COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NOS. 69907, 69908 and 69909 GLORIA CAVANAUGH, ET AL. : : Plaintiff-appellees : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION MARVIN L. SEALEY, JR. : : Defendant-appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : JANUARY 23, 1997 OF DECISION : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. 8973367 JUDGMENT : DISMISSED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellees: For defendant-appellant: ANNETTE C. TRIVELLI, ESQ. MARVIN L. SEALEY, ESQ. 500 Courthouse Square 344 Overlook Park Drive 310 Lakeside Avenue, West Cleveland, OH 44110 Cleveland, OH 44113-1021 HENRY R. FREEMAN, ESQ. 300 The Superior Bldg. Cleveland, OH 44114 - 2 - PATTON, J. Defendant-appellant, Marvin Sealey ("Sealey"), appeals from the juvenile court's order dated October 23, 1995. Sealey appeals from an ex parte temporary restraining order, the denial of motion to show cause, and a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff-appellee, Gloria Cavanaugh ("Cavanaugh"), maintains the court properly granted the restraining order and properly denied the motion to show cause. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal. This appeal results from a paternity action filed by Cavanaugh on November 8, 1989. It was established by genetic testing that Sealey was the father of twin boys born to Cavanaugh. Sealey was ordered to pay child support and was given one hour of visitation per month by the court on June 26, 1992. Six months later, on December 28, 1992, Sealey's visitation rights were suspended because Sealey "failed to comply with this Court's order, by failing to appear for scheduled supervised visitation with the plaintiff children." On February 22, 1994 an agreed judgment entry for visitation rights was ordered and filed by the court. In this agreement, Sealey was permitted one to two hours of visitation per week and after one year of the agreement Sealey would also be provided access to the twins' medical and school records. The agreement stipulated that if Sealey harassed, molested, or threatened Cavanaugh the agreement would automatically terminate and Sealey would lose his visitation rights until further order of the court. - 3 - On September 26, 1995 Cavanaugh filed a motion for ex parte temporary restraining order. In her affidavit, which accompanied the motion, Cavanaugh stated in May 1994 at a scheduled visitation "[d]efendant displayed violent tendencies towards the Plaintiff and her mother." Therefore, because of the self-executing visitation agreement, Sealey's visitation rights were automatically suspended. The record reveals that since May 1994, when his visitation rights were suspended, Sealey has neither petitioned the court to restore his rights nor has he appealed the deprivation of his visitation rights. Cavanaugh's affidavit also alleged that Sealey made false statements to Cleveland public school officials and as a result he was allowed five unsupervised hours of visitation with the twins at their school. The court heard arguments on the restraining order at a hearing which occurred on October 23, 1995. At this hearing the court also entertained Sealey's motions to continue, to modify child support, to consolidate, to show cause, for listening device, and for visitation. The court granted Cavanaugh's restraining order. Regarding Sealey's motions, the court denied all his motions except for the motion for a listening device, i.e., to record the proceedings. In response to his motion for visitation the court held "the court denies defendant's motion there being no witnesses or evidence presented to the court." In his notice of appeal Sealey appeals the "orders of the Court in regards to Motion for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining - 4 - Order, Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Show Cause, heard on October 32, 1995." Sealey cannot appeal an ex parte temporary restraining order because it is not a final appealable order. State ex rel. Tollis v. Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 145. See also, R.C. 2505.02. The record reveals the court never granted, denied, or even considered a motion to dismiss as a result of the hearing on October 23, 1995. The court never ruled on this motion because Sealey never filed a motion to dismiss. Sealey is appealing from a non-existent order. Thus, there is nothing for this court to review. Lastly, Sealey appeals the denial of his motion to show cause. However, Sealey does not argue or discuss this motion in his brief. Pursuant to App.R. 16(A) this court does not have to review an argument not presented by a party in their brief. See also, App.R. 12(A). In his brief Sealey presents three assignments of error. The first assignment of error pertains to an alleged ex parte meeting Cavanaugh's counsel had with the judge. The second assignment of error complains about the granting of the temporary restraining order. And in his third assignment of error Sealey complains he was prejudiced because the trial court deprived him of his parental rights. None of these assignments or error are reviewable. - 5 - The second assignment of error, pertaining to the temporary restraining order, is not reviewable because it is not a final appealable order as discussed above. The first and third assignments of error are unreviewable because Sealey did not include these in his notice of appeal. In Parks v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 426, 428, this court held "that we are without jurisdiction to review a judgment or order which is not designated in the appellant's notice of appeal." Therefore, based on the foregoing discussion, Sealey's appeals are dismissed. - 6 - It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Juvenile Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, C.J. BLACKMON, J., CONCUR JUDGE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App. R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .