COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69722 STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION WILLIAM ARMONTROUT : : Defendant-Appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: AUGUST 1, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. CR-315527 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES CUYAHOGA COUNTY PROSECUTOR BY: FRANK C. GASPER (#0025232) ASSISTANT COUNTY PROSECUTOR THE JUSTICE CENTER 1200 ONTARIO STREET CLEVELAND, OH 44113 For Defendant-Appellant: WILLIAM ARMONTROUT, PRO SE REG. NO. 303-495 P.O. BOX 1812 Marion, OH 43301-1812 - 2 - SPELLACY, J.: Defendant-appellant William Armontrout ("appellant") appeals his guilty plea on one count of involuntary manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.04 and one count of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01. Appellant assigns the following two errors for our review: I. THE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED INCORRECTLY AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. II. DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF CHARGES HE WAS NOT PARTY TO AND HAD NO CULPABILITY. Finding appellant's appeal lacks merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. I. A complete review of the record on appeal reveals the following. On October 13, 1994, appellant and Mike Thompson formulated a plan to rob the home of Mr. Donald A. Janashak. As a result of, and in furtherance of their attempt to commit the robbery, Mr. Janashak was killed. On October 24, 1994, appellant was indicted on one count of involuntary manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.04 with a firearm specification; one count of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01 with a firearm specification; and one count of possessing criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24. On January 4, 1995, pursuant to a plea agreement in which the firearm specification were deleted from counts one and two, appellant pled - 3 - guilty to the charges of involuntary manslaughter and aggravated burglary. Count three of the indictment, possessing criminal tools, was subsequently nolled. On April 3, 1995, the trial court sentenced appellant to ten to twenty-five years on each count. Both counts were to run concurrently. On October 23, 1995, this court granted appellant's motion for leave to file delayed appeal. II. For the purpose of this appeal, appellant's first and second assignment of errors will be addressed together. In his first and second assignment of error, appellant contends that he did not possess the mental culpability necessary to convict him of involuntary manslaughter or aggravated robbery. Furthermore, appellant asserts that the judgment against him was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Crim. R. 11(B) sets forth the effect of a guilty plea. In particular, Crim. R. 11(B) states: "With reference to the offense or offenses to which the plea is entered: (1) The plea of guilty is a complete admission of defendant's guilt." In State v. Kelly (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 129, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that "a plea of guilty following a trial and prior to sentencing effectively waives all appealable errors which may have occurred at trial, unless such errors are shown to have precluded the defendant from voluntarily entering into his or her plea pursuant to the - 4 - dictates of Crim. R. 11 and Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 243." The Supreme Court of Ohio has found as follows: "a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann [v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S. 759]." State v. Spates (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 272, quoting Tollett v. Henderson (1973), 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608. In the case at bar, the record reveals that appellant wished to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to the charge of involuntary manslaughter as amended and the charge of aggravated robbery as amended. (Tr. 3). The trial court went on to explain to defendant the possible punishments for each crime. Furthermore, the trial court conveyed to appellant that it would give appellant concurrent sentences on the charges. The trial court subsequently informed appellant of the constitutional rights which he would be giving up by pleading guilty to the offenses charged. In particular, the trial court stated: THE COURT: Do you understand that upon entering a plea of guilt you are waiving or giving up certain constitutional rights: THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. - 5 - THE COURT: I'm going to explain those rights to you. Let me know you understand each right after I have read them by saying yes out loud. You understand you have a right to a trial by jury or by judge? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: To subpoena witnesses to appear and testify on your behalf? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: To cross examine witnesses? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: To have the State prove your guilt by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: To remain silent and not testify, no one can comment on the fact that you did not testify at trial? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. (Tr. 7-8). "Voluntary choice of imprisonment is not a light decision that should be made cavalierly, so the purpose of the statute in requiring that the accused knowingly and intelligently waive his right to trial before pleading guilty is to make sure that he is well aware of the hard choice he is about to make. It is not a means to get a cheap conviction nor is it a source of escape from a regrettable plea bargain by way of appeal. Where the totality of the circumstances of a guilty plea shows a knowledgeable and intelligent waiver based on the fact that the accused knew all his options and the magnitude and the consequences of his plea, the - 6 - trial court is absolved of any due process violation of Crim. R. 11." State v. Troy Lewis (November 13, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 66352, unreported; See State v. Holder (September 22, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 65494, unreported. Appellant has failed to show that he did not knowingly and intelligently plead guilty to the charges against him. Furthermore, appellant's plea of guilty to the charges against him was a complete admission of his guilt. Subsequently, the trial court properly informed appellant of the constitutional rights he would be waiving by entering a guilty plea in compliance with Crim. R. 11. Having found no violation of Crim. R.11 by the trial court or prejudice to appellant resulting from his guilty plea, we overrule appellant's first and second assignment of error. Lewis, supra. Judgment affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, J. and ANN DYKE, J. CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY CHIEF JUSTICE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time .