COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69804 MAYFIELD VILLAGE : : ACCELERATED DOCKET Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION YULY LINETSKY : : PER CURIAM Defendant-appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: MAY 23, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Lyndhurst Municipal Court Case No. 95-TRD-01663 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: For defendant-appellant: No Brief Filed YULY LINETSKY, PRO SE 3527 Blanche Avenue Cleveland Heights, Ohio 44118 - 2 - PER CURIAM: Defendant-appellant Yuly Linetsky appeals pro se his conviction for failing to yield the right of way. Appellant claims inter alia that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Upon review, we find appellant's assignment of error to be devoid of merit. Hence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. On February 2, 1995 appellant was involved in an automobile accident and was issued a citation for failing to yield the right of way. He entered a plea of not guilty and a hearing was conducted on October 19, 1995. Appellant stated that he exited a Heinen's grocery store parking lot driveway onto S.O.M. Center Road at approximately 3:00 p.m.; that the first lane of the southbound portion of the road was free of traffic; that the second lane contained three stopped cars awaiting a light change and that there was a space between the second and third car sufficient enough to permit him to cross to the northbound lane. Appellant stated that he entered the road; that he crossed the first empty lane and that when his vehicle was half-way across the second lane, the driver of the third car, Joan Bojec, began to accelerate with the light change and struck his car. Appellant stated that he was shocked because he thought Mrs. Bojec was going to let him through. He further stated that Mrs. Bojec told him she did not see him. See, Appellant's Statement of Evidence and Proceedings. Joan Bojec testified that the appellant was attempting to make a prohibited left hand turn from the parking lot onto SOM Center Rd.; - 3 - that he pulled out across the second lane and that when she proceeded south with the light change, she collided with the appellant who failed to yield the right of way to her. Investigating Officer Mark Justice testified that a "no left turn" sign was posted at the drive where appellant exited and that damage points on the respective vehicles were consistent with appellant's improper exiting of the parking lot and his attempt to make a prohibited left hand turn. See, Village of Mayfield's Statement of Evidence. Appellant's insurance agent corroborated Ms. Bojec's testimony and stated that the company paid for her damages. Appellant filed objections to the Village's Statement of Evidence claiming that no evidence was adduced at trial on the issue of his 1 attempt to make a prohibited left hand turn. He also stated that he told his insurance agent he was not guilty of the offense; that he was proceeding to trial and that he did not authorize his agent to make payments to Mrs. Bojec. The trial court issued its own "Statement of Evidence" finding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant: ... VIOLATED SECTION 33.132 OF THE CODIFIED ORDINANCE OF THE VILLAGE BY FAILING TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY FROM A PRIVATE DRIVE ON TO A MAIN THOROUGHFARE AND (SIC) ATTEMPT TO CROSS AND MAKE A LEFT HAND TURN THAT WAS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED BY SIGNAGE POSTED AT THE DRIVE AND ACROSS THE STREET. 1 Appellant claimed in his Objections that he was the only one who told Patrolman Justice that he was attempting to make a left hand turn; that he told the patrolman he changed his mind about doing so; that the patrolman and court told him that the left hand turn charge had been dismissed and that no one testified on the matter of the prohibited left hand turn. - 4 - Id. page 2. Appellant filed the following assignments of error. I THE LYNDHURST MUNICIPAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ANALYZE THE SITUATION IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE COLLISION. II THE LYNDHURST MUNICIPAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE ACCIDENT; THE JUDGMENT IS NOT SUSTAINED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND IS CONTRARY TO LAW. In his first and second assignments of error, appellant claims that the trial court failed to consider the law and argument he presented regarding how Mrs. Bojec "lost her right of way" because she failed to look up and proceed safely in her lane which was 2 already busy when she started moving in violation of R.C. 4511.38. He also claims that the record failed to demonstrate that he attempted to make a prohibited left hand turn. Upon review we find appellant's arguments to be devoid of merit. In determining whether the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence the court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. 2 R.C. 4511.38 Rules for starting and backing vehicles. No person shall start a vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley which is stopped, standing or parked until such movement can be made with reasonable safety. - 5 - State v. Davis (1988), 49 Ohio App.3d 109, paragraph three of the syllabus. A reviewing court will not reverse a jury verdict where there is substantial evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that all the elements of an offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 169, paragraph one of the syllabus. Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence possess the same probative value. Jenks, supra. Contrary to appellant's arguments, the statement of evidence filed by the prosecutor indicated that Mrs. Bojec, Patrolman Justice and the appellant himself testified that he attempted to make a prohibited left hand 3 turn into the northbound lane of SOM Center Rd. Officer Justice testified that appellant's exit from the driveway was improper and that damage on the cars was consistent with an improper exit and an attempt to make a prohibited left turn. The record also demonstrates that the collision occurred when Mrs. Bojec proceeded southbound with a green light. Hence, a trier of fact could reasonably infer that Bojec was proceeding lawfully; that appellant exited the driveway improperly and positioned his vehicle in such a way that it improperly extended into the southbound lane thereby 4 failing to yield the right of way to Mrs. Bojec. Moreover, the credibility of the witnesses is a matter for the trier of fact. 3 See, paragraph five, Village's statement of evidence. 4 The accident report and diagram filed in this case also demonstrates an orientation of appellant's car which is consistent with a failure to yield the right of way. - 6 - State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 231. Hence, the trial court was free to place greater weight on the evidence presented by the state than on appellant's self-serving testimony. Appellant's first and second assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Lyndhurst Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. __________________________________ SARA J. HARPER, PRESIDING JUDGE __________________________________ ANN DYKE, JUDGE __________________________________ JOHN T. PATTON, JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time .