COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 70248 STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION FILMORE LAKE : : Defendant-appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: MAY 29, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-298431 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, ESQ. MICHAEL E. MURMAN, ESQ. CUYAHOGA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 14701 Detroit Avenue BY: DANIEL M. MARGOLIS, ESQ. Suite 555 ASSISTANT COUNTY PROSECUTOR Lakewood, Ohio 44107 The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 - 2 - DYKE, J.: Defendant Filmore Lake appeals from his guilty plea to two counts of trafficking in drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.03. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. On July 8, 1993, defendant and co-defendants Cleopatra Lake and Vivian Fenwick were indicted pursuant to a three count indictment for one count of possession of cocaine (in an amount exceeding the bulk amount but less than three times the bulk amount), one count of preparing cocaine for shipment, and one count of possession of criminal tools. Each of the defendants obtained separate counsel and pleaded not guilty to the charges. There- after, on April 19, 1994, defendants appeared in court with counsel to enter guilty pleas. Pursuant to a plea agreement involving all three co-defendants, defendant pleaded guilty to the two charges of trafficking in drugs, and at the state's request, the charge of possession of criminal tools was nolled. The charge of possession against co-defendant Cleopatra Lake was amended to attempted first degree misdemeanor possession and in exchange for her guilty plea to this charge, the remaining charges against her were nolled. The charge of preparing for shipment against co-defendant Vivian Fenwick was amended to attempted fourth degree felony possession of cocaine and in exchange for her guilty plea to this charge, the remaining charges against her were nolled. In addition, each of the co-defendants agreed to forfeit various items of property which had been seized by the police at the time defendants were arrested. - 3 - In relevant part, the plea proceedings were as follows: THE COURT: I am going to read to Mr. Lake and Ms. Lake something that I have to read here. Are you citizens of the United States of America? THE DEFENDANT: I don't know what I have to -- THE COURT: * * * [I have to advise] the defendants of the possibility of the deportation, exclusion, or denial of naturalization prior to accepting pleas. If you are not a citizen of the United States of America, you are hereby advised that conviction of the offenses to which you are pleading guilty to may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from the admission to the United States or the denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States. * * * MR. ZUCCO: We already discussed it. (Tr. 7-8). The court then engaged in a colloquy with the defendants, before accepting their guilty pleas. The record next reveals that on June 14, 1994, the court received a handwritten letter from defendant in which he asked for leniency and explained that it was his goal to become a computer programmer. On June 16, 1994, the trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of eighteen months actual incarceration, and further ordered that the terms would be served concurrently with defendant's conviction in Case No. 299079, an unrelated matter. In addition, the mandatory fine for the offenses was waived following defendant's certification that he is indigent. On March 25, 1996, this court granted defendant's motion for leave to file a delayed appeal. Defendant now assigns a single error for our review. - 4 - Defendant's assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ACCEPTING APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT ADDRESSING HIM PERSONALLY TO DETERMINE THE PLEA WAS VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CRIM. R. 11. Within this assignment of error, defendant maintains that his guilty plea was not voluntarily made with an understanding of the charge since the trial court did not address him personally as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2). Guilty pleas are governed by Crim.R. 11, which provides in relevant part: (2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and: (a) Determining that he is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that he is not eligible for probation. (b) Informing him of and determining that he understands the effect of his plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court upon acceptance of the plea may proceed with judgment and sentence. (c) Informing him and determining that he understands that by his plea he is waiving his rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be compelled to testify against himself. Thus, before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must inform the defendant that by pleading guilty, he is waiving the rights enunciated in Crim.R. 11(C)(2). In determining whether the trial court has satisfied its duties, reviewing courts have - 5 - distinguished constitutional and non-constitutional rights. See State v. Sims (May 24, 1995), Summit App. Nos. 16841, 16936, unreported; State v. Gibson (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 146, 147. Under the more stringent standard for constitutionally protected rights, a trial court's acceptance of a guilty plea will be affirmed only if it engages in meaningful dialogue with the defendant which, in substance, explained the pertinent constitutional rights "in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant." State v. Ballard (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 473, paragraph two of the syllabus. Under the broader standard for rights not protected by the consti- tution, reviewing courts consider whether the trial court substan- tially complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2) and the defendant subjectively understood the implications of his plea and the nature of the rights he is waiving. State v. Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108. Finally, defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the basis that it was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made must show a prejudicial effect. Id. As to the requirement that the court "[address] the defendant personally," this mandates that the judge will personally interro- gate the defendant to ascertain the voluntariness of the plea and develop a record. See McCarthy v. United States (1969), 394 U.S. 459, 466. The supreme court has observed that there is no easy or exact way to determine what someone subjectively understands. State v. Carter (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 34, 38; accord State v. Flint (1986), - 6 - 36 Ohio App.3d 4, 7. The Carter court stated: If the defendant receives the proper information, then we can ordinarily assume that he understands that information. [In deciding whether defendant had the required information] we look at all the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case. The instant case reveals over thirteen pages of such interro- gation wherein the trial judge asked defendant a total of seventeen questions. We are therefore unable to find that the trial court failed to address the defendant personally in this instance. Further, as to defendant's claimed lack of understanding of his constitutional and other rights, the record demonstrates that defendant's rights were clearly explained to him and the record fails to reveal even the suggestion that defendant did not understand what the court said to him. Defendant responded to the court's questions in English and neither counsel nor the defendants requested an interpreter. There is therefore no basis from which to conclude that defendant did not understand the proceedings. Indeed, defendant's letter to the court demonstrates that he can communicate well in the English language. The assignment of error is without merit. Affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. - 7 - The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. BLACKMON, P.J., AND KARPINSKI, J., CONCUR. ANN DYKE JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .