COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 70021 CITY OF CLEVELAND : : ACCELERATED DOCKET : PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : MAURICE RHOADES : OPINION : : PER CURIAM DEFENDANT-APPELLANT : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: OCTOBER 10, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Cleveland Municipal Court, No. 95-CRB-32490. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: Carolyn Watts-Allen, Esq. Cleveland City Prosecutor 8th Floor Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113 For Defendant-Appellant: Maurice Rhoades, pro se 2455 Baldwin Road Cleveland, OH 44104 -2- PER CURIAM: This cause came on to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 25, the record from the City of Cleveland Municipal Court and the brief of Maurice Rhoades, defendant-appellant. Maurice Rhoades, defendant-appellant, appeals from his conviction in the City of Cleveland Municipal Court for the offense of disorderly conduct in violation of Cleveland Codified Ordinance 605.03(B). Defendant-appellant assigns one error for this court's review. Maurice Rhoades', defendant-appellant's, appeal is not well taken. On November 6, 1995, Maurice Rhoades, defendant-appellant, was arrested at Cuyahoga Community College, downtown campus, in their auditorium after a public hearing on Medicare hosted by Congressman Louis Stokes. Allegedly, defendant-appellant had created a disturbance during the hearing by heckling Mr. Stokes and was involved in a physical altercation with a Mr. Randy Jone of the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority. A bench trial took place on November 23, 1995 in the Cleveland Municipal Court. Maurice Rhoades, defendant-appellant, was found guilty of disorderly conduct in violation of Cleveland Codified Ordinance 605.03(B), a minor misdemeanor. Defendant-appellant was then ordered by the trial court to pay a $100 fine plus court costs. The trial court allowed defendant-appellant until December 22, 1995 to pay the imposed fine and costs. -3- On December 20, 1995, Maurice Rhoades, defendant-appellant, filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. Defendant-appellant's sentence was stayed pending the outcome on appeal. Maurice Rhoades', defendant-appellant's, sole assignment of error states: THE VERDICT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. Defendant-appellant argues, through his only assignment of error, that the trial court's verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, defendant-appellant maintains that he did not create a disturbance at the public hearing in question nor did he have any type of physical altercation with Randy Jone of the Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority. It is defendant-appellant's position that the arresting officer fabricated testimony regarding defendant- appellant's actions. Defendant-appellant maintains further that the trial court accepted the testimony of the arresting officer due to politically motivated considerations arising out of Congressman Stokes' position in the community. In State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, the court set forth the test to be utilized when addressing the issue of manifest weight of the evidence. The Martin court stated: There being sufficient evidence to support the conviction as a matter of law, we next consider the claim that the judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Here the test is much broader. The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the -4- evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. *** See Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 457 U.S. 31, 38, 42. State v. Martin, supra, at 175. Moreover, the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, paragraph one of the syllabus. The power to reverse a judgment of conviction as against the manifest weight must be exercised with caution and in only the rare case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. State v. Martin, supra. In determining whether a judgment of conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, this court in State v. Wilson (June 9, 1994), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 64442/64443, unreported, adopted the guidelines set forth in State v. Mattison (1985), 23 Ohio App.3d 10, syllabus. These factors, which this court noted are in no way exhaustive, include: 1) Knowledge that even a reviewing court is not required to accept the incredible as true; 2) Whether evidence is uncontradicted; 3) Whether a witness was impeached; 4) Attention to what was not proved; 5) The certainty of the evidence; 6) The reliability of the evidence; -5- 7) The extent to which a witness may have a personal interest to advance or defend their testimony; and 8) The extent to which the evidence is vague, uncertain, conflicting or fragmentary. A reviewing court will not reverse a verdict where the trier of fact could reasonably conclude from substantial evidence that the state has proved the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 169. In the case sub judice, defendant-appellant maintains that the trial court's verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, defendant-appellant has failed to provide this court with a transcript of the bench trial in question or an App.R. 9(B) equivalent. Under App.R. 9, if an appellant intends to urge an appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the weight of the evidence, he must provide the reviewing court with either a complete or partial verbatim transcript of the testimony, as required by App.R. 9(B), a narrative statement of the proceedings, as provided for in App.R. 9(C) or an agreed statement as provided for in App.R. 9(D). Conway v. Ford Motor Co. (1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 233. Since defendant-appellant failed to provide this court with a transcript or an App.R. 9 alternative, this court is left with no option but to indulge the presumption of regularity of the proceedings and the validity of the judgment in the trial court. Ostrander v. Parker-Fallis (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 72, 74; Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 197. -6- Accordingly, defendant-appellant's sole assignment of error is not well taken. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cleveland Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DAVID T. MATIA, JUDGE, AND TERRENCE O'DONNELL, JUDGE, CONCURS; SARA J. HARPER, PRESIDING JUDGE, DISSENTS WITHOUT OPINION. N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement .