COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69266 STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION TOMMIE GOLPHIN : : Defendant-appellant : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : NOVEMBER 21, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Criminal appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CR-320,011 JUDGMENT : REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES Cuyahoga County Prosecutor EDWARD M. WALSH, Assistant MICHAEL B. TELEP, Assistant Justice Center, Courts Tower 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For defendant-appellant: JAMES A. DRAPER Cuyahoga County Public Defender SCOTT ROGER HURLEY, Assistant 1200 West Third Street, N.W. 100 Lakeside Place Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1569 TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, J.: Defendant Tommie Golphin appeals from his conviction for murder with a firearm specification. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. On January 31, 1995, defendant, who was then seventeen years old, was charged with juvenile delinquency in connection with the shooting death of Clinton Butler. The complaint further charged defendant with delinquency for having a weapon while under dis- ability, felonious assault and discharging a weapon into a habita- tion. The juvenile court subsequently found probable cause to believe that defendant committed the acts charged in the com- plaint, and it continued the matter for a full investigation in accordance with Juv.R. 30(B). It is undisputed, however, that no physical examination of defendant was performed. Following the amenability hearing, jurisdiction of the matter was transferred to the general division of the court of common pleas. On February 27, 1995, defendant was indicted for aggra- vated murder, with a firearms specification, and having a weapon while under disability. Thereafter, the trial court consolidated the matter with a criminal action pending against Marquis Black. The consolidated matter proceeded to trial on May 30, 1995. - 3 - The state's evidence established that on August 29, 1994, Robert Terrell and Lawrence Williams had a party at Terrell's apartment at 4881 Scovill Avenue. The men hired two dancers and charged $5 for admission. Forty to fifty men arrived at the apartment. Terrell's girlfriend, Tiwana Bogarty, and another woman served food at the party, but when the dancers arrived, they were asked to leave. Bogarty continued to observe from her friend's apartment across the hall. The men put a sheet over the window, and Bogarty stood in the landing above the apartment talking to her friend Tiffany. At approximately 11:30 p.m., defendant arrived with Willie Long and Marquis Black. Long paid the admission fee to Lawrence Williams, who was standing at the door collecting money, then entered. Defendant paid for himself and Black, and also entered. Defendant later hid behind the blind in Terrell's kitchen, and Terrell asked him to leave. Others, including Willie Long and Marquis Black, were also asked to leave after men began to touch the dancers. After leaving, defendant, Long and Black got into an argument with Williams over the return of their money. Williams punched Long in the face. Defendant attacked Williams, and Williams punched defendant. Long, Black and defendant then left the apartment, and defendant stated that he would be back. Bobby Ford, who was standing in the hallway during the altercation between defendant, Long and Williams, returned to the apartment and warned that the group was returning with guns. The - 4 - decedent, Clinton Butler, locked the door and watched through a small hole in the door. A short time later, defendant and Long returned. Defendant had a 9mm weapon and stated that he was "going to take care of some business." He then banged on the door of the apartment and fired two shots toward the door into the apartment. The decedent was struck in the stomach. Defendant and Long then fled from the apartment, and defendant turned and shot at a window of the apartment. It was also established that people inside the apart- ment fired weapons from inside the apartment at Long and defen- dant. Terrell and two other men drove the decedent to the hospital, and the police arrived shortly afterward. At this time, Bogarty told police that the assailants were unknown and that she did not know the type of weapons used. The decedent developed pneumonia while in the hospital and died. His death was ruled a homicide. Long was arrested and implicated defendant after being charged with aggravated murder. In a plea agreement with the state, Long pled guilty to involun- tary manslaughter in exchange for his testimony against defendant. After presenting its case, the state dismissed the charge of having a weapon while under disability. Defendant elected to present evidence and testified that he was with Marquis Black earlier in the evening. At approximately 11:00 p.m., he met Long, and they went to the party at Terrell's. Before reaching the - 5 - apartment, Long placed his gun and a bag containing cocaine into a nearby garbage can. He and Long paid Williams $5 to enter the party. Defendant also paid for Black to enter, but, because the apartment was crowded, Williams did not let him enter until approximately twenty minutes later. Defendant remained inside the apartment for approximately forty-five minutes. The men began to touch the dancers, and Williams turned off the music and had defendant's group and others leave. Defendant, Long and Black then sat on the landing of the apartment and waited to reenter. A short time later, defendant walked back in and hid behind the kitchen blind. Terrell saw him and asked him to leave, and he rejoined Long and Black out at the landing. At this time, Long was fighting with Williams about getting his money back. Williams then punched Long in the face, defendant punched Williams, and defendant and Long then fled. According to defendant, Long ran back to the garbage can, retrieved his gun and said that he was going back to the apartment to scare Williams into giving his money back. Defendant accompanied Long back to the apartment. Defendant arrived there first and pounded on the door. Long moved him away from the door, fired two shots into the door then ran. Defendant also fled. He then looked up and saw Terrell with a gun, shooting. Long returned fire, and the two fled the area. Defendant was subsequently convicted of murder and the firearm specification. He now appeals and assigns four errors for our - 6 - review. For the sake of judicial economy, we shall proceed to defendant-appellant's third assignment of error, which is disposi- tive of this matter. Appellant's third assignment of error states: APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, WHEN THE JUVENILE COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH JUV.R. 30(B), THUS DEPRIVING THE TRIAL COURT OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER APPELLANT'S CASE. Within this assignment of error, appellant argues that since the state failed to conduct a physical examination of him in connection with its relinquishment of jurisdiction, this failure deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over this matter. Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court defines its power to act and to render a valid judgment. See, Morrison v. Steiner (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87. It is conferred by statute; there is no common-law subject-matter jurisdiction. State v. Neguse (1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 596, 599-600. A challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even on appeal in a reviewing court. Fox v. Eaton (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 236, 238. With regard to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, it is axiomatic that juvenile courts have exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over any case involving a child who is alleged to be delinquent. See State v. Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 43. - 7 - R.C. 2151.23 provides: (A) The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction under the Revised Code: (1) Concerning any child who on or about the date specified in the complaint is alleged to be *** a delinquent *** child. (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2151.26 provides in relevant part: (E) No child, either before or after reaching eighteen years of age, shall be prosecuted as an adult for an offense committed prior to becoming eighteen, unless the child has been transferred as provided in this section. *** R.C. 2151.25 provides: When a child is arrested under any charge, complaint, affidavit, or indictment, whether for a felony or a misdemeanor, proceedings regarding such child shall be initially in the juvenile court in accordance with this chapter. *** Pursuant to R.C. 2151.26 and Juv.R. 30, a juvenile court may transfer its exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction to the court which would have had jurisdiction if the child had been an adult at the time of the alleged offense. State v. Wilson, supra. Absent a proper transfer of jurisdiction, or bindover, procedure, the juvenile court retains exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. Where a the child is charged with delinquency for committing 1 an offense prior to July 1, 1996, the juvenile court must, in 1 We note that for offenses occurring after July 1, 1996, the juvenile court is required to transfer jurisdiction if, inter alia, the offender is sixteen years of age or older and is charged with a "category one offense," such as murder. See R.C. 2151.26. - 8 - order to transfer jurisdiction, conduct an investigation that includes both mental and physical examinations. R.C. 2151.26; Juv.R. 30. Juv.R. 30 provides: (F) Determination of Amenability to Rehabil- itation. In determining whether the child is amenable to the treatment or rehabilitative processes available to the juvenile court, the court shall consider the following relevant circumstances: (1) The child's age and mental and phy- sical condition; (2) The child's prior juvenile record; (3) Efforts previously made to treat or rehabilitate the child; (4) The child's family environment; (5) The child's school record; (6) The specific facts relating to the offense for which probable cause was found, to the extent relevant to the child's physical or mental condition. Juv.R. 30(G) provides for waiver of the physical and mental examinations required for transfer where the child refuses to submit to such examinations. In Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 149, the supreme court reversed the appellate court's dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus, which asserted improper bindover for failure to conduct the examinations required by R.C. 2151.26. The court stated: Appellant also claims that he was given no mental and physical examination as required by - 9 - R.C. 2151.26. In the last half of 1983, R.C. 2151.26 stated in part (and still states in substance): "After a complaint has been filed alleg- ing that a child is a delinquent child by reason of having committed an act that would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the court at a hearing may transfer the case for criminal prosecution, the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the offense, after making the following determinations: * * * "(3) After an investigation, in- cluding a mental and physical exam- ination of the child made by a pub- lic or private agency, or a person qualified to make the examination, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: "(a) He is not amenable to care or rehabilitation or further care or rehabilitation in any facility designed for the care, supervision, and rehabilitation of delinquent children; "(b) The safety of the com- munity may require that he be placed under legal restraint, including, if necessary, for the period extending beyond his majority." (140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 585-586.) In State v. Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 652 N.E.2d 196, we held that, without a proper bindover procedure under R.C. 2151.26, a juvenile court's jurisdiction is exclusive and cannot be waived. Id. at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. Accordingly, we hold that appellant's amended petition stated a potentially good cause of action in habeas corpus, alleging, as it did, that the court of common pleas lacked jurisdiction over appellant because of improper bindover. Therefore, we - 10 - reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause for the court of appeals to allow the writ, require appellee to make a return, and determine whether the bindover was improper. See Hammond v. Dallman (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 666, 668, 590 N.E.2d 744, 746, fn. 7. (Emphasis added.) We are aware that Wilson was not a habeas case and that we have stated that habeas will not lie when there is an adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Pirman v. Money (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 591. 593-594, 635 N.E.2d 26, 29. Nevertheless, when a court's judgment is void because it lacked jurisdiction, habeas is still an appropriate remedy despite the availability of appeal. In re Lockhart (1952), 157 Ohio St. 192, 195, 47 O.O. 129, 131, 105 N.E.2d 35, 37, and paragraph three of the syllabus. Id., 150-151. Applying the foregoing, we are compelled to conclude that because the juvenile court did not conduct the physical examina- tion required under Juv.R. 30 and R.C. 2151.26, it did not trans- fer jurisdiction of this matter. The court of common pleas there- fore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and the prosecution in that court was void ab initio. See State v. Wilson, supra. The matter is, therefore, reversed and remanded with instructions that the judgment of conviction against defendant be vacated and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee his costs herein. - 11 - It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DIANE KARPINSKI, J. CONCURS TERRENCE O'DONNELL, P.J. DISSENTS (See attached opinion) JUDGE TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E), unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the clerk per App.R. 22(E). See, also, S.Ct.Prac.R. II, Section 2(A)(1). COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69266 : STATE OF OHIO : - 2 - : : DISSENTING Plaintiff-Appellee : : OPINION vs. : : : TOMMIE GOLPHIN : : : Defendant-Appellant : : DATE: NOVEMBER 21, 1996 O'DONNELL, J., DISSENTING: I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusions that the juvenile court did not transfer jurisdiction of this matter and that the murder prosecution in common pleas court was void ab initio. The evidence in the case indicated that on August 27, 1994, Robert Terrell and his friend Lawrence Williams, a.k.a. Monster, sponsored a party at his apartment located at 4881 Scovill Avenue in Cleveland. Monster collected a $5.00 cover charge at the door, and the party featured free alcoholic beverages and a floor show consisting of nude female dancers. Several witnesses at trial testified that appellant arrived at the party in the company of Willie Long and Marquis Black. Only Long and appellant were admitted, however, because of the crowded conditions inside the apartment. After a short time, the crowd became disruptive and began touching the dancers and as a result - 3 - Monster escorted appellant, Long and twenty or thirty others from the party. An argument developed over refund of the cover charge, and Long began to fight with Monster, during which Monster punched appellant in the face. Appellant, Long and Black left, but indicated an intention to return. The state presented testimony from Bobby Ford who stated he knocked on Terrell's door and advised that appellant had left to get a gun. Terrell's cousin, Clinton Butler, then locked the door expecting appellant to return. The evidence of what happened next is controverted. Several witnesses testified that they saw appellant, Long and Marquis Black return to the apartment. They heard someone bang on the door and also heard the sound of two gunshots. Appellant testified that Long fired the shots. William Butler, the decedent's brother and an eyewitness, however, testified that he saw appellant point a 9mm weapon at the door saying "f--- this shit" or "we aint going out like this, I'm going to kill the mother-f-----." Then he heard the bang on the door followed by the gunshots. The evidence further revealed that a 9mm bullet struck Clinton Butler in the abdomen and as a result, he was transported to St. Vincent Charity Hospital where he died on October 22, 1994 from pneumonia, due to a gunshot wound of the trunk. The coroner ruled the manner of death was homicide. As a result of further investigation of this matter, members of the Cleveland Police Department filed complaints in juvenile - 4 - court charging Tommie Golphin with delinquency in connection with the murder of Clinton Butler, felonious assault, discharging a weapon into a habitation, and having a weapon under a disability, because Golphin had previously been adjudicated delinquent for commission of a felony offense of violence. The juvenile court subsequently found probable cause to believe that he had committed these acts; that at that time, Tommie Golphin was a child of seventeen years and ten months; and that these acts would be felony offenses if committed by an adult. Next, the record shows the juvenile court conducted an amenability hearing where the child, his mother and defense counsel John Lawson, were all present. At the conclusion of that hearing, the court entered a journal entry wherein, inter alia, it referenced its statutory duty as follows: ACCORDING TO SECTION 2151.26(A)(1)(C) AND JUVENILE RULE 30(C), THE COURT MAY RELINQUISH JURISDICTION AND TRANSFER THE CASE OF TOMMIE GOLPHIN IF THERE ARE REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT: (i) HE IS NOT AMENABLE TO CARE OR REHA- BILITATION OR FURTHER CARE OR REHA- BILITATION IN ANY FACILITY DESIGNED FOR THE CARE, SUPERVISION, AND RE- HABILITATION OF DELINQUENT CHILDREN; (ii) THE SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY MAY REQUIRE THAT HE BE PLACED UNDER LEGAL RESTRAINT FOR THE PERIOD EXTENDING BEYOND HIS MAJORITY. IN DETERMINING THE AMENABILITY TO JUVENILE TREATMENT OR REHABILITATION, JUVENILE RULE 30(E) REQUIRES THE COURT TO CONSIDER SEVEN FACTS: - 5 - (1) THE CHILD'S AGE; (2) THE CHILD'S MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH; (3) THE CHILD'S PRIOR JUVENILE RECORD; (4) EFFORTS PREVIOUSLY MADE TO TREAT OR REHABILITATE THE CHILD; (5) THE CHILD'S FAMILY ENVIRONMENT; (6) SCHOOL RECORD; AND (7) THE SPECIFIC FACTS RELATING TO THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH PROBABLE CAUSE WAS FOUND, TO THE EXTENT RELEVANT TO THE CHILD'S PHYSICAL OR MENTAL CONDITION. In that three-page entry, the careful and experienced trial judge noted that appellant was presently eighteen years of age, observed that the condition of appellant's mental health as re- ported by Dr. Dobyns suggested he is not amenable to juvenile treatment, and also considered the appellant's prior record con- sisting of one probation violation and six delinquency adjudica- tions, including those for rape, kidnapping and robbery as further indications that he is not amenable to treatment as a juvenile. The court also stated that prior efforts to treat appellant included public residential treatment, in-patient drug treatment, and community-based programs, all without success. The court also noted that Mayor Michael White's appointment of appellant to the Mayor's City Youth Anti-Violence Council, which convened in October of 1994, was inappropriate because Tommie was not a peer role model for youth and concluded that no appointment should have been made. The court then stated: ALL OF THESE FACTORS, WHEN CONSIDERED TOGETHER, LEAD THE COURT TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE ARE - 6 - REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT TOMMIE IS NOT AMENABLE TO JUVENILE CARE OR REHABILITATION. Further, the court considered the violent nature of the appellant's acts enough on which to base a determination that the safety of the community requires that Tommie be placed under legal restraint for a period extending beyond his majority. Finally, the court noted R.C. 2151.26(B) required the court to consider the instant offenses as acts of violence favoring transfer of juris- diction of appellant. Again, in its entry, the court stated: CONSIDERING ALL OF THESE REASONS, THE COURT DETERMINES THAT THERE ARE REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT: (1) TOMMIE GOLPHIN IS NOT AMENABLE TO CARE OR REHABILITATION OR FURTHER CARE OR REHABILITATION IN ANY FACILITY DESIGNED FOR THE CARE, SUPERVISION, AND REHABILI- TATION OR DELINQUENT CHILDREN, AND (2) THE SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY MAY REQUIRE THAT TOMMIE GOLPHIN BE PLACED UNDER LEGAL RESTRAINT FOR A PERIOD EXTENDING BEYOND HIS MAJORITY. In State v. Watson (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 93, the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction in connection with a failure to properly apply the standards of Juv.R. 30(C) at the bindover hearing. The court stated at 95, The purpose behind Juv.R. 30 and its statutory counterpart, R.C. 2151.26 is "the assessment of the probability of rehabilitating the child - 7 - within the juvenile justice system." State v. Douglas (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 36. (Add'l citations omitted.) In making this assessment, the juvenile court enjoys wide latitude to retain or relinquish jurisdiction, and the ultimate decision lies within its sound discretion. State v. Carmichael (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d 1. (Add'l citations omitted.) There is no requirement that each, or any, of the five factors in Rule 30(E) be resolved against the juvenile so long as the totality of the evidence supports a finding that the juvenile is not amenable to treatment. (Citations omitted.) My review of the record in this case reveals that the trial judge carefully and scrupulously considered each of the factors listed in R.C. 2151.26 and Juv.R. 30. Importantly, the juvenile was present in the courtroom and the judge had ample opportunity to observe his physical well-being. Further, the record also contains a Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court fact sheet which contains information relating to the child's physical condition and, finally, the court's entry makes reference to the examination given the child by Doctor Mary Dobyns, the psychiatrist who examined him, and her report failed to note any physical impairments. Here, the court not only considered the factors listed in Juv.R. 30 and R.C. 2151.26 but also discharged its duty by stating in its conclusions regarding amenability to juvenile rehabilita- tion that the time necessary for rehabilitation to occur and potential community safety problems could require appellant's confinement beyond the age of majority. I therefore find that the court did appropriately transfer jurisdiction of this case to the general division of common pleas court. - 8 - I further find the majority's reliance on State v. Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40, and Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 149, to be misplaced. In State v. Wilson, supra, the facts reveal that the child never appeared before the juvenile court, apparently because the state and the court believed he was eighteen at the time of the theft. In that case, the juvenile court never conducted a bind- over hearing pursuant to R.C. 2151.26. That situation is not present in this case. In Gaskins v. Shiplevy, supra, the court considered a peti- tion for a writ of habeas corpus where the appellant alleged he was unrepresented by counsel at a juvenile adjudication hearing which the court converted into a bindover hearing and also alleged he was given no mental and physical examination. These facts are substantially different from those presented in this case. My review of this assignment of error leads me to conclude that it is not well taken because the trial court complied with the provisions of R.C. 2151.26 and Juv.R. 30 and properly determined Tommie Golphin not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation processes available to the juvenile court. Regarding the remaining three assignments of error, appellant first claims state witnesses Ford and Bogarty violated the trial court's separation of witnesses order because Tiwana Bogarty admitted in court she heard from other witnesses in the hallway outside the courtroom that the appellant had allegedly shot at the - 9 - apartment window; she also, however, admitted she didn't see appellant do this. Appellant also claims Bobby Ford, another state witness, admitted on cross-examination that he sat in the courtroom for about fifteen minutes of testimony by Willie Long, another state witness. Matters relating to the exclusion of witnesses are left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Here, appellant has not demonstrated either Bogarty or Ford tailored testimony to conform to that of other witnesses, and the allegations do not rise to the egregious, yet non-prejudicial, level presented in State v. Spirko (1995), 59 Ohio St.3d 1. There, after considering that a Van Wert County Sheriff's detective had daily telephone contact with Debra Youngs in which he related testimony of witnesses who preceded her rebuttal testimony at trial, the court concluded, "In light of other evidence presented at trial, we find the substantial rights of the defendant were not affected in this context under this proposition of law." I also conclude here that no prejudice and no abuse of dis- cretion has been demonstrated and find no merit to this assignment of error. Appellant next challenges the trial court's dismissal of two veniremen during voir dire, without giving defense counsel an opportunity to pose questions to them. - 10 - The record reflects the court excused James Goff, who admit- ted he may have problems in accepting his responsibility as a juror and difficulty in focusing his attention on the trial because he worked twelve-hour night shifts; also, in response to questioning by counsel for the co-defendant, Marquis Black, Goff stated he felt "kind of woozy" and felt his physical condition may impair his ability to serve on the jury, believing that he may not hear something that's important. The court interrupted the defense counsel's voir dire and excused this prospective juror. The record further reflects the trial court excused venireman Joseph Babic, who advised the court he had previously made vaca- tion plans, paid a fee, and purchased airline tickets for the trip. Appellant's chief complaint is that the court failed to comply with that portion of R.C. 2945.27 which states that, "The judge *** shall permit reasonable examination of jurors by the *** defense counsel." This quoted portion of the statute implies that the judge controls the examination of veniremen during voir dire and is subject to review on the basis of abuse of discretion. Appellant has demonstrated neither prejudice from the actions taken by the trial judge nor the fact that the judge acted unreasonably, unlaw- fully or unconscionably in these rulings. This assignment of error is, in my view, without merit. - 11 - Finally, appellant also challenges his conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. In State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, the court established the standard of review for this kind of challenge: The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and crated a manifest miscarriage of justice ***. Appellant argues the testimony of Tiwana Bogarty, Willie Long, and William Butler is unreliable, conflicting and self-serving in that Bogarty initially told police that unknown persons fired shots through the apartment door but, at trial, implicated appellant as the triggerman who shot a 9mm gun into the door of the apartment though she had earlier told police he carried a .38 caliber weapon; Long related at trial that his reasons for testifying against Golphin included his plea bargain to the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, which the jury evaluated; and Butler, who initially implicated the appellant's brother Earnest Golphin but testified differently at trial and identified Tommie Golphin as the triggerman. From a thorough review of the entire record and all of the witnesses who testified, the verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence in this case. For the foregoing reasons, the murder conviction of Tommie .