COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 70018 CAROL PISANI : ACCELERATED DOCKET : Plaintiff-appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION GLENN T. PISANI : : Defendant-appellee : PER CURIAM : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OF DECISION : SEPT. 19, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Domestic Relations Div. Case No. 219910 JUDGMENT : Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Carol Pisani, Pro se Richard S. Koblentz, Esq. 30 Commons Court Craig J. Morice, Esq. Chagrin Falls, Ohio 44022 Koblentz & Koblentz 75 Public Square, Suite 1025 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- PER CURIAM: An accelerated appeal is authorized pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 25. The purpose of an accelerated appeal is to allow an appellate court to render a brief and conclusionary decision. Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn. (1983), 17 Ohio App.3d 158; App.R.11.1(E). Plaintiff-appellant, Carol A. Pisani nka Carol A. Catalano ("appellant"), appeals pro se from the trial court's decision overruling her Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate a judgment. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion. A review of the record compels affirmance of the trial court's ruling. The procedural background of this case is as follows: In the summer of 1992, appellant and her husband, defendant-appellee, Glenn T. Pisani ("appellee"), intiated divorce proceedings. The trial court granted the divorce. The trial court journalized an entry designating appellee as the residential parent of the two minor children from the marriage, and an entry ordering appellant to pay child support. Appellant was ordered to pay child support, commencing on May 10, 1994. On December 2, 1994, a hearing was held regarding appellee's motion to determine child support and pay child support. An agreed judgment entry was journalized granting judgment in favor of appellee in the amount of $2,124.86. This amount reflected appellant's unpaid child support obligation for the period of May 11, 1994 through October 5, 1994. A continuance was granted until January 12, 1995. -3- On January 12, 1995, a hearing was held on appellant's motion to modify child support. The trial court overruled appellant's motion on the ground that there was not a substantial change in appellant's circumstances to warrant granting a modification of the child support order. Appellant subsequently filed numerous post-decree motions relating to the divorce decree. On November 20, 1995, appellant filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate the December 2, 1994 journalized judgment entry. A hearing on appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion was set for December 20, 1995. The trial court overruled appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion without holding a hearing. Appellant timely appeals the trial court's ruling and raises the following assignments of error for review by this court: I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY OVERRULING A MOTION FOR [sic] 60(B) TO VACATE A JUDGMENT. IT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO VACATE BY STATING HE COULD NOT READ THE JOURNAL ENTRY. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HOLD A HEARING UPON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO VACATE. III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO VACATE BY WRITING IN HIS JOURNAL ENTRY THAT THE SAME WAS AGREED TO BY COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF. WHERE DOES IT SAY PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL AGREED AND IF HE DID HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE FRAUD AND MISREPRE- SENTATION AT THE TIME WHICH WHY THE 60(B) MOTION WAS MADE A RULE OF THE COURT. [SIC]. IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE PLAINTIFF THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THE VALID DEFENSE WHICH CONSTITUTES A GROUND FOR RELIEF OF THE JUDGMENT. -4- V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION WITHOUT HAVING A BRIEF AND OPPOSITION FROM THE OPPOSING PARTY. IT WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO OVERRULE THE MOTION WITHOUT AN OPPOSITION. Appellant's five assignments of error are interrelated, so the assignments of error will be addressed simultaneously. The requirements necessary for a motion seeking relief from judgment have been set forth in paragraph two of the syllabus of GTE Automatic Electric v. ARC Industries (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146. To prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds for relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) and (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. The movant must establish all three elements to prevail on his motion. Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 17, 20. The issue germane to this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate judgment without a hearing. Moore v. Emmanuel Training Ctr. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 64. The term "abuse of discretion" means more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1982), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219. It is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether the motion will be granted in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. The decision of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal. Rose Chevrolet, supra. Appellant's burden on -5- appeal is to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for relief from judgement. Griffey v. Rajan (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 75. A person filing a motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) is not automatically entitled to such relief nor to a hearing on the motion. The movant has the burden of proving that she is entitled to the relief requested in order to have a hearing. Adomeit v. Baltimore, (1974), 39 Ohio App.2d 97. "[W]here the movant's motion and accompanying materials fail to provide the operative facts to support relief under Civ.R. 60(B), the trial court may refuse to grant a hearing and summarily dismiss the motion for relief from judgment ***." Bates & Springer, Inc. Stallworth (1978), 56 Ohio App.3d 233. The movant bears the burden of proving his allegations in support of his motion. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Walker (1978), 59 Ohio App.2d 216, 222. At the outset of our analysis of appellant's appeal, we note that appellant, acting pro se, failed to comply with the requirements set forth in App.R. 12(A) and App.R. 16. However, in the interests of justice, we will address the issues raised in appellant's appeal. This court has carefully reviewed the record and here we find no abuse on the part of the trial court. Turning to the third requirement of Civ.R. 60(B), appellant moved timely to seek relief. However, appellant did not prove that she had a meritorious defense, as set forth by the second requirement of Civ.R. 60(B). Appellant's affidavit did not set forth operative facts to justify -6- vacating the judgment. Appellant was represented at the child support hearing by counsel, and an agreed judgment entry was journalized. Given these factual circumstances, appellant did not meet her burden of proof establishing that she had a meritorious defense to justify vacating the judgment. GTE Automatic Electric, at paragraph two of the syllabus. We need not go any further in our analysis of appellant's Civ.R. 60 (B) motion, since appellant did not satisfy the second requirement set forth in Civ.R. 60(B) viz., demonstrating a meritorious defense. Rose Chevrolet,Inc. Moreover, appellant failed to set forth operative facts indicating that she was entitled to a hearing on her Civ.R. 60 (B) motion. Adomeit. Given the foregoing, this court finds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed appellant's motion without holding a hearing. Bates. Accordingly, appellant's assignments of error are overruled. Judgment is affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant his costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. SARA J. HARPER, PRESIDING JUDGE TERRENCE O'DONNELL, JUDGE DIANE KARPINSKI, JUDGE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc. App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E), unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A) is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .