COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 70150 STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION CAGLE WOOD : : Defendant-appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : SEPTEMBER 19, 1996 OF DECISION : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Criminal appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CR-328311 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: For defendant-appellant: GEORGE J. SADD, ESQ. ROBERT M. INGERSOLL, ESQ. Assistant County Prosecutor Assistant Public Defender 8th Floor, Justice Center 100 Lakeside Place 1200 Ontario Street 1200 West Third Street Cleveland, OH 44113 Cleveland, OH 44113 - 2 - PATTON, J. Defendant-appellant Cagle Wood appeals the trial court's acceptance of his guilty plea where he pleaded guilty to attempted drug trafficking with a violence specification. On November 16, 1995 defendant entered into a plea bargain agreement where defendant would only plead guilty to count one which was amended to include the attempt statute and count two would be nolled. When defendant appeared before the trial court he admitted he had consumed a little alcohol that morning but stated he understood the proceedings. The trial court then explained to defendant the rights he was waiving and defendant subsequently pled guilty. The trial court sentenced defendant to a minimum term of incarceration of one and one-half to five years in prison. Defendant's sole assignment of error states as follows: CAGEL WOOD HAS BEEN DEPRIVED OF HIS LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY HIS GUILTY PLEA IN THE CASE AT BAR, WHICH WAS NOT A KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO TRIAL. Defendant contends the trial court failed to inform him of his right to counsel and argues that if he had been informed of this right he would have pleaded not guilty and gone to trial with a court appointed attorney. Also, defendant claims his guilty plea was not fully voluntary and knowing because he was under the influence of alcohol. - 3 - The state counters by maintaining under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understood the implica- tions of his plea and the rights he waived. There was no objection by defendant or his attorney that defendant had a right to appointed counsel. Errors which arise in the trial court, which are not brought to the attention of the court by objection or otherwise, are waived and may not be raised on appeal. Stores Realty Co. v. Cleveland (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 41, 43. However, even if there was an objection it would not have been well-taken. It is true the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu- tion guarantees a defendant the right to counsel. In this case, defendant had counsel, and stated on the record that he was satisfied with the representation he was receiving. It is illogical for defendant to argue he was not apprised of his right to appointed counsel when in fact he retained counsel on his own. Furthermore, Crim. R. 11(C) sets the forth the trial court's responsibility when accepting a plea of guilty in felony cases and states: "(1) Where in a felony case the defendant is unrepresented by counsel the court shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest unless the defendant, after being readvised that he has the right to be represented by retained counsel, or pursuant to Rule 44 by appointed counsel, waives this right. (2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and: - 4 - (a) Determining that he is making the plea voluntarily, with the understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that he is not eligible for probation. (b) Informing him of and determining that he understands the effect of his plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court upon acceptance of the plea may proceed with judgment and sentence. (c) Informing him and determining that he understands that by his plea he is waiving his rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be compelled to testify against himself." (emphasis added). Crim R. 11(C)(1) clearly states the trial court shall not accept a guilty plea if a defendant is unrepresented by counsel and only if defendant is unrepresented by counsel shall he then be advised he has a right to appointed counsel. In the present case, defendant was represented by counsel so the trial court did not err by not informing defendant of his right to appointed counsel. Defendant next argues his guilty plea was not voluntary and knowingly made because he was under the influence of alcohol. Defendant claims the trial court should have made further inquiries to determine whether defendant's ability to make a knowing waiver was affected by the alcohol. This type of inquiry is not required by Crim. R. 11(C)(2). State v. Hall (April 27, 1989), Cuyahoga App. No. 55289, - 5 - unreported. Thus on review, this court must examine the record and determine whether under the totality of the circumstances there was substantial compliance with the requirements of Crim. R. 11. State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 86. To determine whether there was substantial compliance we must review the relevant testimony: THE COURT: Right now, are you under the influence of drug or alcohol? MR. WOOD: I had a little alcohol this morning. THE COURT: Do you understand what's going on now? You have to say yes out loud. MR. WOOD: Yes. THE COURT: And are you satisfied with the representation you received from your attorney? MR. WOOD: Yes, I have. THE COURT: Do you understand that upon entering a plea of guilt, you are waiving or giving up certain constitutional rights? MR. WOOD: Yes. THE COURT: I'm going to explain those rights to you. Let me know you understand each right, after I read it by saying yes out loud. Do you understand you have a right to trial by jury or by a judge? MR. WOOD: Yes. THE COURT: To subpoena witnesses to appear and testify on your behalf? MR. WOOD: Yes. THE COURT: To cross-examine witnesses. MR. WOOD: Yes. - 6 - THE COURT: To remain silent, not testify and no one can comment on the fact that you did not testify at trial.? MR. WOOD: Yes. THE COURT: Do you understand what you are pleading guilty to? MR. WOOD: Yes. THE COURT: As well as the possible penalties? MR. WOOD: Yes. THE COURT: Are you on probation or parole. MR. WOOD: No, I am not. THE COURT: I told your lawyer I would give you the minimum sentence. Other than that has anyone promised you anything or threatened you in any way to get you to plead? MR. WOOD: No. THE COURT: Are you an American citizen. MR. WOOD: Yes, I am. THE COURT: Do you understand the next step in the proceedings will be sentencing? MR. WOOD: Yes. THE COURT: How do you plead to the charge of attempted drug trafficking, with a specification referencing an offense of violence, guilty or not guilty? MR. WOOD: Guilty. In light of the foregoing exchange between defendant and the trial court it is clear defendant understood the nature of the - 7 - charge against him, the potential penalties, the rights he was waiving, and that he was pleading guilty. Although defendant stated he had consumed a little alcohol this morning, he stated that he understood the proceedings. In addition, this court has on prior occasions recognized that a defendant may be under the influence of an intoxicant and still make a voluntary plea. State v. Stephens (June 10, 1993), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 62554, 62555 and 62556, unreported; State v. Kloos (Feb. 12, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 50879, unreported; and State v. McGhee (Feb 12, 1987), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 51540, 51541, 51542, unreported. Therefore, we find the trial court substantially complied with the requirements contained in Crim. R. 11 and defendant knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty to the charge against him. Accord- ingly, defendant's sole assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 8 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. SPELLACY, C.J. O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR. JUDGE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App. R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .