COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69917 STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION DAVID SLIMAN : : Defendant-appellant : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : OCTOBER 10, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Criminal appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CR-295,859 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES Cuyahoga County Prosecutor RONALD JAMES, Assistant Justice Center, Courts Tower 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For defendant-appellant: PATRICIA J. SMITH Attorney at Law 4403 St. Clair Avenue, N.E. Cleveland, Ohio 44103 TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, J.: Defendant-appellant, David I. Sliman ("appellant"), appeals his conviction in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court following a negotiated plea of guilty to the charges of attempted felonious assault and receiving stolen property. In his sole assignment of error, appellant challenges the trial court's failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Appellant was originally indicted for one count of felonious assault with peace officer and violence specifications, in viola- tion of R.C. 2903.11, one count of failure to comply with order or signal of police officer, in violation of R.C. 2921.331, and two counts of receiving stolen property, in violation of R.C. 2913.51. Appellant, through his attorney, entered into a plea agreement with the state whereby the appellant would plead guilty to the charge of attempted felonious assault without specifications and to one count of receiving stolen property. The indictment was amended accordingly to reflect the terms of this agreement, and the court accepted appellant's plea of guilty. The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed. Appellant was subsequently sentenced to concurrent terms of three to ten years for the attempted felonious - 3 - assault charge and one and one-half years on the receiving stolen property charge. This delayed appeal follows, with the appellant claiming as error: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ACCEPTING THE APPELLANT'S INVALID PLEA. Appellant contends that his guilty plea is invalid because it was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered. Specif- ically, appellant argues that the trial court failed to recite the elements of attempted felonious assault and receiving stolen property. Moreover, he argues that the court's use of the acronym "RSP" for receiving stolen property did not adequately inform appellant as to the nature of the charges against him as appellant could not be expected to understand "legal slang." When a trial court or appellate court is reviewing a plea submitted by a defendant, its focus should be on whether there has been compliance with Crim.R. 11. State v. Kelley (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 128. Crim.R. 11(C)(A) governs pleas of guilty in felony cases and provides, in pertinent part: (2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty ***, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and: (a) Determining that he is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the max- imum penalty involved, and, if applica- ble, that he is not eligible for proba- tion. - 4 - (b) Informing him of and determining that he understands the effect of his plea of guilty ***, and that the court upon acceptance of the plea may proceed with judgment and sentence. (c) Informing him and determining that he understands that by his plea he is waiving his rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be compelled to testify against himself. In determining whether a guilty plea is voluntarily, intel- ligently and knowingly made, it is necessary to look at the totality of the circumstances in determining whether there has been substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2). State v. Carter (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 34, 38; State v. Billups (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 31; State v. Caplinger (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 567, 572; In re Flynn (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 778, 782; State v. Calvillo (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 714, 719. See, also, State v. Nero (1990) 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108; State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 92-93. It is not necessary that the defendant be informed of each element of the offense so long as the court is assured that the defendant understands the charges brought against him. Flynn, supra, at 782; State v. Swift (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 407, 412; State v. Rainey (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 441, 442; State v. Snorton (May 9, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 69020, unreported, at 5; Parma v. Peyatt (Apr. 25, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 68997, unreported, at 6- - 5 - 7. Furthermore, a defendant who challenges his guilty plea on this basis must show a prejudicial effect. Stewart, supra, at 93. The record reflects the following colloquy between the court and the defendant: THE COURT: *** It has come to the court's attention that the defendant wishes to withdraw his formerly entered plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to the indictment as amended, to delete the specification, and also to add the attempt statute. So what the defendant will be pleading guilty to is attempted felonious assault, in violation of 2903.11, 2923.02. That the offense is an aggravated felony of the third degree, punishable by a possible definite sentence with a minimum being either two, three, four, five years to a maximum of ten years, and/or a fine of $5000 to be imposed, as well as the plea of guilty to the third count of the indictment which alleges the offense of RSP, in violation of 2913.551, a felony of the fourth degree, punishable by a possible definite sentence of six months, a year and a half, and or a fine of up to $2500. If those two pleas are forth- coming, it is my understanding the State of Ohio will recom- mend that the remaining counts of the indictment will be nol- led. Is that correct statement of the plea bargain? MR. JAMES: Yes. THE COURT: Is that your understanding of the plea bargain, Mr. Sliman? - 6 - DEFENDANT: Yes. This discourse continued wherein the appellant was informed that he would be giving up certain constitutional rights, to which appellant acknowledged his understanding. The court continued: THE COURT: Have you discussed these char- ges with your lawyer and do you understand what you are pleading guilty to as well as the possible penalties? DEFENDANT: Yes. The court, satisfied that appellant knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea, accepted his guilty pleas, and he was sentenced accordingly. It is evident from this colloquy that the court did not ex- plain the elements of the offenses with which appellant was charged. Furthermore, the record reflects that the court did use the acronym "RSP" for "receiving stolen property." However, looking at the totality of the circumstances as we must, it is apparent that appellant understood the nature of the charges against him. When questioned by the court if appellant had discussed the charges with his attorney and if he understood those charges, appellant answered affirmatively. Moreover, the court used the abbreviated term "RSP" in explaining its understanding of the plea agreement and again when asked how appellant chose to plead to that charge. Appellant did not question the court as to the meaning of that term or otherwise suggest to the court that he was unfamiliar - 7 - with the terminology employed. To the contrary, appellant acceded his understanding of the charges against him and pled guilty. Moreover, during his arraignment, appellant acknowledged receiving a copy of the indictment which used the unabbreviated term "receiving stolen property." As appellant has not demonstrated that he was in any way prejudiced and the record reflects that the trial court had sufficient basis from which to determine appellant understood the nature of the charges against him and that he made his pleas voluntarily, the trial court did not err in accepting appellant's pleas of guilty. Accordingly, appellant's sole assignment of error is over- ruled. - 8 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, P.J. and PATRICIA BLCKMON, J. CONCUR JUDGE TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E), unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .