COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69464 VILLAGE OF VALLEY VIEW : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION TROY TERLOP : : Defendant-Appellant : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM THE GARFIELD HEIGHTS MUNICIPAL COURT CASE NO. 95-TRD-04177 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: ARTHUR P. LAMBROS (#0013853) Prosecuting Attorney Village of Valley View 5709 Smith Road Brook Park, Ohio 44142 For Defendant-Appellant: RICHARD AGOPIAN (#0030924) 800 Standard Building 1370 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 - 2 - SPELLACY, C.J.: Defendant-appellant Troy Terlop ("appellant") appeals from the trial court order denying his motion to suppress evidence. Appellant further appeals the trial court order finding him guilty of driving while under suspension, in violation of R.C. 4511.192; and drug abuse, in violation of R.C. 2925.11. Appellant raises the following two assignments of error for our review: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA WITHOUT ADVISING HIM OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OHIO CRIMINAL RULE 11(E). II. THE POLICE OFFICER DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION OF IMMINENT CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WHICH WOULD WARRANT FURTHER INTRUSION UPON APPEL- LANT. TERRY V. OHIO (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 44 O.O. 2D 383. Finding neither of the assignments of error to have merit, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The facts giving rise to this appeal as contained in the record provide the following. On the evening of Wednesday, May 24, 1995, Officer David Niro of the Valley View Police Department observed appellant exiting the driveway of a private residence in the Village of Valley View. The private driveway, which serves two homes, was unlit at the time and had been the scene of a recent burglary. After exiting the driveway, Officer Niro observed appellant abruptly turn into a public parking lot without signaling. Appellant then attempted to use a public phone located in the - 3 - parking lot, at which time Officer Niro approached appellant's car and was informed by appellant that his driver's license was under suspension. Officer Niro placed appellant under arrest for driving with a suspended license in violation of R.C. 4511.192. A subsequent search of appellant's vehicle revealed a small amount of marijuana; and appellant was subsequently charged with drug abuse in violation of R.C. 2925.11. On June 26, 1995, appellant's case was heard before the Garfield Heights Municipal Court. Appellant entered a plea of no contest and was subsequently found guilty of driving while under suspension, in violation of R.C. 4511.192, and drug abuse, in violation of R.C. 2925.11. I. In his first assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in accepting his plea of no contest without advising him of his constitutional rights in accordance with Crim. R. 11(E). Crim. R. 11(E) states, in pertinent part: In misdemeanor cases involving petty offenses the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first inform- ing the defendant of the effect of the pleas of guilty, no contest, and not guilty. * * * The trial court, therefore, is required to inform the defendant of the effect of a plea of guilty, no contest, and not guilty, including the various rights the defendant may be waiving. - 4 - Toledo v. Chiaverin (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 43, 44; City of Maple Heights v. Molton (January 28, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 61888, unreported. Herein, appellant contends that there was no affirmative showing on the record that the court discharged its mandatory duty to inform him of the rights which he was waiving. Furthermore, appellant asserts that a meaningful dialogue between the court and the defendant was required and that written statements did not satisfy the mandatory duty imposed on the trial court by Crim. R. 11(E). The record in the case sub judice reveals that the trial court substantially complied with the rules set forth in Crim. R. 11(E). In particular, the record reveals that after appellant entered his plea of no contest, the trial court did, in fact, inform the appellant of the rights which he was waiving. The trial court stated the following: "With that plea, waive your right to jury trial, waive your right to a formal trial, waive your right to subpoena witnesses testify in your behalf, cross-examination or may testi[fy] against you, waive your right to a trial by jury on each and every offenses elements contained herein. Remain Silent. * * *" (Tr. 6). Literal compliance with Crim. R. 11 is certainly the preferred practice, but the fact that the trial judge does not do so does not require vacation of the appellant's no contest plea if the reviewing court determines that there was substantial compliance. - 5 - State v. Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108. Furthermore, appellant must prove prejudicial effect in asserting that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his constitutional rights. In the case sub judice, the trial court's explanation to appellant regarding the constitutional guarantees which he was waiving by entering a plea of no contest substantially complied with the mandates as set forth by Crim. R. 11(E). Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is not well taken. II. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that Officer Niro did not possess a reasonable suspicion of imminent criminal activity to warrant stopping appellant and subsequently searching appellant's vehicle. In particular, appellant asserts that Officer Niro could not set forth specific and articulable facts which would have caused the police officer to make an investigative stop. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." Seizure of personal property is per se unreasonable unless a warrant is first issued based on probable cause and describing the item to be seized. Without a warrant, an item may be seized if the exigencies of the circumstances require it or an - 6 - exception to the warrant requirement is present. State v. Smith (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 255, 260. Property may be seized if there is a reasonable, articulate suspicion based on operative facts that the property contains contraband or evidence of a crime. United States v. Place (1983), 462 U.S. 696, 702. In Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may stop and investigate unusual behavior, even without probable cause to arrest, when he reasonably concludes that the individual is engaged in criminal activity. However, "[a] police officer performing an investigative stop must have a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific articulable facts, which would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that criminal activity was imminent." Terry, supra; State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177; City of Cleveland v. Harmon (November 24, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 64139, unreported. "Trial courts must also give due deference to the investi- gating officer's experience and training when considering the totality of the circumstances." State v. Badley (November 9, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 68349, unreported. The totality of the circumstances must be viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and prudent police officer. Id.; State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86; State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291. A reviewing court must furthermore recognize that under the totality of the circumstances, wholly lawful conduct, when taken together with other factors or circumstances, may amount to reasonable suspicion - 7 - that criminal activity is imminent. United States v. Sokolow (1989), 490 U.S. 1. In the present case, Officer Niro observed appellant parked at night, in an unlit driveway, where a burglary had recently occurred. Furthermore, Officer Niro observed appellant exit from the driveway and make an abrupt turn without signaling. Officer Niro initially stopped appellant for the purpose of issuing him a traffic citation for failure to signal. However, upon approaching appellant's vehicle, Officer Niro learned that appellant was driving under a suspended license. Subsequently, Officer Niro arrested appellant and conducted an inventory search of appel- lant's vehicle. Herein, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Niro possessed a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity had or was about to take place. Officer Niro's suspicion was based on the time of day, his knowledge that the area had been the scene of a recent burglary, and his experience and familiarity with the area. Appellant further argues that a traffic stop made for the purpose of issuing a citation for a traffic violation may not be a pretext for an investigative stop, which turns into a full blown search. Appellant's argument, however, is misplaced. If police officers observe a traffic violation, there is sufficient cause for an investigative stop. See State v. Darrington (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 321; State v. Bevan (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 126; cf. State v. - 8 - Chatton (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 59. Furthermore, a violation of a traffic law is clearly deemed to be "criminal activity" an as such justifies an investigative stop. State v. Evans (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 405; State v. Keathley (1988), 55 Ohio App.3d 130. Thus, Officer Niro's original purpose in stopping appellant for not signaling was justified. Officer Niro had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity and traffic violations were taking place. Therefore, the trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress evidence derived from the investigative stop. Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. - 9 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Garfield Heights Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DAVID T. MATIA, J. and JOSEPH J. NAHRA, J. CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY CHIEF JUSTICE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time .