COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69339 SUSAN ANDRAS : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION JOHN ANDRAS : : Defendant-Appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: APRIL 4, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION CASE NO. D-224049 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: MILDRED K. SCHAD (#0012985) York Executive II, Suite 305 6325 York Road Parma Heights, Ohio 44130-3030 For Defendant-Appellant: GAIL E. SINDELL (#0014267) Kaufman & Cumberland Co. L.P.A. 1404 East Ninth Street, Third Floor Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1779 For Ken Adras & Andras Corp.: IRENE M. MACDOUGALL (#0020995) Rosenzweig, Schulz & Gillombardo Co. 700 Transohio Tower 2000 East Ninth Street Cleveland, OH 44115-1301 - 2 - SPELLACY, C.J.: Defendant-appellant John Andras ("appellant") appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting a divorce to appellant and plaintiff-appellee Susan Andras. Appellant assigns the following errors for review: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED/ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DIVIDING THE PARTIES' MARITAL ASSETS IN SUCH A WAY THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAS NO LIQUID ASSETS. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED/ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT A NON-MARITAL ASSET'S PROCEEDS WERE NOT TRACEABLE AND THEREFORE TRANSMUTED TO MARITAL PROPERTY WHERE APPELLANT PRODUCED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, IN THE FORM OF ORAL TESTIMONY AND DOCUMENTATION, TO TRACE SAID PROCEEDS TO AVOID THE OCCURRENCE OF TRANSMUTATION. III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPUTING AND AWARDING SPOUSAL SUPPORT. IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPELLING DEFENDANT- APPELLANT TO PAY TOWARDS PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S ATTORNEY'S FEES WHERE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE WAS AWARDED FAR MORE LIQUID ASSETS THAN DEFENDANT- APPELLANT AND, AS A RESULT OF THE PROPERTY DIVISION, WAS BETTER ABLE TO PAY HER OWN FEES THAN DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and remanded in part. I. Appellant and Susan Andras were married on February 19, 1949, in Czechoslovakia. They came to the United States a short time later. Four children, now emancipated, were born as issue of the marriage. - 3 - Appellant worked as a warehouse supervisor and a towmotor operator. Appellant also worked part-time for a burial vault company. In 1981, appellant and the parties' son, Kenneth, learned the Cromco Vault Company was for sale. The Andras Corporation was created in order to purchase Cromco. As the corporation was unable to obtain financing for the purchase, appellant and Kenneth arranged personal loans to raise the $190,000 needed to purchase Cromco. Kenneth contributed $10,000 of his own money. The remainder of the price was obtained through two bank loans. The marital residence, rental property, and two vacant lots owned by the parties were pledged as collateral along with real property owned by Kenneth. The parties and Kenneth all signed on the loans. Appellant also purchased two parcels of real estate from the owner of Cromco. The business was located on this property. Appellant paid $10,000 and took a mortgage deed for the remaining $100,000. The deed was in appellant's name alone. The Andras Corporation paid appellant the sum of $5,000 every month as rent. Appellant applied the entire amount to repaying the loans on the corporation and the property. In 1987, the Andras Corporation refinanced the debt by means of a corporate loan. It continued to disburse the $5,000 rent payment to appellant even though the loan payments were approximately $1,750 lower than prior to the refinancing. - 4 - The Andras Corporation stock is comprised of one hundred eighty shares. Appellant and Susan Andras each own sixty shares. Kenneth owns forty shares with the remaining twenty owned by their son David. The parties have stipulated that the value of the corporation is $390,000. The parties and two of their children, Kenneth and David, spent long hours working at the Andras Corporation. Susan Andras answered the telephone and cleaned the office. At home, she did the laundry, including work clothes, for the four of them as well as doing all meal preparation. In 1984 or 1985, a business telephone was installed in the marital residence to allow Susan Andras to stay in the home. This continued for six or seven years until problems over the amount of time required in answering the phone by Susan caused the removal of the business line. Susan Andras no longer performed any work for the corporation after this. Susan did not receive compensation from the corporation until 1987 when she began receiving $120 per week with slight increases each year. She used the money to purchase food and household supplies. The corporation ceased Susan Andras' salary in January of 1993. The parties started a cremation business called Cromco Services in 1985. It is operated as a subdivision of the vault company. All of the parties spent a great deal of time and effort in making both businesses successful and viable. Appellant and his two sons spent nearly all of their time operating the businesses. - 5 - Appellant no longer receives rent payments from the corporation. The payments were discontinued in 1992 when Kenneth and David both received raises. Appellant was paid $400 per month in wages until 1993 when he was removed from the payroll. At that time, he no longer performed any services for the corporation due to health problems. The corporation pays a yearly $11,480 premium for an insurance policy on appellant's life on which three of the Andras' children are beneficiaries. On February 11, 1993, Susan Andras filed a complaint for divorce. Appellant filed his answer and counterclaim. The matter was tried before a referee. Appellant filed objections to the report. No transcript or affidavits were filed with appellant's objections. The trial court sustained in part the referee's report and modified the referee's recommendation for the amount of spousal support to be received by Susan Andras. The referee had recommend- ed that Susan Andras receive $1,300 per month in spousal support. The trial court awarded her $500 per month. II. In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the court erred in dividing the marital assets as he was left with no liquid assets. Appellant asserts this has caused him to suffer a severe financial hardship. Appellant was awarded his sixty shares of the Andras Corporation stock and ordered to purchase the sixty shares owned by Susan Andras for $96,877 within six months of judgment. Appellant contends he was not awarded any liquid assets and lacks - 6 - money for necessities such as housing, furniture or for a medical emergency. Marital property is to be divided equally unless such a division would be inequitable; in that case the property must be divided equitably. R.C. 3105.171(C)(1); Getter v. Getter (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 1, 6. In making a division of marital property, the court is required to consider the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.171(F). Terry v. Terry (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 228, 231. A reviewing court is limited to determining whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court abused its broad discretion when fashioning the award. James v. James (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 668. An abuse of discretion implies that the court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217. This exercise of discretion is not unlimited, but must always be rooted in the facts of the case. Beekman v. Beekman (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 783, 787. However, when applying an abuse of discre- tion standard, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court but must be guided by a presumption that the findings of the trial court are correct. Focke v. Focke (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 552. Further, a reviewing court is not required to conduct an item-by-item review of a property division but must determine if the trial court's disposition resulted in a property division which, viewed in its entirety, was an abuse of discretion. Josselson v. Josselson (1988), 52 Ohio App.3d 60. - 7 - Susan Andras was awarded the mortgage-free marital home, two vacant lots, her IRA, a 1989 Buick, the proceeds in a bank account, and funds she previously withdrew from the parties' bank accounts. Appellant received the property on which the business was located, the Andras Corporation, his IRA, his 1993 tax refund, a bank account, a 1992 Toyota truck, and the accounts he had transferred to a living trust. Appellant was ordered to pay $96,877 to Susan Andras for her sixty shares of corporate stock. The referee found that appellant continually blurred business and personal interests when making transfers and withdrawals from various bank accounts. Appellant also placed bank accounts he termed as being business in his living trust. Appellant has the ability to access and control the income of the business. Therefore, the corporate shares owned by Susan Andras would not have the same value to her as appellant if she continued to hold the stock. Appellant argues he owes a fiduciary duty to the other shareholders and cannot pay himself a high salary or easily sell the corporation without violating that duty. However, the referee found appellant had always used corporate assets and accounts for personal expenses and use. At least one corporate meeting was held without notifying shareholders Susan and David Andras. At that meeting, officers were elected and funds allocated for future expansion. Appellant's realization of his fiduciary - 8 - responsibilities apparently occurred after the divorce hearing was held. The referee found appellant's access to corporate funds was such as to allow him to comply with the judgment entry. Appellant did not provide the trial court with a transcript or affidavits but relied on the referee's report alone. When a party objecting to a referee's report has failed to provide the trial court with the evidence and documents by which the trial court could make a find- ing independent of the report, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court's application of the law to its factual findings constituted an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Duncan v. Chippewa Twp. Trustees (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 728, 730. The referee found appellant treated corporate funds as personal. The referee further found that appellant has sufficient funds, primarily through the corporation, to meet the obligations imposed by the divorce decree. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the referee's report in regard to the division of property. Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. III. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in finding nonmarital assets used to purchase property were not traceable and, therefore, had transmuted into marital property. Appellant inherited property from his grandmother. He testified he used the $53,000 proceeds from the - 9 - sale of the inherited property to purchase the land on which the corporation is located. Appellate review of a trial court's classification of property as marital or separate is based on whether the determination is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. James v. James (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 668, 684. Resolution of manifest weight questions requires a review of the transcript of the proceedings. In re Swain (1991), 68 Ohio App.3d 737. It was appellant's burden to provide the trial court with a transcript. Without a transcript or statement of the evidence, a reviewing court cannot determine whether the findings of the referee are against the weight of the evidence. The assignment of error must be overruled for failure to demonstrate error. Staggs v. Staggs (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 109. Appellant's second assignment of error is not well-taken. IV. Appellant's third and fourth assignments of error pertain to the trial court's award of spousal support and attorney fees. The referee had recommended appellant pay Susan Andras $1,300 per month in spousal support. The trial court ordered appellant to pay $500 per month in spousal support and $8,500 as additional support towards the payment of attorney fees. The trial court has broad discretion in fashioning an award of spousal support. Bechtol v. Bechtol (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 24. After the trial court has determined the division of property, it may award reasonable spousal support to either party. R.C. - 10 - 3105.18(B). A court should be guided by the factors listed in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) in making the award. Holcomb v. Holcomb (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 128. The trial court must set forth a factual basis or rationale which supports the award of spousal support. Kaechele v. Kaechele (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 93, paragraph two of the syllabus. The trial court must indicate the basis for its award of spousal support in sufficient detail so the reviewing court can determine that the award was fair, equitable and in accordance with law. Gullia v. Gullia (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 653, 660. The trial court did not indicate the basis of its award in sufficient detail to permit this court to determine if the award was fair and equitable. Because the award of attorney fees is part of spousal support, both issues of the $500 monthly payment and the attorney fees are remanded to the trial court for more specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellant's third and fourth assignments of error are sustained. Judgment affirmed and remanded. - 11 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant her costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOSEPH J. NAHRA, J. and TERRENCE O'DONNELL, J. CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY CHIEF JUSTICE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time .