COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69346 : STATE OF OHIO : : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellee : : and v. : : OPINION CHARLES WILSON : : : Defendant-Appellant : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: MARCH 20, 1997 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. CR-320007 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, ESQ. PAUL MANCINO, JR., ESQ. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 75 Public Square Suite 1016 LISA REITZ WILLIAMSON, ESQ. Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2098 THOMAS CONWAY, ESQ. Assistant County Prosecutors The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 - 2 - KARPINSKI, J.: Defendant Charles Wilson appeals from his jury convictions for first degree murder and three counts of armed robbery. The charges arose out of a shooting and robbery at a gas station on December 17, 1972. Defendant, who fled the scene and began using at least thirteen different name variations following the offenses, was ultimately arrested more than twenty-two years thereafter on 1 February 17, 1995. Defendant was indicted five days thereafter on one count of first degree murder under former R.C. 2901.01, and three counts of armed robbery under former R.C. 2901.13. The case proceeded to trial following the denial of pretrial motions to dismiss and to suppress evidence. The prosecution presented testimony from sixteen witnesses to support the charges. The prosecution's evidence at trial revealed that defendant drove his father's vehicle to an ARCO gas station owned by the victim Willie Binford on December 17, 1972. Defendant paid for maintenance on the vehicle with a stolen check and used a credit card to pay for gasoline. Defendant signed his own name "Charles Wilson" on the credit card slip. Defendant returned to the station shortly thereafter because he was dissatisfied with the repairs to the vehicle. Binford, who by this time had learned that the check was uncollectible, 1 The thirteen different name variations include defendant's use of names with different middle initials. - 3 - told defendant he would have to "make good" on the check. Defendant shot Binford in the head and neck, robbed his person, the gas station cash register, and two employees. Before fleeing the scene, defendant retrieved the stolen check and credit card slip, but not the carbon paper insert which bore his signature. Two of the gas station employees identified defendant as the offender and a handwriting examiner who performed a handwriting comparison testified that defendant signed the carbon paper. The record contains evidence that at various times defendant used a total of at least thirteen different names, maintained five different addresses, listed two different social security numbers, and changed his date of birth. Photographs revealed defendant's physical appearance also changed repeatedly and significantly. There was no defense testimony. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and on all three counts of armed robbery. The trial court entered judgment on the guilty verdicts and sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment on the first degree murder conviction and seven to twenty-five years on each of the three armed robbery convictions. Defendant timely appeals raising twelve assignments of error. Defendant's first assignment of error follows: DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE COURT OVERRULED HIS MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON A DENIAL OF A SPEEDY TRIAL. This assignment lacks merit. - 4 - Defendant contends the charges against him should have been dismissed because he was not tried until June 14, 1995, approximately twenty-two and one-half years after the December 17, 1972 killing and armed robberies. Defendant contends the police impermissibly delayed bringing him to trial on the charges. Defendant relies principally on Doggett v. United States (1992), 112 S.Ct. 2686, and State v. Luck (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 150, which held that unjustifiable delay of eight and one-half and seven years respectively from the date of the offense to the 2 date of trial was improper. Defendant's argument, however, ignores the fact that the trial court specifically found him to be a fugitive who repeatedly changed his identity, name, physical appearance, and whereabouts to avoid being brought to trial on the charges. The parties presented sharply conflicting evidence during the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss. Defendant presented testimony from five witnesses, and proffered testimony from a sixth, to support his claim that the prosecution did not diligently investigate the crimes. However, the prosecution presented abundant contrary evidence that defendant escaped apprehension, despite reasonable investigation, by using at least 2 Doggett involved post-indictment delay and is relevant to the charge of first degree murder because defendant was originally charged with this offense in 1973. Luck involved pre-indictment delay and is relevant to the armed robbery charges because defendant was not charged with those offenses until after his arrest in 1995. - 5 - (1) thirteen different name variations, (2) five different addresses, and (3) two social security numbers, in addition to (4) changing his physical appearance, and (5) date of birth. Defendant's name, social security number, date of birth and address changed between the time of the crimes and five months thereafter when defendant completed an employment application. Police records indicated that after the incident officers contacted numerous witnesses, including defendant's father, mother, and stepmother; his current and former schools, Cuyahoga Community College, East Tech High School; and his current employer, Ford Motor Company. The police also issued a nationwide all-points bulletin for defendant under the name of "Charles Wilson" and followed up on responses received. However, embarking on a series of deliberately deceptive changes in his name, address and physical appearance, defendant ensured that efforts to locate him under his true identity and likeness would be futile. The record contains the original dated postal correspondence and other documents recovered from defendant which show that he used at least thirteen different name variations, maintained five different addresses, and repeatedly changed his physical appearance. It is well established that the evidence and credibility of the witnesses is for the trial judge to weigh on pretrial motions. See State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366. The evidence abundantly supports the trial court's conclusion that defendant deliberately evaded the authorities. - 6 - The Supreme Court in Doggett specifically recognized that no constitutional violation occurs when the delay in bringing a defendant to trial results from the defendant's active efforts to escape detection: Our speedy trial standards recognize that pretrial delay is often inevitable and wholly justifiable. The government may need time to collect witnesses against the accused, oppose his pretrial motions, or, if he goes into hiding, track him down. We attach great weight to such considerations when balancing them against the costs of going forward with a trial whose probative accuracy the passage of time has begun by degrees to throw into question. Id. at 2693. The Doggett Court found defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial, in part, however, because the defendant lived openly under his own name in the United States for approximately six years and the trial court found the government was responsible for the post-indictment delay in bringing him to trial. State v. Luck, supra, which involved a due process claim arising out of a pre-indictment delay, is distinguishable for precisely the same reason. The defendant in Luck was a known suspect, was interrogated by the police, did not seek to hide, and remained in the area until indicted approximately sixteen years later. In the case sub judice, however, defendant became a fugitive after the incident, immediately began using different names, adopted several different residences, changed his physical appearance, and was, therefore, personally responsible for the lapse of time in bringing him to trial. - 7 - The lapse of time in bringing defendant to trial in the case at bar is similar to that in other cases involving fugitives. See United States v. Sandoval (9th Cir. 1993), 990 F.2d 481 (21 years); Pharm v. Hatcher (7th Cir. 1993), 984 F.2d 783 (13 years); United States v. Wangrow (8th Cir. 1991), 924 F.2d 1434 (19 years); State v. Williams (Apr. 20, 1994), Medina App. No. 2273-M, unreported at pp. 2-3 (16 years). Any prejudice to defendant's case which may have resulted from being tried after the death of his parents arose because of his own actions and does not dictate a different conclusion. Under the circumstances, defendant has failed to show the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds or denied him due process of law. Accordingly, defendant's first assignment of error is overruled. Defendant's second assignment of error follows: DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE COURT FAILED TO DISMISS THE ARMED ROBBERY COUNTS BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. This assignment lacks merit. Defendant contends the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss the three armed robbery charges on statute of limitations grounds. As noted by defendant, R.C. 2901.13(A)(1), - 8 - 3 which was enacted after the offenses in this case, establishes a six-year statute of limitations for armed robbery as follows: (A) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a prosecution shall be barred unless it is commenced within the following periods after an offense is committed: (1) For a felony other than aggravated murder or murder, six years; However, defendant's argument ignores R.C. 2901.13(G), which provides that the limitations period shall not commence on any crime when the accused deliberately evades prosecution as in this case: (G) The period of limitation shall not run during any time when the accused purposely avoids prosecution. Proof that the accused absented himself from this state or concealed his identity or whereabouts is prima- facie evidence of his purpose to avoid prosecution. The evidence discussed above in the context of defendant's speedy trial claims, which shows that defendant sought to avoid prosecution, is also relevant to determining whether any limitations period had run. As noted above, the three armed robberies occurred on December 17, 1972. The prosecution presented police records indicating the police immediately contacted members of defendant's family who were uncooperative. The police investigated schools defendant attended, his former employer, and numerous other witnesses. A job application completed by 3 There was no statute of limitations on any of the charges in this case when defendant committed the crimes on December 17, 1972. There continues to be no statute of limitations on murder charges. R.C. 2901.13(A)(1). - 9 - defendant approximately six months after the offenses, in May of 1973, shows that defendant was already using a different name, date of birth, and social security number to identify himself. Defendant himself presented conflicting testimony concerning his residence after the crimes. It appears that defendant ultimately used at least thirteen different name variations and five different addresses before he was arrested on the warrant issued for his arrest. The record shows there was sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that defendant concealed his identity and/or whereabouts to avoid prosecution and thus to toll the statute of limitations under R.C. 2901.13(G). State v. Dawson (Nov. 18, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 63122, unreported. We further note that the record is sufficient, without the use of any presumption, to support the trial court's finding. Under the circumstances, defendant has failed to show that he was denied due process of law. Accordingly, defendant's second assignment of error is overruled. Defendant's third assignment of error follows: DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE COURT OVERRULED HIS MOTION TO SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE. This assignment lacks merit. Defendant contends the trial court should have suppressed the testimony of Donnell Watson concerning his identification of defendant as the offender. Defendant complains the photographic array presented to Watson contained only two photographs and the - 10 - procedure was improperly suggestive. Defendant also complains that Watson encountered him in the courthouse prior to trial. The Ohio Supreme Court has recently recognized that presentation of a single photograph to an eyewitness may provide a sufficient basis for admissible identification testimony. State v. Allen (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 634. Although use of only two photographs may have been "suggestive," it is well established that reliable identification testimony may be admitted regardless of flaws in the identification procedure. Id., citing State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22, 26-27. The record shows that, prior to the offenses, Watson observed defendant over the course of a three-hour period while repairs were being made to the vehicle driven by defendant. Defendant subsequently robbed Watson at gunpoint. Both Watson's in- and out-of-court identifications of defendant as the offender were independently verified, moreover, by another eyewitness and further supported by the testimony of the handwriting expert. Under the totality of the circumstances, defendant has failed to show that Watson's pretrial identification was unreliable to warrant suppressing the evidence, that Watson's in-court identification should have been excluded, or that he was otherwise denied due process of law. Accordingly, defendant's third assignment of error is overruled. Defendant's fourth assignment of error follows: - 11 - DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE COURT OVERRULED HIS MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF SEARCH WARRANTS IN THIS CASE. This assignment lacks merit. Defendant contends the state improperly obtained evidence as a result of general warrants authorizing the police to search his residence. Among the evidence recovered were photographs, postal correspondence, pay stubs, cancelled checks, identification and social security cards, and similar documents which showed defendant repeatedly changed his name, address, and physical appearance after the crimes. The first warrant specified, in pertinent part, that the police sought to recover the following items: Photographs, books, documents, papers, records, and other material tending to establish the identity, change of identity, and whereabouts, of Charles Wilson a/k/a Dahlia Wilson a/k/a D.W. Bey between 1972 and the present; and/or any and all other contraband and/or evidence tending to establish the violations of the homicide and theft laws of the State of Ohio, to wit: R.C. Chapters 2903. and 2911. The second warrant added "photograph albums" and "scrap books" to the above list of items. Contrary to defendant's argument, these descriptions in the search warrants are sufficiently specific and not impermissibly overbroad. The Federal Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected a similar claim that a warrant authorizing a search for "weapons," "disguises," "U.S. currency," and "fictitious identification" constituted an improper general warrant in United States v. Savoca (6th Cir. 1985), 761 F.2d 292, 298-299. See also State v. Benner (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 301, 307 (upholding a - 12 - warrant authorizing a search for "fibers and hairs and other trace evidence for comparison"). The warrants in this case did not authorize a general exploratory search of defendant's residence, and the items listed were sufficiently specific to provide appropriate guidelines for the officers conducting the search. Defendant does not indicate how the description in the warrants of the items sought to be recovered could have been any more specific. The items recovered were of the type specified in the warrant. Under the circumstances, defendant has failed to show that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress this evidence or otherwise denied him due process of law. Accordingly, defendant's fourth assignment of error is overruled. Defendant's fifth assignment of error follows: DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE COURT PROCEEDED TO COMMENT UPON THE CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS ON A CRUCIAL ISSUE OF IDENTIFICATION. This assignment lacks merit. Defendant argues the trial court erred and improperly denied his motion for a mistrial after the court stated for the record in front of the jury that employee eyewitness Jesse Coleman 4 "positively" identified defendant. The record shows defendant did not initially raise any objection to the trial court's use of the term "positively." 4 The word "positively" could mean either that the witness "affirmatively" identified the defendant as the offender or that his identification was "certain." - 13 - After defendant made a motion for mistrial the following day, the trial judge gave the jury a curative instruction which specifically informed the jury that evaluation of the evidence was solely the province of the jury. First, contrary to defendant's argument, Coleman's identifi- cation testimony was not "crucial" because he was only one of the victim's employees who identified defendant. Defense counsel, furthermore, had an opportunity to cross-examine Coleman to determine the accuracy and reliability of his identification. Moreover, the fact that none of defendant's three experienced trial counsel objected to the trial court's statement confirms that the single, isolated statement was innocuous when made. Even if erroneous or ambiguous, the statement was sufficiently corrected by the court's subsequent curative instruction. The jury was properly instructed that evaluation of this evidence was solely within the province of the jury. Under the circumstances, defendant has failed to show prejudicial error or that he was denied a fair trial. See State v. Wade (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 182, 187-189. Accordingly, defendant's fifth assignment of error is overruled. Defendant's sixth assignment of error follows: DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE COURT PERMITTED HEARSAY TESTIMONY AS TO THE SOURCE OF THE LICENSE PLATE REPORTED TO THE POLICE. This assignment lacks merit. - 14 - Defendant contends for the first time on appeal that the trial court improperly permitted Detective McKibben to testify concerning the license plate number listed on the credit card slip signed by defendant when he purchased gasoline from the victim on December 17, 1972. Defendant contends this testimony was improper "hearsay." The license plate number did not constitute "hearsay." The information was introduced not to prove the truth of the matter (that is, what the license plate number actually was), but rather to show evidence of the transaction and the basis for the 5 subsequent police investigation. It is well established, contrary to defendant's argument, that statements offered to explain a police officer's conduct during an investigation do not constitute hearsay. State v. Thomas (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 223, 232; State v. Price (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 108, 110; State v. Mills (Feb. 4, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 61780, unreported at pp. 6-7. This court has previously affirmed the admission of a license plate number into evidence on precisely these grounds. State v. Davis (1988), 49 Ohio App.3d 109, 113-114. We note that even if this information were "hearsay" as defendant contends, he has failed to establish plain error from the admission of the information into evidence in this case to support his claim that he was denied due process of law. 5 The license plate number was registered in the name of defendant's father. - 15 - Accordingly, defendant's sixth assignment of error is overruled. Defendant's seventh assignment of error follows: DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE COURT PERMITTED EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH FAILED TO QUALIFY AS EXPERT TESTIMONY AND WAS BASED UPON INFORMATION FROM OTHER PERSONS, THUS, DENYING DEFENDANT HIS RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION. This assignment lacks merit. Defendant contends that the coroner was improperly permitted to testify in this case because she was not the person who conducted the autopsy of the victim in 1972. Defendant also argues that a forensic document examiner should not have been permitted to testify. The Ohio Supreme Court recently rejected defendant's argument concerning the coroner's testimony. State v. Mack (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 502. It is well established, contrary to defendant's argument, that experts need not base their opinion testimony solely on facts or data perceived by them. Id. at 510- 512; State v. Solomon (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 124. Medical experts frequently rely upon reports prepared by other medical professionals. Moreover, certified copies of autopsy protocol 6 documents are admissible into evidence. Coroner Balraj merely 6 Counsel for defendant served as counsel of record in two prior cases when this court pointed this out and rejected the argument he now makes again. State v. Mack (Dec. 2, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 62366, unreported, affirmed, State v. Mack (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 502; State v. Boyd (May 28, 1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 60639, unreported. We find his argument no more persuasive the third time. - 16 - recited the findings of the autopsy report and conclusions based on her own observations in connection with the case. Defendant's objection to forensic document examiner Mary Kelly's handwriting opinion testimony likewise lacks merit. The Ohio Supreme Court has recently recognized the admissibility of handwriting expert testimony. State v. Loza (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 76-77. Such testimony by qualified experts is sufficiently reliable to be admissible at trial. Under the circumstances, defendant has not shown any error concerning the admission of any of this testimony or that the trial court denied him due process of law. Accordingly, defendant's seventh assignment of error is overruled. Defendant's eighth assignment of error follows: DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY REASON OF INTRODUCTION OF IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL EVIDENCE. This assignment lacks merit. Defendant complains in a two-paragraph assignment of error that Detective Candelaria stated he arrested defendant and that the prosecution introduced into evidence exhibits obtained by warrant from defendant's residence concerning defendant's various identities in this case. The transcript cited by defendant shows Detective Candelaria commented on the outstanding arrest warrant for defendant, but made no comment on defendant's arrest. Moreover, it is well established that evidence concerning flight from justice may be admissible to establish consciousness of guilt. State v. Richey - 17 - (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 357; State v. Eaton (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 145, syllabus paragraph two. In this case, the circumstances of defendant's arrest and his repeated changes in identity following the crimes were relevant to whether defendant's conduct exhibited a consciousness of guilt. Defendant was not denied a fair trial. Accordingly, defendant's eighth assignment of error is overruled. Defendant's ninth assignment of error follows: DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY REASON OF IMPROPER ARGUMENT AND OFFER OF IMPROPER EVIDENCE. This assignment lacks merit. Defendant contends the prosecution presented improper victim character evidence concerning Willie Binford's involvement with his church and his family. The Ohio Supreme Court has recently rejected defendant's claim that isolated references to the victim's way of life as in this case constitute prejudicial error. State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio St.2d 414, 420-421. The record shows, contrary to defendant's argument, that he received a fair trial. Accordingly, defendant's ninth assignment of error is overruled. Defendant's tenth assignment of error follows: DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE COURT INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH A NEWLY ANNOUNCED INSTRUCTION. This assignment lacks merit. - 18 - Defendant contends the trial court improperly instructed the jury concerning the proper manner of evaluating circumstantial evidence. Defendant contends he was entitled to the approved circumstantial evidence jury instruction existing at the time he committed the offenses set forth in State v. Kulig (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 157. Defendant argues the trial court improperly instructed the jury in this case according to State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, which overruled Kulig and eliminated any requirement for a separate circumstantial evidence instruction. However, the Ohio Supreme Court has rejected defendant's argument in State v. Webb (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 325, 330. The Webb Court specifically held that applying Jenks to crimes occurring before 1991 did not violate federal or state constitutional provisions prohibiting ex post facto laws. The Sixth District Court of Appeals pointed this out to defense counsel when he previously raised the argument in State v. Parsons (Jan. 27, 1995), Huron App. No. H-93-47, unreported at p. 7. Defendant's attempt to clothe this argument under the elastic doctrine of due process is no more persuasive in this case. Accordingly, defendant's tenth assignment of error is overruled. Defendant's eleventh assignment of error follows: DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN HE WAS SENTENCED FOR A CAPITAL OFFENSE AT TRIAL WHEN HE WAS DENIED A SPECIAL VENIRE REQUIRED FOR A CAPITAL OFFENSE. This assignment lacks merit. - 19 - Defendant contends that he was entitled to a special venire because when he committed the first degree murder in 1972 the crime was a capital offense. Defendant should have raised this issue prior to selecting the jury. This claim is waived and, even if it were timely raised, lacks merit. Case law at the time defendant killed the victim in this case held that defendants charged with the offense of first degree murder were not entitled to a special venire. State v. Gaines (1974), 40 Ohio App.2d 224, 231-232. The Ohio Supreme Court has also subsequently recognized that a special venire is not required when, as in this case, there is no possibility that defendant can be sentenced to death for the offense. State ex rel. Corrigan v. McAllister (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 239. Defendant was not denied due process of law. Accordingly, defendant's eleventh assignment of error is overruled. Defendant's twelfth assignment of error follows: DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN HE WAS MULTIPLY SENTENCED FOR MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE AND ARMED ROBBERY. This assignment lacks merit. Defendant argues that the trial court improperly sentenced him for first degree murder and "the armed robbery." Defendant argues these offenses should be merged. R.C. 2901.01 defined the offense of first degree murder as follows: No person shall purposely, and either of deliberate and premeditated malice, or by means of poison, or in - 20 - perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate rape, arson, robbery, or burglary, kill another. R.C. 2901.13 defined the offense of armed robbery as follows: No person shall knowingly, while armed with a pistol or other dangerous weapon, by force or violence, or by putting in fear, steal from another. Defendant apparently contends that his theft of money from the person of the victim after he shot him in the head constituted both first degree murder and armed robbery. Even if this were true, however, the record shows that defendant committed three additional armed robberies when he also stole, while armed with the pistol he just fired, money from two employees and the store cash-register. As a result, under the circumstances, defendant has failed to show the trial court committed any sentencing error or denied him due process of law. Accordingly, defendant's twelfth assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 21 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DAVID T. MATIA, P.J., and McMONAGLE, J., CONCUR. DIANE KARPINSKI JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement .