COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69786 CHISARA S. NWABARA, ET AL. : : : PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : : OPINION AUBREY WILLACY, ET AL. : : : DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: JUNE 13, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 9270452. JUDGMENT: DISMISSED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiffs-appellees: Michael Troy Watson, Esq., Watson & Watson, Attorneys, Cuyahoga Savings Center, West, 1367 East Sixth Street, #400, Cleveland, Ohio, 44114. For Defendants-appellants: Timothy A. Marcovy, Esq., Willacy & Lopresti, 700 Western Reserve Building, 1468 West Ninth Street, Cleveland, Ohio, 44113, and Crede C. Calhoun, Esq., 2775 East Overlook Road, Suite 9, Cleveland Heights, Ohio, 44106. - 2 - SWEENEY, JAMES D., P.J.: Defendant-appellant Aubrey Willacy appeals from various orders rendered by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, in a paternity action filed by the plaintiffs-appellees Chisara Nwabara and her son Maxim Nwabara. The appellant filed his first appeal, Cuyahoga App. Case No. 65175, subsequent to a jury determination that the appellant was the father of the child. This court, sua sponte, dismissed the appeal pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B). A second appeal was filed and once more the appeal was dismissed for lack of a final appealable order. See Nwabara v. Willacy (May 6, 1994), motion for reconsideration granted in part and denied in part (May 26, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 65450, unreported. The case sub judice is the appellant's third appeal and, again, prior to a consideration of the merits, this court must first determine whether or not the entries appealed from constitute a final appealable order. The notice of appeal filed by the appellant lists several trial court orders upon which he bases the appeal. The following two orders are pertinent to the resolution of whether or not this court has jurisdiction. In the court's order of September 15, 1995, the trial court entered an order specifically finding that "all motions regarding permanent custody and visitation are premature in this parentage action, and are therefor overruled." The court continued the case for a determination on the issues of 1) past support, 2) appellee's - 3 - motion to show cause for attorney fees, and 3) appellee's motion to tax as costs and fees the expenses incurred as a result of the appearance and testimony of Dr. Elizabeth Panke. The trial court's order of October 26, 1995, awarded the appellees $34,003.00 as past support; awarded to appellees' attorney $5,000.00 as attorney fees; and ordered that the expert witness fee was to be shared equally between the parties. The court declared that any and all motions pending but not ruled upon were moot or overruled; that all matters of adjudication and disposition were ruled upon; that the order was final; and that there was no just cause for delay. This appeal was filed on November 6, 1995. Jurisdiction is conferred on this court by Section 6, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. This sole source of jurisdiction of courts of appeal gives this court jurisdiction to entertain appeals on questions of law only from final judgments or final orders of courts of record within our district. Nwabara, supra, citing to McMahon v. McMahon (1951), 156 Ohio St.2d 280. The legislature had enacted R.C. 2505.02 which, in part, defines a final order as an order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding. See Polikoff v. Adam (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 100. Proceedings in the juvenile division, including parentage actions, are special statutory proceedings pursuant to Civ.R. 1(C)(7). State ex rel. Fowler v. Smith (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 357. In an action to establish paternity and child support, - 4 - the juvenile court's order is not a final order until both issues have been adjudicated. State ex rel. Fowler, supra. A substantial right is not affected until the trial court issues a support order based upon the judgment of paternity. Adams v. Jett (Feb. 10, 1995), Montgomery App. No. 14636, unreported. Since an order is final only if the requirements of both R.C. 2505.02 and Civ.R. 54(B), if applicable, are met, Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 86, this court must next determine whether or not the language in the trial court's order stating that there was no just cause for delay was sufficient to render the order appealable pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B). The inclusion in a judgment entry of 54(B) findings cannot translate an interlocutory order into a final appealable order since, even with a finding of no just reason for delay, an order is not appealable unless it also meets the requirements of R.C. 2505.02. Cassim v. Cassim (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 576. Where the trial court has yet to determine the issue of child support between the parties, despite the recitation of Civ.R. 54(B) language, there is no final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02. Benson v. Heskett (August 9, 1995), Fairfield App. No. 95 CA 5, unreported. As a final note, in addition to considering this court's jurisdiction, this court must also be cognizant of the doctrine of the law of the case. The doctrine of law of the case provides that a decision of a reviewing court remains the law for that case as to all relevant legal questions in subsequent proceedings both at - 5 - trial and at the appellate level, unless that rule achieves an unjust result. City of North Olmsted v. Eliza Jennings, Inc. (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 173. Thus, the decision of an appellate court in a prior appeal will ordinarily be followed in a later appeal in the same case and court. Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1. In Nwabara, supra, this court cited to Wojtkiewicz v. Wojtkiewicz (Jan. 24, 1985), Cuyahoga App. No. 48337, unreported; Eligado v. Eligado (Nov. 25, 1981), Cuyahoga App. No. 43635, unreported; and Shon v. Shon (Aug. 6, 1981), Cuyahoga App. No. 43075 and noted that this court has previously determined, in the context of divorce proceedings, that a judgment which defers the issue of permanent custody and child support is not a final appealable order. This court went on to hold in Nwabara, supra, that "we perceive of no reason why the same rule should not apply in paternity proceedings, such as the case sub judice, where analogous attendant issues remain undetermined." The court found that since the issues of past care, permanent support and permanent custody had not been determined, there was no final order providing this court with jurisdiction. A review of the record before this court reveals that while the court determined the issue of past care, no determination has yet been made as to permanent custody or child support. Based upon the case law and upon the doctrine of the law of the case, without - 6 - a determination of permanent custody and child support, no final order has been rendered by the trial court. This court lacks jurisdiction to render an opinion on the merits of this case. No final order was entered by the trial court, and the trial court's order that there was no just cause or reason for delay does not render the order final. Until such time as the trial court makes a determination as to permanent custody or as to child support, no final order will exist which may be reviewed by this court. This cause is dismissed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellees recover of appellants their costs herein taxed. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. JAMES M. PORTER, J., and DIANE KARPINSKI, J., CONCUR JAMES D. SWEENEY PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time .