COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69564 RICHARD FARAGHER : : : PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : : OPINION CLEVELAND CIVIL SERVICE : COMMISSION : : DEFENDANT-APPELLEE : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: JUNE 13, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court, Case No. CV-281537. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-appellant: Kevin P. Prendergast, Esq. 27999 Clemens Road #1 Westlake, Ohio 44145 For Defendant-appellee: Sharon Sobol Jordon Director of Law Joseph J. Jerse Assistant Director of Law Room 106 - City Hall 601 Lakeside Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114 SWEENEY, JAMES D., J.: Plaintiff-appellant Richard Faragher ("Faragher") appeals from the granting of defendant-appellee City of Cleveland Civil Service Commission's ("Commission") motion to dismiss pursuant to R.C. 2505.07 and Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and (6), on the basis of plaintiff's failure to timely file his appeal from the civil service administrative decision to the common pleas court. For the reasons adduced below, we affirm. A review of the record on appeal indicates in pertinent part that Faragher was employed by the City of Cleveland's ("City") police department from July 16, 1960, until his retirement from the force on December 4, 1988. On December 5, 1988, Faragher started his employment as a security manager in the City's Department of Parks, Recreation and Properties ("DPRP"). On September 16, 1994, with the consolidation of security functions of the DPRP into the City's Division of Property Management ("DPM"), Faragher was notified by the Commissioner of the DPM that, effective September 30, 1994, he (Faragher) would be placed on layoff status. Faragher appealed this layoff decision to the Commission. The matter was heard by the Commission on October 31, 1994. At the close of this oral hearing, the Commission denied the appeal on a three-to-two vote. On November 7, 1994, at its next regularly scheduled meeting, the Commission approved, without objection, the minutes of its October 30, 1994 meeting. - 3 - On December 8, 1994, appellant filed with the Commission a "Notice of Administrative Appeal From Decision of Cleveland Civil Service Commission" with a legend "Jury Demand Endorsed Hereon." This document was purported to be filed pursuant to R.C. 2506.01 et seq. One minute after filing this "Notice of Appeal," Faragher filed with the Commission a praecipe instructing the Commission to prepare and file the administrative appeal record within twenty days with the common pleas court clerk of courts. On January 3, 1995, the City filed a motion to dismiss the "Notice of Appeal" on the basis that, pursuant to R.C. 2505.07 and Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and (6), a timely appeal within thirty days from the administrative decision to the trial court had not been achieved, thereby depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Thereafter, appellant filed a brief in opposition to dismissal. On August 11, 1995, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. This appeal followed presenting the following lone assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS- APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS. An appeal from an administrative decision made pursuant to R.C. 2506.01 must generally be perfected in the common pleas court within thirty days after the entry of the final order of the administrative body. R.C. 2505.07. In the present case, the administrative body issued its final order on November 7, 1994. The thirty-day appeal time commenced on November 8, 1994, and - 4 - expired on December 7, 1994. Appellant filed his notice of appeal to common pleas court on Thursday, December 8, 1994, one day after the thirty-day appeal time had expired. Appellant presents several arguments in his brief in an attempt to defeat the jurisdictional prerequisite imposed by R.C. 2505.07. These arguments are without merit. The first argument employed is that, pursuant to Rule 9.70 of the Cleveland Civil Service Commission ("Rule 9.70"), the Commission's decision was not final until that body enacts written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which enactment was not done on November 7, 1994. The application of Rule 9.70 to the facts of this case is clearly inappropriate. Rule 9.70 applies to those cases which involve administrative appeals from discharges, demotions and suspensions for a variety of causes based on personal conduct, which was not the case in the matter sub judice. Rule 8 of the Cleveland Civil Service Commission applies to situations involving layoffs. Thus, this argument concerning the enactment of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by the Commission under Rule 9.70 is a ruse. The second argument presented by appellant is that the notice of appeal to common pleas court was brought pursuant to, not just the stated R.C. 2506.01, but through unstated alternative reference to R.C. 124.34 (which applies the procedural rights contained in R.C. 119.09 and .12, concerning the certified mailing of the agency order to the affected party and an explanation within the mailing - 5 - of pertinent appeal rights) as well. Appellant believes this to be a proper inference from the language in R.C. 2506.01 which states "The appeal provided in this chapter is in addition to any other remedy of appeal provided by law." (Emphasis added.) This second argument is, as was the first argument, a stratigem. R.C. 124.34 governs reduction in pay or position, suspension or removal on the basis of disciplinary reasons. A disciplinary sanction was not involved in this case, therefore R.C. 124.34 is unavailable as "any other remedy of appeal provided by law" pursuant to R.C. 2506.01. Since R.C. 124.34 is unavailable to appellant, the procedural rights contained in R.C. 119, et seq., which govern an administrative appeal brought under R.C. 124.34, are likewise unavailable. The third, and final, argument presented (at page 6 of his appellate brief) in support of this assignment, is somewhat related to the first argument and urges reversal because appellant alleges that the November 7, 1994 adoption of the minutes was not a final order. This allegation is based upon appellant's earlier argument that a filing of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was necessary to vest finality in the November 7, 1994 oral ruling. This third argument is without merit as well, for several reasons. The first being, that as previously stated, Findings and Conclusions are inapplicable to the facts before us and were not required by the Commission as a prerequisite to making a final order in a matter involving an employee's layoff. The second - 6 - reason is provided in the headnote in Swafford v. Norwood Bd. of Edn. (1984), 14 Ohio App.3d 346, which states: In the usual and customary case, the entry of a resolution, order, or directive into the official minute book of a public board or commission and its subsequent approval by such board or commission constitutes "the entry of other matter for review" within the meaning of R.C. 2505.07 and, without more, commences the running of time for appeal. (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to Swafford, the thirty-day appeal time in R.C. 2505.07 commenced running in this case on November 7, 1994. Assignment overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. LEO M. SPELLACY, C.J., and ANN DYKE, J., CONCUR. JAMES D. SWEENEY JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time .