COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 70700 : ACCELERATED DOCKET T GROUP COMMUNICATIONS : : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : and v. : : OPINION CUYAHOGA COMMUNITY COLLEGE, ET AL. : : : PER CURIAM Defendants-Appellees : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: JANUARY 30, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. CV-303112 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: For Defendants-Appellees: C. DOUGLAS THOMAS, pro se LAWRENCE D. POLLACK, ESQ. 4301 Prospect Avenue ULMER & BERNE Cleveland, Ohio 44103 Bond Court Building 1300 East 9th Street, #900 Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1583 ROBERT HART STOTTER, ESQ. STOTTER & KOOSED CO. 75 Public Square, #1200 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 - 2 - PER CURIAM: Plaintiff-appellant T Group Communications ("T Group") appeals from an order of the common pleas court dismissing its action against defendants-appellees, Cuyahoga Community College ("Tri-C") and HKM Marketing ("HKM"), arising out of a failed bid for a public contract. T Group, represented pro se by C. Douglas Thomas, filed a two- count complaint against Tri-C and HKM in the trial court on February 9, 1996. T Group alleged in the first count that Tri-C's agent "maliciously and fraudulently and without notice disqualified and refused to consider" its bid. T Group also alleged that Tri- C's agent "deceived, concealed and misrepresented the status of bids" to award the contract to HKM. The second count alleged that Tri-C "violated state, federal and local statutes, rules and regulations and thereby violated public policy" when granting HKM the disputed contract. T Group alleged that HKM was a necessary party to the litigation. Tri-C and HKM responded by filing motions to dismiss the complaint. Tri-C argued that T Group failed to state a claim for relief and did not state its claim of fraud with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B). Tri-C also argued that T Group lacked standing to file the complaint because its fictitious name was not properly registered with the Ohio Secretary of State. HKM argued lack of standing for the same reason and failure to state a cause - 3 - of action against it. Additionally, HKM averred no contract was awarded to it. T Group did not file a brief in opposition to the motions to dismiss or request an opportunity to amend its complaint. Rather, on April 19, 1996, approximately one month after the deadline for responding to the motions had expired, T Group submitted a motion for extension of time to respond to the motions to dismiss. Notably absent from T Group's belated motion, however, was a completed certificate of service. The trial court subsequently granted the motions to dismiss in orders journalized April 24, 1996. T Group, again represented pro se by Thomas, timely appeals in this accelerated appeal raising one general assignment of error in its four-page brief. T Group, which requested oral argument, did not appear for it. Motion for Extension of Time T Group argues the trial court did not grant its motion for extension of time and improperly dismissed with prejudice its complaint. Contrary to T Group's argument, the trial court was not required to grant its motion for extension of time. Civ.R. 5(D) expressly provides that papers filed with the court "shall not be considered" until proof of service is properly filed. Because T Group never filed a certificate of service concerning the motion, the trial court properly disregarded the motion in its entirety. See Amiri v. Thropp (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 44, 50; In re Jimmy Rose (June 1, 1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 62493, unreported at pp. 4-9. - 4 - We note that denial of the motion would have been warranted even if T Group had properly filed a certificate of service. The record shows that T Group's motion for extension of time was filed after the time for responding to the motions to dismiss had already elapsed. T Group's motion for extension was not filed until April 19, 1996, approximately one month after the seven-day period to 1 respond to the respective motions to dismiss had elapsed. Civ.R. 6(B)(2) provides that the court may extend the time for responding after expiration of the original period only when the failure to timely respond resulted from "excusable neglect." However, T Group's belated motion in this case did not allege, argue or establish "excusable neglect." Rotbart v. Sating (June 21, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67538, unreported at pp. 6-7. A trial court could properly find that a motion for an extension of time does not raise sufficient grounds merely by referring vaguely to "the press of other matters," particularly when the motion is not supported by an affidavit as in this case. Failure to State a Claim T Group's brief on appeal apparently concedes that its complaint failed to state a claim, but argues, for the first time, that the trial court should have given it an opportunity to amend its complaint rather than dismissing the action. It should be noted at the outset, however, that in the trial court T Group did 1 C.P.Loc.R. 11(C) establishes a seven-day deadline for responding to motions. HKM's motion to dismiss was filed on March 8, 1996, and Tri-C's motion to dismiss was filed on March 19, 1996. Therefore, the deadline for T Group to respond to the motions was March 18 and 27, 1996, respectively. - 5 - not oppose the motions to dismiss on the merits or request an opportunity to amend its complaint. The record shows the trial court properly dismissed with prejudice T Group's complaint for failure to state a claim. As noted above, T Group's complaint contained no substantive allegations against HKM. Without such allegations or any allegations to impose liability against HKM, T Group never stated a claim against HKM and established no basis for joining HKM as a party to the litigation. Civ.R. 41(B)(3); Byrd v. Faber (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 56, 60-62. T Group's allegations concerning Tri-C were likewise insufficient to state a claim. It is well established that "[p]rinciples of generous construction of pro se filings do not require courts to conjure up questions never squarely asked or construct full-blown claims from convoluted reasoning." State ex rel. Karmasu v. Tate (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 199, 206. Civ.R. 9(B) expressly requires claims of fraud to be pleaded with specificity. Byrd v. Faber, supra at 61; Korodi v. Minot (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 1, 3-6. T Group's complaint against Tri-C did not satisfy this standard because it did not allege each element of a claim of fraud or the factual circumstances which allegedly constitute the fraud. T Group's remaining vague contention that Tri-C violated "state, federal and local statutes, rules and regulations" by awarding HKM the dispute contract also failed to satisfy the minimal pleading standards of Civ.R. 8(A) and - 6 - was insufficient to state a claim for relief. See State ex rel. Karmasu v. Tate, supra. Accordingly, T Group's sole assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOSEPH J. NAHRA, PRESIDING JUDGE DIANE KARPINSKI, JUDGE LEO M. SPELLACY, JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .