COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 70411 HOUSEHOLD REALTY CORPORATION : : ACCELERATED DOCKET : PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : NAUM HOOLIN, ET AL. : OPINION : : PER CURIAM DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: AUGUST 22, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CV-270531. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: Stephen D. Miles, Esq., 18 W. Monument Avenue, Dayton, Ohio, 45402. For defendants-appellants: David M. Dworkin, Esq., 20133 Farnsleigh Road, South Euclid, Ohio, 44122. For Cuyahoga County Treasurer, et al: James O'Brien, Assistant County Prosecutor, Justice Center, 8th Floor, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio, 44113. For Firestone Bank: Steven M. Ott, Esq., 50 Public Square, 600 Terminal Tower, Cleveland, Ohio, 44113, and Phyllis A. Ulrich, Esq., Carlisle, McNellie & Rini, 28601 Chagrin Boulevard, Suite 600, Cleveland, Ohio, 44122-4531. - 3 - PER CURIAM: An accelerated appeal is authorized pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 25. The purpose of an accelerated docket is to allow an appellate court to render a brief and conclusionary decision. Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 158; App.R. 11.1(E). Defendants-appellants Naum Hoolin and Helen Hoolin appeal from the trial court's decision granting the motion for summary judgment of the plaintiff-appellee Household Realty Corporation (Household). The trial court adopted the magistrate's report which granted the appellee foreclosure on a home owned by Helen Hoolin. The appellants entered into an open-end loan with the appellee and secured the loan with a mortgage on the home owned by Helen Hoolin. After paying off a balance of $60,500, Household contacted the appellants individually and asked if they wished the loan to remain open. The appellants each affirmed that they requested the appellee to cancel the loan. Shortly thereafter, Naum Hoolin borrowed another $60,000. The appellee filed suit seeking the balance due on the loan. Judgment was entered for the sum of $56,030.95 plus interest and costs. The appellants assert one assignment of error: THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED BELOW MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS SUBMITTED EVIDENCE IN AFFIDAVIT FORM WHICH PRESENTED SPECIFIC FACTS EXPLAINING THAT A GENUINE ISSUE EXISTED FOR TRIAL. - 4 - The appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting the appellee's motion for summary judgment. The appellants contend that since they waived their right to close out the loan account in writing as required under R.C. 1321.58, the appellee should have closed out the account as authorized during the telephone call. Hence, the account should have been closed prior to Naum Hoolin borrowing the second $60,000. In the alternative, the appellants argue that the appellee is estopped from asserting that the open- end loan is a valid lien securing the defaulted loan to Naum Hoolin because Helen Hoolin reasonably relied on the telephone conversation to cancel the loan. Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact remaining to be litigated, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come but to one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. State, ex rel. Parsons v. Fleming (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 509, Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317. The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial, however, the nonmoving party must produce evidence on any issue for which that party bears the burden of production at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1987), 477 U.S. 317. See also Mitseff v. - 5 - Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 112. Doubts must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 356. The appellate court reviews the trial court's granting of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Brown v. Scioto Bd. of Commrs. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 704. R.C. 1321.58 authorizes and governs open-end loans. R.C. 1321.58(F) states that whenever there is no unpaid balance in an open-end account, the account may be terminated by written notice, by the borrower or by the lending institution, to the other party. Where the lending institution has taken a mortgage to secure the open-end loan, it shall deliver to the borrower a release of the mortgage within thirty days of the termination of the account. Neither party contends that written notice of the termination of the account was ever given, nor was the mortgage released. In N. Olmsted v. Eliza Jennings, Inc. (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 173, this court held that a waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right, with the intent to do so with full knowledge of all the facts. A waiver is akin to estoppel and may be enforced by the person having a duty to perform, who has changed his position as a result of the waiver. The party seeking to prove the waiver must do so by showing a clear, unequivocal, decisive act by the other party of such purpose it amounts to an estoppel on that party's part. Id. at 180. Promissory estoppel is defined as "a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance - 6 - on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Talley v. Teamsters Local No. 377 (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 142. In the case sub judice, the appellee submitted uncontested evidence that the appellants borrowed a sum certain on an open-end loan, that the loan was secured by a mortgage, and that the appellants defaulted on the payments. The appellee clearly established its right to foreclose on the property used to secure the debt. Neither of the appellants submitted any evidence that they voluntarily relinquished the right to close the account in writing. There is no evidence that the appellee and the appellant ever discussed the need to close the account in writing, much less that the appellants waived their right to properly close the account. The appellants submitted no evidence, much less clear, unequivocal, decisive, evidence of any act by the appellee of such purpose it amounts to an estoppel and would prohibit the appellee from enforcing the terms of the agreement. The appellee merely telephoned the appellants and initiated a discussion of the future of the account. The appellee had every right to expect that if the appellants wished to close the account, that they would then follow through with the necessary steps to do so. The record contains no evidence that the appellee ever promised to close the account without a written request as provided for in the statute. - 7 - The appellants assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 8 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, P.J. ANN DYKE, J. JOHN T. PATTON, J. N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .