COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69961 IN RE: BRANDI BURRELL, A Minor : : Appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY : and : OPINION : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : JANUARY 30, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Juvenile Division : Case No. 9513228 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For appellant : TIMOTHY CLARKE Attorney at Law 24500 Center Ridge Road, #130 Westlake, Ohio 44145-5607 For appellee : STEPHANIE TUBBS-JONES Cuyahoga County Prosecutor JOSE TORRES, Assistant 8th Floor, Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, J.: This court is asked to decide whether the decision finding defendant-appellant Brandi Burrell ("Brandi") a delinquent child by reason of having committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02 and criminal trespass in violation of R.C. 2911.22, is legally sufficient. Because we find sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision, we affirm the decision of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, finding Brandi delinquent. On September 15, 1995, Brandi, who was fourteen years old at the time, was a runaway child. She and another child, Christina Wise ("Christina"), broke into the home of Brandi's mother and step-father, Adelle and Herman Williams, while they were not home and admitted to emptying their jar of coins valued at $10 as well as taking all of Brandi's clothing. Upon the parents' return home, they noticed several items of their own clothing, valued in excess of $400, also missing. In a conversation Brandi had with her mother following this incident, Brandi denied having taken their clothes and suggested that Christina may have taken them. On September 29, 1995, Brandi accompanied Christina to the home of Armenia Robinson, whose daughter Kimberly, age sixteen, was an acquaintance of Christina's. Without knocking on the door or - 3 - ringing the doorbell, Christina attempted to enter Mrs. Robinson's home. At the same time, Brandi was headed toward the back yard. Mrs. Robinson opened the inside door and confronted Christina as Christina was opening the screen door. Mrs. Robinson was familiar with Christina but did not know Brandi. When asked her identity, Brandi gave a false name. Mrs. Robinson then addressed both girls as to why they were there and what they were doing. Brandi replied that she saw Kimberly from the window. Mrs. Robinson became suspicious because she knew that Christina was aware that Kimberly was at school and not at home. She then admonished both girls for trying to break into her home and eventually made a police report to that effect. As a result of these acts, a two-count complaint was filed alleging that Brandi was delinquent for (1) the theft of property from her mother and step-father and (2) entering and remaining on the property of Armenia Robinson. Furthermore, Brandi was a repeat offender, having been previously adjudged delinquent on September 29, 1994. The trial court approved the magistrate's decision finding Brandi to be a delinquent child and ordering her to serve a minimum term of six months and a maximum term not to exceed her twenty-first birthday at the Ohio Department of Youth Services. Brandi timely appeals and assigns the following errors for our review: - 4 - I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPEL- LANT DELINQUENT BASED ON THEFT WHERE THAT FINDING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPEL- LANT DELINQUENT BASED ON CRIMINAL TRES- PASS WHERE THAT FINDING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. As Brandi's assignments of errors both challenge the suffi- ciency of the evidence in finding her delinquent, they will be discussed together. In challenging the legal sufficiency of the state's evidence, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 1 reasonable doubt." The same standard applies in juvenile 2 proceedings. I. Brandi contends that because the state failed to present any direct evidence that she took clothing belonging to her mother and step-father, and only minimal circumstantial evidence to that effect, it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she had committed the theft offense. Specifically, Brandi admitted being 1 State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 430; State v. Ivey (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 249, 255; see, also, State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 263; Mayfield Hts. v. Riddle (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 337, 341. 2 In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1. - 5 - in her mother's and step-father's house at some point during the period that their clothing was taken. This alone, she contends, is insufficient to find her delinquent for taking their clothing. The state, on the other hand, maintains that circumstantial evidence is entitled to the same weight as direct evidence and that sufficient evidence was introduced from which the trier of fact could find that Brandi took the property in question. Where the evidence is either circumstantial or direct, the appropriate standard of review is whether any reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the offense beyond a 3 reasonable doubt. In this regard, circumstantial evidence 4 possesses the same probative value as that of direct evidence. Consequently, an appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence admitted at trial is to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind 5 of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Brandi was found delinquent of theft under R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), which provides: No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services in any of the following ways: (1) Without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent; *** 3 State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 279. 4 Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 5 Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. - 6 - The testimony adduced at trial revealed that the clothing belonging to Brandi's mother and step-father was in their home when they left for work the day Brandi returned to collect her clothing and missing upon their return at the end of the day. Both testified that Brandi did not have permission to take their clothing. Furthermore, Brandi admitted that she took the coins without authority to do so, recognizing that this was "a mistake." Brandi's attempt to analogize this case to that of State v. 6 Iacovone is disingenuous. In that case, this court found certain circumstantial evidence insufficient to support the defendant's conviction for breaking and entering. Specifically, the trial court had relied on photographs of a chevron pattern of drops of an unidentified fluid to place the defendant at the scene of the crime. That circumstantial evidence was determined to be legally insufficient to support a conviction for breaking and entering. In contrast, in this case, it is undisputed that Brandi was present in the home of her mother and step-father and that she, in fact, took not only her own clothing but also coins from a jar in their bedroom. There was no evidence presented that any other person, authorized or unauthorized, was present in the Williams' home between the time that Brandi was there and when the Williamses returned home. Thus, the inference drawn by the trial court that Brandi took the items she denies taking is one that any rational 6 State v. Iacovone (Aug. 23, 1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 57204, unreported. - 7 - trier of fact could have determined from the evidence, albeit circumstantial, adduced at trial. Reviewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, it cannot be said that the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Brandi took the property in question. Consequently, the trial court did not err in finding Brandi delinquent for theft. Accordingly, Brandi's first assignment of error is overruled. II. Brandi next contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of delinquency for criminal trespass at the home of Armenia Robinson. Specifically, Brandi argues that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that her entry onto the Robinson property was not privileged. The state, on the other hand, contends that sufficient evidence was presented to support the adjudication of delinquency. Brandi was found delinquent of criminal trespass under R.C. 2911.21(A)(1), which provides: No person, without privilege to do so, shall do any of the following: (1) Knowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another; *** Armenia Robinson testified that Brandi and Christina were present at her home and that Christina, without knocking or ring- ing the doorbell, attempted to enter her home while Brandi ran to - 8 - the back yard. After confronting the girls, Mrs. Robinson ques- tioned Brandi as to her identity, whereupon Brandi gave a ficti- tious name. In contrast to this testimony, Brandi testified that Christina had knocked at the door before opening it. She further testified that she did not run toward the back yard but, rather, sat in the driveway. Despite this conflicting testimony, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that Brandi, without pri- vilege to do so, entered the property of Armenia Robinson. Brandi was only recently acquainted with Kimberly Robinson and knew, or should have known, that Kimberly would be at school at the time she decided to go to her house. Furthermore, if Brandi believed her presence there to be privileged, as she suggests, then there would have been no reason to give a fictitious name when questioned by Mrs. Robinson. Because it is the trier of fact who determines the weight and credibility to accord to such evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found sufficient evidence to support a finding of delinquency for criminally trespassing the property of Armenia Robinson. Consequently, the trial court did not err in finding Brandi delinquent for criminal trespass. Accordingly, Brandi's second assignment of error is over- ruled. Judgment affirmed. - 9 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. LEO M. SPELLACY, C.J. and JAMES M. PORTER, J. CONCUR JUDGE TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E), unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .