COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69711 JOHN A. HALLBAUER, ET AL. : : Plaintiffs-Appellants : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION HERSCHEL KOBLENZ, ET AL. : : Defendant-Appellees : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: NOVEMBER 27, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. CV-225254 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiffs-Appellants: DON C. ILER (#0008380) JOHN A. HALLBAUER (#0001076) 1640 STANDARD BUILDING ATTORNEY AT LAW, PRO SE 1370 ONTARIO STREET 1400 BANK ONE CENTER CLEVELAND, OHIO 44113-1746 CLEVELAND, OHIO 44114 For Defendants-Appellees: BURT FULTON (#005140) RANDALL D. LUKE (#0012332) GARY L. NICHOLSON (#0005268) HAHN, LOESER & PARKS GALLAGHER, SHARP, FULTON 3300 BP AMERICA BUILDING AND NORMAN 200 PUBLIC SQUARE 1501 EUCLID AVENUE CLEVELAND, OHIO 44114-2301 6TH FLOOR - BUCKLEY BUILDING CLEVELAND, OHIO 44115 - 2 - SPELLACY, C.J.: Plaintiffs-appellants John and Linda Hallbauer ("appellants") appeal the judgment of the trial court granting the law firm of Hahn, Loeser & Parks and six partners individually named as defendants' ("appellees") motions for summary judgment in this cause of action for breach of partnership agreement. Appellants assign the following errors for our review: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ALL COUNTS AND CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT, AND ON THE CASE AS A WHOLE, AGAINST PLAINTIFFS AND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS, THERE BEING LEGALLY VALID THEORIES AND MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT SUPPORTING ALL COUNTS AND NUMEROUS LEGAL THEORIES FOR RECOVERY AND RELIEF. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDERING THE AGGREGATE HAHN LOESER & PARKS PARTNERSHIP JUDICIALLY DISSOLVED AND SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS FOR A FINAL ACCOUNTING AND WINDUP DISTRIBUTION. III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING BIFURCATION PURSUANT TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION. IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PROCEEDING WITH SUMMARY JUDGMENT RULINGS ON THE MERITS ON BRIEFS AND DOCUMENTS AFTER RULING THAT ALL THAT WOULD BE ADDRESSED WAS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF PLAINTIFF JOHN A. HALLBAUER'S DEPARTURE/ SEPARATION FROM HIS PARTNERS. V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LIMITING ONGOING DISCOVERY AND OTHERWISE LIMITING PROCEEDINGS ON ALL ISSUES UNDER PARTIAL, CONFUSING AND MISSTATED RULINGS, ALL OF WHICH WERE ALSO FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR AND OPERATED TO VIOLATE PLAINTIFFS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING IN CAMERA INSPECTIONS OF UNKNOWN DOCUMENTS SOUGHT IN DISCOVERY AND THEN DETERMINING RELEVANCY AND - 3 - OTHER ISSUES AGAINST PLAINTIFFS SO AS TO DENY THEM BOTH OPPORTUNITY TO ANALYZE THE SAME TO ARGUE POTENTIAL RELEVANCY AND IN FAILING TO PRESERVE SUCH DOCUMENTS AS, AT LEAST, PART OF A SEALED RECORD FOR THE FURTHER EVALUATION AND REVIEW AT THE APPELLATE LEVELS. VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FOLLOW AND APPLY CONTROLLING PRECEDENT OF THE EIGHTH DIS- TRICT COURT OF APPEALS IN JAMES H. TILBERRY V. A.C. BODY, ET AL. (MARCH 30, 1987), CUYAHOGA APP. NO. 29623, UNREPORTED. Finding appellants' appeal to have merit in part, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part for further proceedings. A complete review of the record reveals the following. On January 17, 1992, appellants filed a five count complaint against appellees. Count I alleges breach of partnership agreement and fiduciary obligation. Count II alleges fraud, bad faith, and unlawful conspiracy to deprive appellant John Hallbauer of his partnership interest. Count III alleges a willful, malicious, intentional and wanton breach of contract. Count IV seeks judicial dissolution of appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks law firm, appointment of a receiver, an accounting and other relief. Count V is appellant Linda Hallbauer's loss of consortium claim based upon personal injuries sustained by her husband John Hallbauer coupled with her claim for emotional distress. On January 18, 1994, appellees filed a motion to bifurcate the present action. On July 14, 1994, pursuant to appellees' motion, the trial court ordered that this case be bifurcated for initial determination by the trial court of the circumstance and nature of - 4 - appellant John Hallbauer's departure from appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks. (Journal Entry, July 14, 1994). In a judgment entry dated January 27, 1995, and clarified on July 13, 1995, the trial court determined that, under Counts I and III of the complaint, there was no breach of contract as to the termination procedure. (Journal Entry, January 27, 1995; and Journal Entry, July 13, 1995). However, the trial court permitted appellants to pursue any claim under Counts I or III that appellees had miscalculated Hallbauer's benefits or other financial entitle- ments under the Agreement. Further, with respect to Count IV of the complaint, the trial court determined that appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Journal Entry, January 27, 1995, and Journal Entry, July 13, 1995). On July 5, 1995, the trial court determined and held that appellees were entitled to summary judgment on Count I of the complaint relating to Hallbauer's benefits and financial entitlements under the terms of the Agreement. The trial court thereby granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on all claims asserted in Counts I and III of the complaint. (See Journal Entry, July 5, 1995). On May 18, 1995, the trial court determined and held, with respect to Count V of the complaint, that appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on appellant Linda Hallbauer's claim for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Journal Entry, May 18, 1995). On August 8, 1995, the trial court determined and held, with respect to John Hallbauer's emotional - 5 - distress claims and appellant Linda Hallbauer's loss of consortium claim in Count V, appellees were entitled to summary judgment. Finally, on September 22, 1995, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of appellees on Count II of the complaint, and final judgment in favor of appellees on the complaint as a whole. I. The history of the case reveals that on June 1, 1986, the law practice of Parks, Eisele, Bates & Wilsman was merged into the law practice of Hahn, Loeser, Freedheim, Dean & Wellman. After the merger, the Partnership engaged in the practice of law under the name of Hahn, Loeser & Parks (herein "appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks"). At the time of the merger, appellant John Hallbauer ("Hallbauer"), who had been a partner at Parks, Eisele, Bates & Wilsman, became a partner at appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks. At all times relevant, the rights and duties of the partners at appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks were determined by the Partnership Agreement ("Agreement"), and the terms of the Agreement were to be carried out by the Management Committee which was comprised of appellees N. Herschel Koblenz, Stephen Knerly, Jr., Kenneth Lapine, Lee Powar, David Weiner, and Richard Zellner. Weiner was the Chairman and Koblenz was the Executive Partner and Chief Operating Officer. The Agreement set forth the terms of compensation to be given to the partners in the firm. In particular, tiers of compensation to be paid to the partners were set forth in the Agreement. Furthermore, pursuant to the Agreement, review of and subsequent - 6 - determination of a partner's income would be decided every other year by the Management Committee. The Agreement also set forth the following ways for a partner to leave the partnership: death, retirement, expulsion and withdrawal. Dissolution of the partnership, however, is never mentioned in the Agreement as a means for leaving the partnership. In 1990, appellees determined the income of appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks was lower than had been expected. As a result, appellees decided one solution to the problem would be to begin downsizing appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks. (Koblenz, Tr. 39). In January 1991, the Management Committee determined that John Hallbauer would be asked to leave the firm. (Koblenz, Tr. 152). Subsequently, on January 18, 1991, appellees Koblenz and Weiner informed Hallbauer of the Management Committee's decision. Further, Koblenz and Weiner informed Hallbauer that they were going to reduce tier one of his compensation by $10,000.00 and completely eliminate tier two. (Hallbauer, Tr. 302). Koblenz and Weiner informed Hallbauer, however, that they would continue to pay him his tier one compensation through June 30, 1991. At that time, Hallbauer would be required to seek other employment. (Koblenz, Tr. 153). Koblenz and Weiner never informed Hallbauer why he was being expelled, nor did they inform the other partners of the Management Committee's decision to begin expulsion procedures. Hallbauer remained at appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks until September 27, 1991, when the firm offices moved from the National - 7 - City Bank Building to the BP America Building. Hallbauer testified that the firm did not move his files and refused to allow him to remove them by locking them up in the National City Bank Building. (Hallbauer, Tr. 327). Appellees, however, claim that they never refused Hallbauer access to his files. (Koblenz, Tr. 271). Moreover, appellees contend that Hallbauer, on September 27, 1991, voluntarily withdrew from the firm in order to join the firm of Buckley, King & Bluso. (Koblenz, Tr. 244). II. In their first assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on all counts and claims alleged in their complaint. For purposes of this appeal, this Court will address each count of appellants' complaint. Initially, this Court will address Counts I through III and the issues set forth in each. Count I of appellants' complaint alleges that appellees breached the terms of the partnership agreement and their fiduciary obligation when they sought to force Hallbauer from the partnership. Count II of the complaint alleges that appellees conceived and devised a fraudulent and bad faith scheme and conspiracy to deprive Hallbauer of his interest in appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks and the assets and good will thereof. Count III of the complaint alleges that the Management Committee willfully, maliciously, intentionally and/or wantonly forced Hallbauer from appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks. Furthermore, each of the above - 8 - counts allege a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The test for granting a motion for summary judgment is set forth in Civ. R. 56 and in numerous cases interpreting the rule. The law is clear that: Summary judgment is appropriately rendered when no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come but to one conclusion; and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. Lovsin, et al. v. J.C. Penney Company, Inc., et al. (May 9, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 69520, unreported, citing to Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317; Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64. In the case sub judice, the trial court, through several judgment entries, granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on all the counts and claims raised in appellants' complaint. On January 23, 1995, the trial court ruled, in part, on counts I, III, and IV of appellants' complaint. The trial court's ruling was subsequently clarified July 13, 1995. In its journal entry dated January 23, 1995, the trial court stated, "[u]nder Count I and Count III of the complaint, the Court finds no breach of contract as to the termination procedure. This determination follows the Court's analysis of the termination provisions of the partnership agreement." (Journal Entry, January 23, 1995). The trial court, however, stated that it would permit appellants to pursue any claim - 9 - under either count to the effect that appellees had miscalculated Hallbauer's financial entitlements under the partnership agreement. (See, clarified Journal Entry, July 13, 1995). Subsequently, in a judgment entry dated July 5, 1995, the trial court determined and held that appellees were entitled to summary judgment on Count I of the complaint relating to Hallbauer's benefits and financial entitlements under the terms of the Agreement. (Journal Entry, July 5, 1995). The trial court thereby granted summary judgment in appellees' favor on all claims asserted in Counts I and III of the complaint. On September 22, 1995, the trial court entered judgment on Count II. The trial court, having reviewed and considered the briefs, arguments, legal authorities, depositions and affidavits submitted by the parties, held that "there are no genuine issues of material fact and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count II of the Complaint and all claims asserted therein." (Journal Entry, September 22, 1995). The broad issue presented here is whether appellants have set forth sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for summary judgment on all counts and claims set forth in the complaint. Ultimately, this issue turns on whether the circumstances surrounding Hallbauer's departure from appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks reveal whether he voluntarily left the firm or was improperly expelled therefrom. - 10 - In the present case, the Agreement sets forth the following guidelines for expulsion of a partner: The Management Committee shall have the authority to expel a Partner, subject to the approval of two-thirds (2/3) of the Active Partners. (See Partnership Agreement, Section 6.3(c)). Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, appellees did, in fact, begin such procedure with regard to Hallbauer. Appellee Koblenz, however, testified that the Management Committee did not obtain the approval of two-thirds of the Active Partners in order to complete the expulsion process with regard to Hallbauer. Rather, appellees contend Hallbauer voluntarily withdrew from the partnership, making a two-thirds vote of the Active Partners unnecessary. (Koblenz, Depo., pp. 244- 246). Hallbauer, however, contends that he did not voluntarily withdraw from the partnership. Rather, he was improperly expelled from appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks by the Management Committee. In particular, Hallbauer contends the Management Committee's failure to obtain two-thirds vote of the active partners to expel him, as required by the Agreement, was a breach of the Agreement and fiduciary duty by appellees. In reaching its conclusion that there was no breach of contract as to the termination procedure, the trial court, itself, determined the circumstance and nature of Hallbauer's departure from appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks. However, in construing the evidence most strongly in appellants' favor, it is clear that - 11 - reasonable minds could reach different conclusions as to the circumstances and nature of Hallbauer's departure from appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks. Therefore, issues regarding whether Hallbauer voluntarily withdrew from appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks or whether he was improperly expelled by the Management Committee without two-thirds approval of the Active Partners, are questions of fact to be submitted to a jury for its determination, rather than questions of law to be determined by the trial court. The factual dispute stated supra directly relates to the issues and claims set forth in Counts I, II, and III of appellants' complaint. Accordingly, appellees' motions for summary judgment on each of the three counts and the issues contained therein were improperly granted by the trial court. Counts I, II, and III of appellants' complaint further allege claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress with regard to John Hallbauer. Furthermore, Count V of appellants' complaint states a claim by appellant Linda Hallbauer for loss of consortium. On June 26, 1995, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment on John Hallbauer's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. On August 8, 1995, the trial court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment on both John Hallbauer's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and Linda Hallbauer's claim for loss of consortium and held: The evidence fails to show intentional infliction of harm and fails to show pltf J (sic) Hallbauer experienced substantial emotional distress as no treatment was sought - 12 - or received. The failure of pltf J Hallbauer's claim destroys the maintainability of pltf L Hallbauer's claim. Judgment is entered in defts' favor and against pltfs upon Count V and upon pltf j (sic) Hallbauer's int'l infliction claim. (Journal Entry, August 8, 1995). In order for appellants to recover or even present a jury question in a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, sufficient evidence must be presented to create a genuine issue of any material fact as to the appellees' alleged behavior. In Ohio, the behavior as a matter of law must be indecent and extreme. Schwartz v. Comcorp, Inc. (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 639, citing Paugh v. Hanks (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 78. In Yeager v. Local Union 20 (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 369, the Ohio Supreme Court characterizes the requisite behavior as "go[ing] beyond all possible bounds of decency, * * * to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id. at 375. In the case sub judice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment as to John Hallbauer's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Appellants failed to present evidence that was sufficient to create a genuine issue as to the material fact that appellees' behavior was extreme and outrageous. Furthermore, even if it is determined by a jury appellees improperly expelled Hallbauer from the firm, appellants have still failed to present any evidence that appellees' conduct was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as - 13 - atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Moreover, Hallbauer has failed to submit medical testimony or evidence of treatment for serious emotional distress. Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is clear appellants failed to sustain their burden with respect to John Hallbauer's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed this claim. We will now address appellant Linda Hallbauer's claim for loss of consortium. "A claim for loss of consortium is a derivative claim." Lawyers Cooperative v. Muething (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 273, 280. Therefore, appellant Linda Hallbauer's ability to maintain a cause of action for loss of consortium is dependent on John Hallbauer's possession of a legally sufficient claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against appellees. As stated supra, John Hallbauer failed to support his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress with sufficient evidence. Therefore, failure of John Hallbauer's claim destroys appellant Linda Hallbauer's ability to maintain her claim for loss of consortium. Thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on the loss of consortium claim set forth by appellants in Count V of the complaint. Accordingly, appellants' first assignment of error with regard to appellants' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress as set forth in Counts I, II, III, and the loss of - 14 - consortium claim in Count V of appellants' complaint are overruled. However, with regard to the remaining claims set forth in Counts I, II and III, the judgment of the trial court granting appellees' motions for summmary judgment is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings on the issue of John Hallbauer's departure from appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks. III. Appellants second assignment of error and Count IV of appellants' complaint request judicial dissolution of appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks. In particular, appellants contend that appellees have so conducted themselves in matters relating to the Partnership business that it is not reasonably practical to carry on the business of the partnership with said appellees. On June 29, 1994, appellants filed a motion for partial summary judgment on judicial dissolution of the law firm partnership of appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks. Subsequently, appellees, filed their brief in opposition. On January 27, 1995, the trial court held: Even if the Court were to conclude that there was no action taken under the partnership agreement to properly or effectively terminate Hallbauer, there is no evidence that it became impracticable to carry on the business of the partnership Hahn, Loeser & Parks after the January 18, 1991 announcement of the Committee's decision to terminate Hallbauer; there is no evidence that it became impracticable to carry on the business of the partnership of Hahn Loeser & Parks after June 30, 1991 when the terminated Hallbauer failed to leave; there is no evidence that it became impracticable to carry on the business of the - 15 - partnership of Hahn Loeser & Parks after September 1991 when the terminated Hallbauer actually left to take up his new position. Similarly there is no evidence of a complete breakdown of the partnership and its business such as found in Tilberry. Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on judicial dissolution of the law firm partnership of Hahn Loeser & Parks is denied. (Journal Entry, January 27, 1995). In the present case, appellants' summary judgment motion seeking judicial dissolution was based largely upon the holding in Tilberry v. Body (March 19, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 49623, unreported, which recognized an absolute right to judicial dissolution under R.C. 1775.31 (A)(4). Appellants' reliance on the holding in Tilberry, however, is misplaced. Hallbauer and appellees entered into a partnership agreement that mentions several ways for a partner to leave - death, retirement, expulsion, and withdrawal. The Agreement, however, does not mention dissolution as an appropriate means for leaving the partnership. In the case sub judice, no provision for dissolution is made in the Agreement. Thus, "[t]he rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership are determined by statute unless there is an agreement to do otherwise." R.C. 1775.17. Therefore, R.C. 1775.31 must be applied instead of the Agreement. R.C. 1775.31 provides for dissolution by court decree. In pertinent part, R.C. 1775.31 set forth the following: - 16 - (A) On application by or for a partner the court shall decree a dissolution whenever: (4) a partner willfully or persistently commits a breach of the partnership agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to the partnership business that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with him. This Court is required to give deference to the findings of the trial court and indulge a presumption of correctness in the result reached. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80. If the findings of fact and conclusions of law are supported by competent and credible evidence, the decision of the trial court will be upheld. Id. Appellants assert the partnership was an aggregate, to which John Hallbauer was a component part, not an entity separate and distinct from him. Furthermore, appellants contend there was never a "departure" but, rather, an involuntary separation of John Hallbauer from the partnership which resulted in an inability to carry on the aggregate partnership business. Appellees contend, however, that there was no breakdown of the partnership and its law business when Hallbauer was advised that the Management Committee wanted him to leave or before or after Hallbauer left. In Tilberry, this Court found competent credible evidence had been presented that the requirements set forth in R.C. 1775.31(A)(4) had been met, making dissolution appropriate. In particular, evidence was presented that the partnership at issue in Tilberry consisted of four partners involved in the practice of - 17 - patent and copyright law. Further, under the partnership agreement, a withdrawing partner would forfeit fifty percent of his capital fund. Evidence was also presented that three of the partners had decided Tilberry should leave, and that Tilberry's departure was not voluntary. The Tilberry court, upon presentation of this evidence, determined: If a partner who was expected to consider all clients the clients of the partnership instead talked and acted as if they were his clients, as appellants said [Tilberry] did, then the practicability of carrying on the business is affected. If appellant Daniels decided that he did not want to work with [Tilberry] and appellant Vickers believed [Tilberry] was not competent to do patent work and refused to refer patent work to him, the practicability of carrying on of a business is affected. Tilberry, supra. In the present case, unlike Tilberry, appellants have failed to provide this Court with any competent credible evidence that it became impracticable for appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks to carry on the business of the partnership. Moreover, there is no evidence of a complete breakdown of the partnership as found by this Court in Tilberry. Thus, the trial court properly denied appellants' request for dissolution of appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks. Further, this conclusion is not dependent upon jury determination of the circumstance and nature of Hallbauer's departure from the partnership. The decision of the trial court is supported by competent credible evidence. Accordingly, appellants' second assignment of - 18 - error with regard to Count IV of the complaint, requesting judicial dissolution, is overruled. IV. Count V of appellants' complaint set forth a claim by appellant Linda Hallbauer for loss of consortium, as well as a claim for negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress. As stated supra, appellant Linda Hallbauer's claim for loss of consortium is a derivative claim. Because John Hallbauer was unable to substantiate his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, appellant Linda Hallbauer's claim for loss of consortium fails as well. Addressing her direct action for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, this Court finds that the trial court appropriately concluded that appellants failed to state a cause of action for the negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, and properly granted appellees' motion for summary judgment. The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized a cause of action alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress without contemporaneous physical injury. Paugh v. Hanks (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 72. In particular, the Paugh court has extended the cause of action to plaintiff bystanders who are not personally involved in the incident, but who are in such close proximity to reasonably appreciate the peril, and as a result, suffer serious emotional distress. Id. Courts, however, have refused to extend this cause - 19 - of action for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress further. See, e.g., Criswell v. Brentwood Hosp. (1989), 49 Ohio App.3d 163, 165. Further, this Court has held that, "Ohio courts do not recognize a separate tort for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context." Tschantz v. Ferguson (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 693. In the case sub judice, appellants have failed to provide the Court with evidence supporting their alleged theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, the alleged action of appellees does not fall within the contemplation of Paugh. Thus, appellant Linda Hallbauer's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress fails as a matter of law, and summary judgment in favor of appellees was proper. Next, we will consider appellant Linda Hallbauer's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. As stated supra, appellants, in order to survive summary judgment on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, must set forth facts showing that appellees' conduct was so outrageous that it went beyond all possible bounds of decency and is considered utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Yeager, supra at 375. In the present case, appellant Linda Hallbauer claims that appellees' conduct toward her husband, which would later be communicated to her, was so outrageous that it would offend an average member of the community. Appellant Linda Hallbauer's claim, however, is unsupported by any evidence that she has - 20 - suffered severe or substantial emotional distress of a nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure. Moreover, Linda Hallbauer has failed to present any medical testimony or evidence of treatment sought for her alleged serious emotional distress. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that summary judgment by the trial court, in favor of appellees on appellant Linda Hallbauer's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, was properly granted. Accordingly, appellants' contention that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on count V of their complaint is overruled. V. In their third assignment of error, appellants assert the trial court erred in ordering bifurcation pursuant Civ.R. 42(B). Civ.R. 42(B) sets forth: The court, after a hearing, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedi- tion and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third- party claim, or of any separate issue or any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, or third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right to trial by jury. In the present case, appellees filed a motion to bifurcate with the trial court on January 18, 1994, and appellants filed their motion in opposition to appellees' motion to bifurcate on February 15, 1994. On July 14, 1994, the trial court granted appellees' motion stating: - 21 - [t]he court concludes this matter shall be subject to bifurcation under Civil Rule 42(B) and the court concludes that the issue that should be bifurcated for this court's initial determination is the circumstance and nature of plaintiff John Hallbauer's departure from the partnership Hahn, Loeser & Parks. (Journal Entry, July 14, 1994). The decision of the trial court to bifurcate a trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Heidreder v. Trustees (1979), 64 Ohio App.2d 95, 100. Therefore, in determining whether the trial court properly granted appellees' motion to bifurcate, we must review the trial court's decision under the abuse of discretion standard. The term "abuse of discretion" connotes more than an error of law or judgment, it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219. In the present case, the trial court, pursuant to Civ.R. 42(B), exercised its discretion and bifurcated the issue regarding the circumstance and nature of Hallbauer's departure from appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks. The trial court's order to bifurcate was not an abuse of discretion. However, the trial court improperly determined that the issue of Hallbauer's departure from appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks was to be determined by the court. Rather, as stated supra, the circumstance and nature of Hallbauer's departure is a question of fact to be determined by a jury. Therefore, the issue of Hallbauer's departure from appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks, - 22 - in accordance with the trial court's order, is to remain bifurcated for initial determination by a jury. Accordingly, appellants' third assignment of error is overruled. VI. In their fifth and sixth assignments of error, appellants assert the trial court erred in limiting ongoing discovery. In particular, appellants contend it was error for the trial court to make in camera inspections of unknown documents sought in discovery and then determine relevancy and other issues against appellants. In the case sub judice, appellants filed various requests for production of documents seeking partnership records of appellee Hahn, Loeser & Parks. Appellants assert, however, that the trial court, during in camera review of the documents sought to be discovered, improperly limited access to these records. In particular, appellants state that the trial court in discovery orders of October 1993, and in April 1995, greatly limited access to the records requested. In camera inspection of the documents by the trial judge is the most appropriate method of dealing with claims of executive privilege. Henneman v. Toledo (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 241, 243, citing Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal. (1976), 426 U.S. 394, 406. By conducting such an inspection in chambers, away from the jury and without the presence or participation of counsel for either party, the trial judge may make the necessary - 23 - determination without compromising the confidentiality of any information he finds to be privileged. Henneman, supra. Any items deemed to be discoverable by the court may then be disclosed to the requesting party's counsel in connection with the case. Henneman, supra, citing Urseth v. Dayton (S.D. Ohio 1986), 110 F.R.D. 245, 257. Any records requested which the trial judge deems to be non- discoverable will then be sealed and made part of the record so that an appellate court faced with the question may determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in withholding such records. Id. at 244. Denial by the trial court of appellants' discovery requests must be reviewed by this Court under an abuse of discretion standard. As stated supra, an abuse of discretion implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. See Blakemore, supra. In the present case, appellants assert the trial court's in camera review and subsequent denial, in October 1993, of the management committee minutes, which reflect the December 1990 payment to Lee Fisher in return for the "top of the list" position for the State of Ohio business on his assumption of the office of Ohio Attorney General, was in error. A complete review of the record and the trial court's journal entry from October 20, 1993, however, does not reveal that the trial court addressed this issue. Rather, the trial court set forth a number of additional admissible issues. (See Journal Entry, October 20, 1993). - 24 - Appellants further assert that the trial court erred, in April 1995, by denying their third request for production of document Nos. 22 and 31. (See Journal Entry, April 26, 1995). Appellants, however, have failed to provide the requested documents which were denied by the trial court for this Court to review. Thus, this Court will presume regularity, and holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' discovery requests. Accordingly, appellants' fifth and sixth assignments of error are overruled. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in accordance with this opinion. - 25 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants one-half their costs herein taxed. It is ordered that appellants recover of appellees one-half their costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. SARA J. HARPER, J. and DAVID T. MATIA, J. CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY CHIEF JUSTICE N.B. This is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(B) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the clerk per App.R. 22(B). See, also S.Ct.Prac.R. II, Section 2(A)(1). .