COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69531 : STATE OF OHIO : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellee : : and -vs- : : OPINION : PAUL BISHOP : : Defendant-Appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT AUGUST 22, 1996 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. CR-320143 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, ESQ. MARVIN T. WARREN, ESQ. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 16621 Broadway Avenue JOHN R. KOSKO, ESQ. Maple heights, Ohio 44137 Assistant County Prosecutor 8th Floor Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- -3- PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J.: Defendant-appellant, Paul Bishop, appeals his conviction for murder, and assigns the following error for our review: APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL DUE TO THE TRIAL JUDGES (sic) ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL. Having reviewed the record of the proceedings and the legal arguments presented by the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The apposite facts follow. On February 8, 1995, defendant-appellant, Paul Bishop, was arrested and charged with the aggravated murder of Arthur Mayson, Jr. On October 26, 1978, Mayson was shot five times after arguing with one of several men standing in front of the store where he worked. Wanda Wilson, a witness to the shooting, saw Mayson approach the group of men and ask them to leave the area. Mayson referred to the men as "wineheads". One of the men, who Wilson knew as "Fish," and who was later identified as defendant Paul Bishop, took exception to the term and approached Mayson. Mayson hit Bishop, causing him to fall to the ground. Bishop stood up and began to walk away. He then turned, pulled a gun from his pocket and shot Mayson five times. Wilson ran into the back room of the store to alert her co- worker, Silas Owens, of the shooting. Owens ran to the front of the store and saw a man he knew as "Fish" holding a gun and standing near Mayson's body. Owens then called out to "Fish" asking him not to shoot Mayson any more. Fish then walked away from the scene. -4- Mayson was taken to the hospital. Though seriously wounded, he told his wife, Earline that "Fish" shot him after an altercation in front of the store. Mayson died from his injuries on November 26, 1978, one month after he was shot. On June 8, 1979, Cleveland police detectives received an anonymous phone tip that "Fish" was Paul Bishop. Police searched their files and obtained a photo of Paul Bishop. The files also indicated that Bishop used the alias "Paul Fisher" and was also known as "Fish." Police compiled a photographic array containing Bishop's picture and showed it to Owens and then to Wilson. Both picked out Bishop's picture as the man who shot Mayson. A warrant was issued for Bishop's arrest. Police checked two addresses for Bishop but were unable to locate him. Years later, in February of 1995, James Larkin of the FBI Fugitive Task Force was reviewing old murder warrants when he came upon the warrant for Bishop. After contacting Cleveland police for additional information, Larkin conducted a public records checks and uncovered an address for Bishop. Larkin went to the address, spoke with the building administrator and obtained a current address for Bishop. Bishop was arrested later that evening. Bishop was indicted for aggravated murder. At the close of the state's evidence, the charge was reduced to murder. Bishop was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years to life and fined $15,000. This appeal followed. -5- In his sole assignment of error, Bishop asserts the trial court abused its discretion in the conduct of his trial. He first argues the trial judge improperly indicated his opinion as to the credibility of prosecution witnesses James Larkin and Sterling Moulton. The record reveals that the trial judge questioned both Larkin and Moulton but we find no evidence that the court's questions indicated bias. A trial judge must remain impartial at all times and avoid making comments that might influence the jury. State v. Allen (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 696, 700. A trial judge is presumed not to be biased or prejudiced, and the party alleging bias or prejudice must set forth evidence to overcome the presumption of integrity. State v. Wagner (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 88, 93. The existence of prejudice or bias against a party is difficult to establish unless the judge specifically verbalizes personal bias or prejudice toward a party. Okocha v. Fehrenbacher (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 309, 322. A statement made by the trial judge within the hearing of the jury which may be interpreted as an opinion by the judge about the credibility of witnesses or about the facts of the case constitutes prejudicial error. Allen at 700. In this case, the trial judge made no specific statements indicating personal bias or prejudice toward the defense. At no time did he state any opinions about the credibility of the witnesses or about the facts of the case. Larkin argues the trial court asked questions of Larkin in an attempt to rehabilitate him after Larkin admitted on cross examination that the system did not -6- contain all public records and that he really didn't know what information the system contained. While the trial court did ask questions of Larkin about the public records computer system, we find no indication that the questions were an attempt to "rehabilitate" Larkin. None of the trial court's questions or Larkin's answers did anything to counter the testimony given by Larkin on cross-examination. In questioning Moulton, the trial court sought to determine the dates Bishop's name was entered onto Sheriff's Department records and whether he was the proper party to respond to a subpoena about the records. However, the information sought by the trial court's questions was already in the record. On direct examination, Moulton gave the dates of the records and stated that the records were kept in the ordinary course of business of the Sheriff's Department. He also testified that he was one of the custodians of those records. The court's questions did not elicit any new information nor did they imply bias toward the defense. On the contrary, the court instructed the prosecution to refer to the Sheriff's Department records as "business records" and not "criminal records" in a clear attempt to avoid any prejudice to the defense. Under the circumstances, we conclude the trial court's questions show no indication of bias toward the prosecution. Bishop also argues the trial court called the prosecution's attention to a notation in his police records that he worked in the area where the shooting occurred. Bishop argues this fact was not -7- known to the prosecution before the court's comment and that Bishop's defense was prejudiced by the revelation. Bishop's argument that the employment address was not noticed by the prosecution was directly contradicted by one of the prosecutors, Peter Gauthier, who stated on the record that he was aware of the address before the court mentioned it and that he informed his co-counsel. I myself noticed the address when I spoke to Corrections Officer Moulton in Judge Gallagher's room which is directly next door to your room. I pointed that out to Mr. Kosko and to Mr. Moulton, and I also knew that. That was before we entered court, Your Honor. (Tr. 379) We also reject Bishop's contention that prosecutor John Kosko admitted he did not know about the employment information until the trial court informed him of it. Kosko made the following statement: Now, I never have been accused of being too smart, but I think during the course of my direct examination and in the course of my redacting these copies, I would have discovered the East 105th and Superior address and would have made every attempt to bring it in, so I don't believe, and I just want to state for the record, I don't believe after twelve years of prosecuting cases and the last eight of which are homicide cases, I need assistance in prosecuting a case, so there was nothing improper about what the Court did at sidebar. Everything was on the record. (Tr. 377) Although Kosko's statement appears to indicate that he did not discover the information, it does not contradict Gauthier's -8- statement that he told Kosko about the address before it was mentioned by the trial court. (Emphasis added.) A review of the police records in question indicate that each record was relatively short containing, in addition to Bishop's fingerprints, his name, signature, social security number, race, age, height, weight, date and place of birth, address, marital status, religion, and occupation. The employment address was listed under "occupation." Due to the relative brevity of the records, we find it unlikely that the prosecution would have overlooked the employment address as suggested by Bishop. Accordingly, the trial court did not "provide" this information to the prosecution. Finding no merit to Bishop's assignment of error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. -9- It is ordered that Appellee recover of Appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. NAHRA J., and O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- .