COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 70067 : ACCELERATED DOCKET ITALIA PALMIERI : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : and -vs- : : OPINION DEACONESS HOSPITAL : : Defendant-Appellee : PER CURIAM : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : JUNE 13, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. 288,010 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : __________________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: WILLIAM J. NOVAK PETER C. TUCKER Attorneys at Law 270 Skylight Office Tower Tower City Center Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1498 For defendant-appellee: DALE E. MARKWORTH Attorney at Law 55 Public Square, #2150 Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1994 - 2 - PER CURIAM: This cause came on to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 25, the records from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, the briefs and the oral arguments of counsel. Plaintiff-appellant Italia Palmieri appeals the decision of the trial court which granted summary judgment to the defendant- appellee, Deaconess Health Systems, on her claims of medical malpractice against it. The complaint of plaintiff Palmieri claimed that the inser- tion of a naso-gastric tube into her lungs constituted clear negligence on the part of the defendant, Deaconess Hospital. Upon motion for summary judgment, the trial court entered judgment for the defendant/hospital on December 5, 1995. The trial court determined that the "defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted as the plaintiff has failed to provide an expert report as to the standard of care. The standard of care as to the post-operative placement of a nasogastric tube is not sufficiently obvious that it can be reasonably evaluated by non- professionals." From this judgment of the trial court, the plaintiff filed her appeal on January 8, 1996, claiming the trial court erred in that an expert report was not required to - 3 - prove her case in medical malpractice. This court granted the appellant's Motion to Deem the Appeal as being Timely Filed pursuant to Civ.R. 58(B). For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Appellant raises the following sole assignment of error for our review: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRE- TION IN GRANTING DEFENDANT-APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BY FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT EXPERT TESTIMONY IS NOT REQUIRED IN THE WITHIN ACTION AS THE STANDARD OF CARE IS SUF- FICIENTLY OBVIOUS THAT NON-PROFESSIONALS CAN REASONABLY EVALUATE THE CONDUCT. This court reviews the lower court's granting of summary judgment de novo. Brown v. Scioto Bd. of Commrs. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711 ("We review the judgment independently and without deference to the trial court's determination."). The appellate court applies the same test as the trial court, which is set forth in Civ.R. 56(C). Stegawski v. Cleveland Anesthesia Group, Inc. (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 78. Civ.R. 56 specifically provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that: (1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclu- sion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327. - 4 - Moreover, it is well settled that the party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1987), 477 U.S. 317, 330; Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 115; Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280. Doubts must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358-359. In accordance with Civ.R. 56(E), "a nonmovant may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Chaney v. Clark Cty. Agricultural Soc. (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 421. The nonmoving party must produce evidence on any issue for which that party bears the burden of production at trial. Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 111; Celotex, supra, at 322-323. The medical malpractice complained of by appellant in the matter before us is the post-operative insertion of a naso- gastric tube into the plaintiff-appellant's lungs. The record reflects after the insertion of the naso-gastric tube, an X-ray was taken which diagnosed the tube as mispositioned. The tube was then reinserted and repositioned into the appellant's stomach. In Ohio, in order to establish a cognizable claim of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must show the existence of the standard of care in the medical community, the breach of that standard of care, and proximate cause between the medical negligence and the - 5 - injury sustained. Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 86; Bruni v. Tatsumi (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 127, 131; Buerger v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corp. (1989), 64 Ohio App.3d 394. In Bruni, supra, the supreme court stated: Proof of malpractice, in effect, requires two evidentiary steps: evidence as to the recog- nized standard of the medical community in the particular kind of case, and a showing that the physician in question negligently departed from this standard in his treatment of plaintiff *** Id. at 131. The issue as to whether the physician or surgeon has pro- ceeded in the treatment of a patient with the requisite standard of care and skill must ordinarily be determined from the testimony of experts. Buerger v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., supra; Bruni, supra. In addition, the establishment of proximate cause through the testimony of a physician must be by probability. Shumaker v. Oliver B. Cannon & Son, Inc. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 367. Appellee Deaconess Health Center supported its motion for summary judgment with the affidavit of its medical expert, Arnold M. Baskies, M.D. By affidavit, Dr. Baskies stated that in his opinion, "to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the placement of a nasogastric tube in Italia Palmieri was performed according to the recognized standards of the medical community and no injury was caused to the patient by the procedure." - 6 - The appellant offered no expert testimony as to the standard of care to rebut the affidavit testimony of Dr. Baskies. An exception to the rule requiring expert testimony exists when the standard of care is sufficiently obvious that non- professionals can reasonably evaluate that conduct. Bruni, supra; Whiteleather v. Yosowitz (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 272. Appellant in this case contends that the insertion of a naso-gastric tube into the lung indicates such an apparent lack of skill or care on the part of the hospital that it is to be within the comprehension of laymen and requires only common knowledge and experience to understand and judge it. Bruni, supra, at 130; Buerger, supra, at 398; and Johnson, supra, at 127. However, as the court in Buerger, supra, stated at 399, "(r)elatively few courts in Ohio have found the common knowledge exception applicable so as to obviate the need for expert witness testimony on the malpractice issue. While no general rule can be stated, those cases seem to deal with instances of gross inatten- tion to plaintiff's needs when it was obvious that plaintiff needed attention. See Jones v. Hawkes Hosp. of Mount Carmel (1964), 175 Ohio St. 503, 26 O.O.2d 170, 196 N.E.2d 593 (delirious pregnant woman who had attempted to climb out of bed several times was left unattended by nurse); Urdang v. Makrer (App.1959), 81 Ohio Law Abs. 23, 158 N.E.2d 902 (seventy-six- year-old woman was left unattended in lavatory and injured herself trying to get out after crying out for help several - 7 - times); Wharton v. Long (1934), 18 Ohio Law Abs. 147 (doctor failed to attend to a minor boy who, when taken home after adenoid and tonsil surgery, vomited blood and had a high fever)." Buerger supra, at 399. Appellee Deaconess Health Center contends that the alleged negligence in this case is not sufficiently obvious that non- professionals can reasonably evaluate the conduct. We agree. The record does not disclose facts from which an inference might rea-sonably be drawn that a lay person might understand and judge that the hospital was negligent in its initial insertion of the naso-gastric tube into the lung of the patient. "Absent compelling evidence in the record tending to demon- strate a complete lack of care and skill on the professional's part, this court will not recognize an exception to the rule calling for an expert witness to establish a plaintiff's malprac- tice action." Rogoff v. King (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 438. Accordingly, some expert testimony on the requisite standard of care and skill would be necessary under these facts to show that the defendant, Deaconess Health Center, deviated from that standard. In the case sub judice, the record reflects that: 1) the appellee has supported its motion with a sworn affidavit testimony indicating that the treatment of appellant at Deaconess complied with the applicable standards of care recognized by the medical community; 2) the appellant has failed to offer any expert testimony to establish the recognized standards of the medical community; and 3) the appellant has failed to show that - 8 - the claimed negligence caused her harm. Therefore, defendant- appellee Deaconess Hospital is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Hoffman v. Davidson (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 60, 62. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed. This cause is affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. SARA J. HARPER, PRESIDING JUDGE TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, JUDGE JOHN T. PATTON, JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, .