COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69700 SANDRA BAUDO, : : Plaintiff-Appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION CLEVELAND CLINIC FOUNDATION, : : Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : JULY 25, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Common Pleas Court : Case No. 258283 JUDGMENT : REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: John C. Meros SCHULMAN, SCHULMAN & MEROS 1700 Standard Building 1370 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1727 For defendant-appellee: George S. Coakley Nancy F. Zavelson REMINGER & REMINGER CO., LPA 113 St. Clair Building Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1273 -2- NAHRA, J.: Appellant-plaintiff, Sandra Baudo, was injured when she slipped and fell on the premises of appellee-defendant, Cleveland Clinic Foundation. Appellant is appealing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand. Ms. Baudo accompanied her father to the Cleveland Clinic for his cancer treatment. At 10:15 a.m., Baudo and her father walked down the H-corridor to get to the cafeteria. Baudo did not notice any liquid on the floor at that time. The cafeteria, H-corridor and H-lobby are all located on the first floor of the building. At 10:45, Baudo left the cafeteria, and walked down the H- corridor, to the H-lobby, to go to the washroom. She did not see any water on the floor. She left the washroom to return to the cafeteria. As she rounded the corner from the H-lobby leading into the H-corridor, she slipped and fell. After she had fallen, she noticed a clear liquid on the floor beneath her. There was a six inch area of liquid underneath her elbow, and a large area of liquid behind her, measuring approximately one foot wide at its narrowest point, and spreading out to three feet wide. Baudo stated it appeared that half a bucket of water was on the floor. Katrina Jones, a Clinic Catering Department employee saw appellant's fall. Jones stated that the clear liquid may have been spilled by people carrying beverages away from the cafeteria. She did not notice any beverage cups on the floor near the spill. -3- Perry Murdock, assistant director of the Clinic's Building Services Department, testified that a utility room for Building Services is located in the H-corridor. Buckets of water are sometimes transported from this utility room on utility carts. Rita Ellis, a security officer at the Clinic, was summoned to the scene of appellant's fall. Ellis said the liquid on the floor appeared to be a spill from a cup, and covered an area the size of a snapshot. The place appellant fell was not located by any entrances or exits, and the liquid did not appear to be tracked in from outside. Appellant's sole assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. Appellee is entitled to summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact, appellee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to appellant, and that conclusion is adverse to appellant. Civ. R. 56, Osborne v. Lyles (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 326. To prevent summary judgment, the non-moving party must present sufficient evidence to establish the existence of each essential element of their case for which the non-moving party bears the burden of production at trial. Wing v. Anchor Media (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 112. Appellant must present evidence sufficient to allow reasonable minds to reach different conclusions -4- as to an essential element of appellant's case. Mitseff, supra, Turner v. Turner (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 339-341. To establish her negligence claim, appellant must show appellee had a duty of care, breached the duty of care, and such breach proximately caused injury to appellant. Sedar v. Knowlton Construction Co. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 193, 198. The parties agreed appellant was an invitee at the Clinic, and the Clinic had a duty of ordinary and reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Patete v. Benko (1986), 29 Ohio App.3d 325. In order for an invitee to show the premises owner breached this duty of care, the invitee must show either that: 1. That the defendant through its officers or employees was responsible for the hazard complained of; or 2. That at least one of such persons had actual knowledge of the hazard and neglected to give adequate notice of its presence or remove it promptly; or 3. That such danger had existed for a sufficient length of time reasonably to justify the inference that the failure to warn against it or remove it was attributable to a want of ordinary care. Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co.(1943), 141 Ohio St. 584, 589. If the plaintiff proves defendant or its employees created the dangerous condition, the plaintiff does not have to show defendant had knowledge of the dangerous condition. Crane v. Lakewood Hospital (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 129. Appellant presented no evidence that appellee knew about the liquid on the floor, or that the liquid was there for any length of time. Appellant asserts there is evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the liquid on the floor was spilled by -5- Clinic employees transporting buckets of water. See Detrick v. Columbia Sussex Corp. (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 475. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to appellant, the liquid on the floor looked like half a bucket of water, and covered an area six inches wide to three feet wide, which extended down the hallway. Clinic employees transported buckets of water in the area appellant fell, from a near-by storage room. It did not appear the liquid had been tracked in from outside. No other explanation was offered for the presence of the liquid on the floor. A reasonable trier of fact could find that it was more probable that the large quantity of liquid on the floor was produced by a spill from a bucket, rather than a drinking cup. The trier of fact could conclude it was more probable the hazard was created by Clinic employees, and was not created by another cause for which appellee would not be liable. The facts of this case are distinguishable from Gedra v. Dallmer Co. (1950), 153 Ohio St. 258, Allen v. C.G.S. Investments, Inc. (June 11, 1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 62947, unreported, Burton v. Sanray Corp. (March 26, 1993), Trumbull App. No. 92-T-4685, unreported, and Rapp v. Andersons (June 10, 1994), Wood App. No. 93WD114, unreported. In those cases, there was no evidence showing it was more likely the hazard was created by the defendant or its employees. In this case, appellant presented some evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the hazard was created by appellee. See Detrick, supra, Leffingwell v. Wal-Mart Stores (Nov. 20, 1995), Lawrence App. No. 95CA13, unreported. Reasonable minds -6- could reach different conclusions as to whether appellee breached a duty of care and proximately caused injury to appellant. There was a genuine issue of material fact as to how the liquid came to be on the floor. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee. Accordingly, appellant's assignment of error is sustained. The decision of the trial court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. -7- This cause is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee her costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. SPELLACY, C.J., and BLACKMON, J., CONCUR. JOSEPH J. NAHRA JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time .