COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 70560 : ALICE MANDATO : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : and -vs- : : OPINION : DEBBIE HORTON : : Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT MARCH 20, 1997 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. 282735 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: For Defendant-Appellee: JAMES D. INGALLS, ESQ. DALE F. PELSOZY, ESQ. 20th Floor Standard Building Bertsch, Millican & Winslow 1370 Ontario Street 1280 W. 3rd Street, 2nd Fl. Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J.: Plaintiff-appellant, Alice Mandato, appeals the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant- appellee, Debbie Horton, and assigns the following error for our review. I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Having reviewed the record and arguments of the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Debbie Horton represented Alice Mandato in her divorce proceeding against her ex-husband, Jack A. Dunkle. The entry of divorce, which was journalized on March 26, 1992, awarded Mandato possession of their car, a 1990 Chevrolet Lumina. Dunkle was required to transfer title of the car to Mandato, and Mandato would hold Dunkle harmless for any obligation on the debt. Mandato was notified by the leasing company that the car payment was past due. Horton subsequently advised Mandato that if she returned the car to the leasing company she would have satisfied her obligations. Dunkle was subsequently sued by Bank One for failure to make the car payments. Dunkle filed a motion to show cause against Mandato in the divorce action. On October 28, 1992, Horton admitted to Mandato that she failed to inform her that she could be held liable for money damages upon returning the car. On December 7, 1992, Mandato dismissed Horton as counsel and retained the law firm of Daniel T. Todt & Associates to represent her on the motion to show cause. On -3- March 15, 1993, and on April 12, 1993, Mandato's new attorney James D. Ingalls, faxed two letters to Horton's insurers indicating that Mandato had a potential legal malpractice claim against Horton. The April 12, 1993 letter included an offer of settlement which was purportedly authorized by Mandato. On May 27, 1993, Lake County Domestic Relations Court dismissed Dunkle's motion to show cause. On December 30, 1994, Mandato filed the instant action for legal malpractice. After discovery, Horton moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitations under R.C. 2305.11(A) had run. The motion was granted and this appeal followed. In her sole assignment of error, Mandato argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the statute of limitations did not begin to run until Mandato received the opinion from the Lake County Domestic Relations Court dismissing Dunkle's motion to show cause. We disagree. The standard of review for an appeal from summary judgment is plenary. This court applies the same test as the trial court, which is set forth in Civ.R. 56, and we evaluate the record according to Civ.R. 56. Civ.R. 56 specifically provides before summary judgment may be granted it must be determined that: "(1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party." -4- Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327. Moreover, it is well settled that the party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1987), 477 U.S. 317, 330; Mitseff v Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 115. Doubts must be resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358-59. Under Civ.R. 56(E) "a nonmovant may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Chaney v. Clark Cty. Agricultural Soc. (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 421, 424. "Under R.C. 2305.11(A), an action for legal malpractice accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when there is a cognizable event whereby the client discovers or should have discovered that his injury was related to his attorney's act or non-act and the client is put on notice of a need to pursue his possible remedies against the attorney, or when the attorney- client relationship for that particular transaction or undertaking terminates, whichever occurs later." Zimmie v. Calfee Halter & Griswold (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 54 at the syllabus. A client need not exhaust all remedies before the statute of limitations begins to run and need not be aware of the full extent of the injury before there is a cognizable event. Instead, it is enough that some "noteworthy" event has taken place and alerts the client that -5- a questionable legal malpractice has taken place. See Zimmie at 58-59. A cognizable event may occur when the client became aware he might be cited for contempt for failing to comply with a divorce settlement. McDade v. Spencer (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 639. It may occur when the client knows of the attorney's error, not when the client was actually sued. See Spencer v. McGill (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 267. It may also occur when the client's new attorney knows that a questionable legal practice may have occurred. Schultz Trust by Sandra Schultz v. Strachan (June 2, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 66550, unreported. In this case, the cognizable event occurred on October 28, 1992 when Horton admitted to Mandato that she failed to properly advise she could be held liable for money damages after returning a leased vehicle. As of that date, Mandato knew of Horton's error. See Spencer v. McGill, supra. Mandato also knew she might be cited for contempt. See McDade v. Spencer, supra. Thus, the cognizable event occurred on October 28, 1992 before Horton was dismissed as her attorney. Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run when Mandato dismissed Horton as her attorney on December 7, 1992. Mandato argues she was not aware of the legal ramifications of Horton's error until the contempt proceeding was dismissed. However, Zimmie is clear on this point. A client need not be aware of the full extent of their injury at the time of the cognizable event. Id. at 58. Assuming, for the sake of argument, "full -6- extent of the injury" was the standard, the cognizable event occurred on April 12, 1993 when Mandato's new attorney sent his second settlement letter to Horton's insurance carrier. See Strachan, supra. The cognizable event would have been more than one year prior to the filing of the malpractice complaint. Nonetheless, this court concludes the cognizable event was on October 24, 1992 when Horton admitted her mistake. Horton's legal services were terminated on December 7, 1992. Therefore, the statute of limitations had run in December of 1993, more than one year before Mandato's complaint was filed. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Horton. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that Appellee recover of Appellant her costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. NAHRA, J., and MCMONAGLE, J., CONCUR. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .