 23, 1995. Murawski said he was working in the attic, went to take out his trash, when he heard a white male say I got that SOB. On June 6, 1995, Schrader was arrested. The following day, he was questioned by police. He became nervous, started shaking and crying, and told police he had something to talk to the officers about. Schrader gave police a statement admitting to his role in - 4 - the crimes and implicating Murawski. Murawski and Schrader were both charged with aggravated murder, felony murder, and burglary in connection with the deaths of Naples and Manley. In exchange for his testimony against Murawski, Schrader was allowed to plead guilty to murder and was promised a sentence of fifteen years to life. At trial, the Cuyahoga County Coroner stated the victims died from stab wounds. He confirmed that Naples' neck was broken and corroborated Schrader's account of the murders. Joseph Noch, a friend of Murawski's, testified that in the summer of 1994, he heard an argument between Murawski and Manley. Manley later told Noch the argument was about a $15.00 debt he owed Murawski. Manley told Noch he was worried about how to pay Murawski back. Mary Murphy, who lived next door to the victims, testified that she heard Murawski threaten Manley several times and that Manley sometimes hid from Murawski. Dennis Chunat, Manley's boyfriend, testified that Murawski and Manley were not getting along and that Murawski had accused Manley of stealing a six-inch knife from him. According to Chunat, Murawski said I'm going to get that m***** f*****. Chunat also heard Murawski say That m***** f***** tried to rape Donna [Yates]. I'm going to get him for that. Scott Schrader testified that he and Murawski went to the house to confront Manley about the rape. Schrader admitted his role in the killings, but said it was Murawski who fatally stabbed Manley and Naples. The jury found Murawski not guilty of aggravated murder in - 5 - counts one and two but convicted him of the lesser included offense of murder on both counts. Murawski was also found guilty of two counts of aggravated murder (felony murder) and one count of burglary. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of fifteen years to life on each murder count, thirty years to life on each of the aggravated murder (felony murder) counts, and fifteen to twenty- five years for the burglary. This appeal followed. In his first assignment of error, Murawski argues the trial court erred in denying his request for a continuance to prepare for a voir dire examination of Scott Schrader. Murawski argues that, because a psychiatric report on Schrader was not produced until two days before trial, he needed additional time to properly prepare for questioning Schrader. A ruling on a motion for continuance will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Crebs (1987), 42 Ohio App.3d 50, 51. Murawski argues he was unfairly surprised by the psychiatric report in which Schrader denied knowing anything about the crime. However, the prosecution stated they turned the report over to defense counsel as soon as they received it. The trial court conducted a voir dire examination of Schrader, and Murawski's trial counsel was able to thoroughly question Schrader about the statements he had made during the psychiatric examina- tion. Under the circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Murawski's motion for continuance. Murawski's first assignment of error is overruled. In his second assignment of error, Murawski argues the trial - 6 - court abused its discretion by refusing trial counsel's request to re-visit the crime scene for a second jury view after Murawski and his trial counsel failed to appear for the first jury view. The record reveals that, on the date of the jury view, Murawski's trial counsel did not appear at the designated location outside the Justice Center so he could accompany the jurors to the crime scene. Representatives from the police department and the prosecutor's office waited for several minutes but left in order to timely arrive at the crime scene. Murawski's trial counsel argued he was confused about where to meet the officers and consequently did not see them. The decision to allow a jury view lies within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Richey (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 367. A trial court may permit more than one view of a crime scene, however, a decision refusing to allow a second view will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Watson (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 1, 11. A view of a crime scene is neither evidence nor a crucial stage of the proceedings mandating the defendant's presence. See State v. Smith (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 177, 180. The prosecutor told the trial court that Murawski's trial counsel was not at the location where the parties agreed to meet before going to the crime scene. He said they waited there five to ten minutes before proceeding to the crime scene. Once they arrived at the scene, they waited an additional ten to fifteen minutes for trial counsel to arrive. When he did not appear, they - 7 - went forward with the jury view. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel's request for another jury view. Trial counsel's failure to attend the jury view was the direct result of his own tardiness. Besides he knew where the jury's view was and could have easily arrived without the escort of the police. Murawski's second assignment of error is overruled. In his third assignment of error, Murawski argues photographs of Naples' transected spinal cord were gruesome and cumulative and should have been excluded by the trial court. The admission of photographs is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Eley (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 174, 182. In this case, the Coroner testified that Naples' neck was fractured and that the fracture caused her spinal cord to be crushed. The challenged photographs were properly admitted as illustrative of this testimony. He also stated that Naples would have been paralyzed immediately upon suffering the neck fracture. Schrader testified that Murawski stabbed Naples after her neck was broken. Evidence that Naples was already incapacitated when she was stabbed is probative evidence on the issue of whether that Murawski acted with intent to kill Naples when he stabbed her in the back. Under the circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not erred in admitting the challenged photographs. Murawski's third assignment of error is overruled. In his fourth assignment of error, Murawski argues the prosecutor erroneously allowed testimony from Mary Murphy and Dennis Chunat about threats Murawski made against Manley; about - 8 - Murawski's emotional state before the murders; and about conflicting statements made by Donna Yates. Under R.C. 2945.59, the state may properly introduce evidence of any acts of the defendant that tend to show his motive or intent, whether they are contemporaneous with or prior to the act in question. Evidence that Murawski repeatedly threatened Manley was clearly relevant to show a motive for the crime. The evidence was also properly admitted under Evid.R. 404(B) which allows for the introduction of evidence of other acts for purposes such as motive, plan, or absence of mistake or accident. Chunat's testimony that Murawski became angry and upset when talking about Manley's alleged rape of Yates was also properly admitted as evidence of Murawski's motive for committing the crimes. See also Evid.R. 803(3); State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 421. Murawski also argues the prosecutor improperly asked Chunat if he was aware that Donna Yates gave conflicting statements to police investigating the crime. A review of the transcript reveals the prosecutor withdrew the question after an objection and before the witness answered it. (Tr. 981-983.) However, Murawski argues the question amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree. In order to prove prosecutorial misconduct, Murawski must show that the prosecutor's remarks were improper and that they prejudicially affected his substantial rights. State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14. Murawski makes no argument that the question was prejudicial to him, only that the question was improper. Accordingly, he failed to establish his claim of - 9 - prosecutorial misconduct.Murawski's fourth assignment of error is overruled. In his fifth and sixth assignments of error, Murawski argues the trial court erroneously denied his motion for acquittal and that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. A motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) must be denied if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bridgeman (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 261 at syllabus. R.C. 2903.01 defines murder as purposely causing the death of another. R.C. 2903.01(B) defines aggravated murder as purposely causing the death of another while committing or fleeing after committing kidnaping, rape, arson, burglary, robbery or escape. R.C. 2911.11 defines aggravated burglary as trespassing by force, stealth, or deception in an occupied structure for the purpose of committing any theft offense or any felony. When evaluating the weight of the evidence, the appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175. Weight of the evidence concerns the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence offered in a trial to support one side of the issue rather than the other. State v. - 10 - Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387. The state presented testimony from Scott Schrader that, on the night of the crime, Murawski angrily announced his intention to confront Manley about the alleged rape of his girlfriend. Murawski picked up a six-inch knife and took it to Naples' house where Manley was staying. Schrader observed Murawski stab Naples and Manley. Manley was stabbed multiple times in the chest and back. Naples was stabbed in the back with such force that the knife contacted her chest plate. The Coroner testified that Naples and Manley died as a result of the stab wounds. After the killings, Murawski removed the victims' clothing and disposed of it in his household trash. Several witnesses testified that Murawski had threatened Manley in the months before the crime. We conclude the evidence presented by the state was such that reasonable minds could differ as to whether each element of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We also find the jury did not lose its way in resolving the conflicts in the evidence. Murawski's fifth and sixth assignments of error are overruled. In his seventh assignment of error, Murawski argues he was denied a fair trial due to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Murawski had to show that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that the errors by counsel deprived him of a fair trial. State v. Ballew (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 244, 255; Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687. However, in meeting his burden, Murawski must overcome a strong presumption that counsel's conduct - 11 - falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 256; Strickland at 689. In addition, counsel is presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Id. At 690. [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchalleng- eable. Id. In this case, we find no indication that trial counsel's decision not to produce any defense witnesses was anything other than sound trial strategy. Murawski was advised of his right to testify on his own behalf but declined to do so. (Tr. 1208-1210.) Trial counsel conducted a vigorous defense of the case, challenging the testimony of the witnesses produced by the prosecution. Under the circumstances, we conclude Murawski has not gone forward with enough evidence to show that trial counsel's decisions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Accordingly, Murawski's seventh assignment of error is overruled. In his eighth assignment of error, Murawski argues the trial court was improperly motivated by personal animosity toward Murawski and his trial counsel when it imposed the maximum consecutive sentence upon him. However, the trial court had the statutory authority to impose the challenged sentence. Generally, a statutorily authorized sentence is not an abuse of discretion. State v. Rittenhour (June 28, 1996), Crawford App. No. 3-95-27 [citing State v. Cassidy (1984), 21 Ohio App.3d 100, 102.] - 12 - Murawski's sentence was within the statutory guidelines. We also note that the court conducted an extensive mitigation hearing including the testimony of nine witnesses on Murawski's behalf. We find no indication that the trial court based its sentence on any animosity toward Murawski or his trial counsel. Murawski's eighth assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that Appellee recover of Appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. O'DONNELL, J., and SPELLACY, J., CONCUR. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsidera-tion with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the clerk per App.R. 22(E). See, also S.Ct.Prac.R. II, Section 2(A)(1). APPENDIX ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR I. THE TRIAL ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING APPELLANT'S COUNSEL A CONTINUANCE TO PREPARE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE VOIR DIRE OF THE STATE'S LONE EYEWITNESS, SCOTT SCHRADER, AFTER THE WITNESS' PSYCHIATRIC PROBLEMS AND RELATED EXCULPATORY INFORMATION WERE NEWLY DISCOVERED. II. THERE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT IN REFUSING TO PERMIT A RE-VISIT OF THE CRIME SCENE FOR A SECOND JURY VIEW WHEN APPELLANT AND HIS COUNSEL COULD BE PRESENT RENDERING THE INITIAL VISIT HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPELLANT, AND REVERSIBLE ERROR. III. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO PERMIT THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CORONER'S PHOTOGRAPHS DEPICTING THE ENHANCEMENT OF WOUNDS INFLICTED UPON ONE OF THE VICTIMS. IV. IT WAS PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT TO PERMIT QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES MARY MURPHY AND DENNIS JAMES CHUNAT ABOUT THREATS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY APPELLANT AGAINST ONE OF THE VICTIMS. V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL AND BY ALLOWING THE VERDICT TO STAND WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. VI. THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. VII. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE, THUS, DENYING APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING A MAXIMUM CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE BASED ON FACTORS OUTSIDE THE CODIFIED CONSIDERATIONS AND BASED, INSTEAD, ON .