COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69940 DEBORAH J. WITSAMAN : : Plaintiff-appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION ROBERT E. WITSAMAN : : Defendant-appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : JANUARY 23, 1997 OF DECISION : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. D-235975 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: For defendant-appellee: JEFFREY W. PEDERSON, ESQ. STEPHEN McGOWAN, ESQ. WILLIAM T. GUARNIERI, ESQ. 7425 Royalton Road Old Arcade, #254 North Royalton, OH 44133 401 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, OH 44114 - 2 - PATTON, J. Plaintiff-appellant, Deborah Witsaman ("mother"), appeals the order of the trial court granting sole custody of the parties' two children to defendant-appellee, Robert Witsaman ("father"). On September 14, 1994 the mother filed a complaint for divorce praying for custody of the two boys, ages twelve and nine. The father answered the complaint and also prayed for custody of the two children. Trial commenced on September 20, 1995 with custody being the sole issue for determination. At the bench trial both the mother and father testified as well as the guardian ad litem and the court appointed psychologist. The guardian ad litem and the psychologist both recommended that the father be named the custodial parent. Based on their recommendations and the other testimony presented the trial court awarded sole custody to the father. It is this order from which the mother now appeals. The mother's first assignment of error states as follows: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT IN DENYING HER TIMELY REQUEST FOR FINDINGS OF FACT SEPARATE FROM CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. The mother argues the trial erred by not issuing separate findings of fact and conclusions of law as mandated by Civ.R. 52. In addition, the mother claims the trial court merely recited the evidence presented at trial which prejudiced her on appeal because she had no findings upon which to show abuse of discretion. - 3 - The father maintains Civ.R. 52 does not require strict compliance but merely substantial compliance when issuing conclusions of fact and law. Moreover, the court's opinion in the present case together with the transcript provided an adequate record for appeal. Civ.R. 52 states in pertinent part: "When questions of fact are tried by the court without a jury, judgment may be general for the prevailing party unless one of the parties in writing requests [that]* * * the court shall state in writing the conclusions of fact found separately from the conclusions of law." The purpose of Civ.R. 52 is "to aid the appellate court in reviewing the record and determining the validity of the basis of the trial court's judgment." In re Adoption of Gibson (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 170, 172 quoting Werden v. Crawford (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 122, 123. A trial court does not have a specific design it has to follow when issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rather, "the findings and conclusions must articulate an adequate basis upon which a party can mount a challenge to, and the appellate court can make a determination as to the propriety of, resolved disputed issues of fact and the trial court's application of the law." Kroeger v. Ryder (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 438, 442, citing Stone v. Davis (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 74, 85. In the present case, the trial court issued a nine page judgment entry detailing the reasons behind its decision. Also, included in the record is a seven-hundred page transcript together - 4 - with all the motions, reports, and recommendations that were filed by the various participants in the case. We find the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in combination with the rest of the record provided an adequate basis for determining the validity of the trial court's decisions. Therefore, the mother was not prejudiced and her first assignment of error is overruled. The mother's second assignment of error states as follows: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILDREN TO THE FATHER. The mother alleges it is not in the best interests of the children to award sole custody to the father. Furthermore, the mother claims the trial court abused its discretion in arriving at this decision because the trial court did not properly consider the relevant factors and the totality of the circumstances. The father argues the trial court did not abuse it discretion and issued a well reasoned judgment entry supported by the recommendations of the guardian ad litem and psychologist. In Miller v. Miller (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, the Ohio Supreme Court stated: "While a trial court's discretion in a custody modification proceeding is broad, it is not absolute, and must be guided by the language set forth in R.C. 3109.04.* * * In addition, the trial court's determination in a custody proceeding is, of course, subject to reversal upon a showing of an abuse of discre- tion." - 5 - An "abuse of discretion" is more than an error of law or judgment and is defined as a court's unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable attitude. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219. The mother claims she was the primary caretaker of the children and should remain their caretaker because "[t]he Court can't ignore the father's actions in voluntarily separating himself from the children." The mother left the family residence and took the children with her. There was also testimony that in the months following the separation the mother denied the father visitation privileges. Thus, the father did not voluntarily separate himself from the children and the mother was the initial primary caretaker only because she took the children with her. In addition, R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), which lists the factors to be considered in a custody case, states that being the initial primary caretaker of the children is not a factor to be considered. The mother argues next that a move at this point to the father's home might be traumatic for the children based on the testimony of the children's therapist. However, the children would not have to change schools and the GAL and psychologist both concluded the difficulties of such a move would be outweighed by the advantages of the move. Also, the children themselves expressed a desire to be with their father, one of the boys even threatened suicide if he was not allowed to be with his father. - 6 - Lastly, the mother believes the father has a violent temper and this could result in abuse to the children. However, there is no evidence to support this allegation and the psychologist testified that the father was emotionally and intellectually able to provide the necessary care for the children. After a review of the record and all the evidence presented at trial, we believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion in naming the father as the residential parent. Thus, the mother's second assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant his costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, C.J. BLACKMON, J., CONCUR JUDGE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App. R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .