COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69249 STATE OF OHIO, CUYAHOGA : CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT : AGENCY, and TRACI SEALS : ACCELERATED DOCKET : Plaintiff-Appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION KARL SEALS, SR. : : PER CURIAM Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: MAY 9, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE JUVENILE COURT DIVISION CASE NO. CV-94-72064 JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES Cuyahoga County Prosecutor BY: SHARON HAWK (#0020936) Assistant County Prosecutor P.O. Box 93894 Cleveland, OH 44101-5894 For Traci Seals: TRACI SEALS, pro se (#P00008338) 631 E. 113th Street Cleveland, OH 44108 For Defendant-Appellee: KARL SEALS, pro se (#P00069249E) 11314 Whitmore Avenue Cleveland, OH 44108 PER CURIAM: Appellant the State of Ohio, Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency ("CSEA"), appeals the order of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which approved the Referee's Report in this child support case and dismissed CSEA as a party to the action. Appellant has presented the following four assignments of error for our review: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REMOVING CSEA AS A PARTY WHEN THE STATE OF OHIO, CSEA IS A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT FOLLOWING THE FRAMEWORK OF R.C. 3113.215 IN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT. III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT FOLLOWING THE REQUIREMENTS OF R.C. 3113.215 AND MARKER V. GRIMM IN ORDERING A DEVIATION IN THE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT. IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF R.C. 3113.217(C) BY NOT ISSUING A SEPARATE ORDER REGARDING HEALTH INSURANCE. Finding appellant's appeal to have merit, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded. The facts giving rise to this appeal as contained in the record provide the following. On August 19, 1989, Traci and Karl Seals were married. The parties subsequently separated and have not lived together since. One child, Karl Seals, Jr., was born during the marriage; and one child, Toija Seals, was born prior to the marriage. The present - 3 - action, however, deals solely with the issue of support for the minor child Karl Seals, Jr. CSEA and Traci Seals commenced this action on November 29, 1994, seeking an award of child support from appellee Karl Seals, Sr. On May 8, 1995, Referee Menzies filed his report stating that appellee was to pay child support for the minor child Karl Seals, Jr. in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100.00) plus a fee of 2% per month through the Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency. Furthermore, Referee Menzies dismissed CSEA as a party to the action. On May 30, 1995, after reviewing the Report of the Referee, the assigned judge approved and adopted the report. I. In its first assignment of error, CSEA asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing it as a proper party in the present action. In Cuyahoga Cty. Support Enforcement Agency v. Lozada (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 442, this court addressed the question of whether CSEA is a proper party in proceedings regarding child support. After a careful analysis of the applicable statutes and relevant case law, this court held that: * * * [T]he State of Ohio has an interest in all child support actions by virtue of either the residential parent's assignment of rights as public assistance recipients or the interest in enforcing child support awards in order to protect and ensure the integrity of the public fisc. Further, we hold that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions to allow the aid and support of - 4 - the CSEA in an action for child support brought by parents who have established their parentage through the probate court and residential parents who are on public assistance while denying the aid and support of the CSEA to parents who have established their parentage through the administrative process. From a thorough reading of Chapters 3111. and 3113., together with the mandates of Title IV-A and Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, we find that the general assembly intended that the child support enforcement agencies be proper parties to all actions for the collection of child support; any other result would hinder the legitimate state interest spelled out by the general assembly for the enforcement of child support orders as well as the mandates of Title IV-A and Title IV-D. Lozada, 102 Ohio App.3d at 455-456. The decision set forth by this court in Lozada clearly establishes that CSEA is to be considered a proper party to all actions for the collection of child support. Therefore, the dismissal of CSEA in the case sub judice was not in accordance with our holding in Lozada. Further, the dismissal of CSEA was improper as it was against the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. Id. Accordingly, CSEA's first assignment of error is well taken. II. In its second and third assignment of error, CSEA argues that the trial court erred by not following the mandatory requirements of R.C. 3113.215. R.C. 3113.215 is a comprehensive enactment governing the procedures a court must follow in calculating and awarding child - 5 - support. Marker v. Grimm (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 139, 140. R.C. 3113.215(B)(1) states in pertinent part that: In any action in which a child support order is issued or modified * * * the court or agency shall calculate the amount of the obligor's child support obligation in accordance with the basic child support schedule in division (D) of this section, the applicable worksheet in division (E) or (F) of this section * * * . The amount of child support that would be payable under a child support order * * * is rebuttably presumed to be the correct amount of child support due * * *. Where the amount of child support ordered deviates from the amount "rebuttably presumed" to be the correct amount, the court must strictly adhere to the dictates of R.C. 3113.215 (B)(1)(a) and (b). In particular, the court or agency shall order that amount to be paid as child support unless both of the following apply with respect to an order issued by the court: (a) The court, after considering the factors and criteria set forth in division (B)(3) of this section, determines that the amount calculated *** would be unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child. (b) The court enters in the journal the amount of child support calculated pursuant to the basic child support schedule and pursuant to the applicable worksheet * * * its determination that that amount would be unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child, and findings of fact supporting that determination. R.C. 3113.215 (B)(1)(a) and (b); Lozada, 102 Ohio App.3d at 456. The language set forth in R.C. 3113.215 has been interpreted by courts as being mandatory in nature. And, " * * * when the standard provision for support as provided in the statute is not specifically followed by the trial court, the law requires any such - 6 - deviation to be explicitly explained after following specific procedures." Grimm, 65 Ohio St.3d at 142. After a complete review of the Referee's Report and the completed child support computation worksheet in the present case, it appears that the trial court miscalculated the amount of appellee's child support obligation for his minor child Karl Seals, Jr. In its calculation of appellee's child support obligation, the trial court determined appellee's income to be fourteen thousand five hundred sixty dollars ($14,560.00) and Traci Seals' income to be seventeen thousand five hundred dollars ($17,500.00). The trial court then adjusted the annual gross incomes of both parties to reflect annual child support payments which appellee was making under agency order for the support of minor child Toija Seals in the amount of two thousand fifty-two dollars ($2,052.00). Subsequently, for purposes of determining the amount of child support due for the minor child Karl Seals, Jr., the trial court determined the combined annual income of the parties to be twenty- six thousand four hundred and forty-six dollars ($26,446.00). The basic child support schedule in R.C. 3113.215(D) provides that for $26,446.00 of "combined gross income" with one child the amount due is four thousand eight hundred and sixty-five dollars ($4,865.00) in annual child support. Appellee would then have been responsible for forty-six per cent (46%) or two thousand two hundred thirty-eight dollars ($2,238.00) in annual child support - - 7 - - or one hundred eighty-six dollars ($186.00) per month -- if proper procedures for calculating support had been followed. The trial court, however, calculated the amount of child support based on the "combined gross income" of both parties with two children and found the amount of support due by appellee to be three thousand two hundred forty-eight dollars ($3,248.00). It appears that the court then, for a second time, deducted the annual amount of support that appellee was paying for the support of the minor child Toija Seals. Based on these calculations, the court determined that appellee was obligated to pay one hundred dollars ($100.00) plus two per cent (2%) interest for the support of the minor child Karl Seals, Jr. As stated supra, the terms of R.C. 3113.215 are mandatory in nature. "Further, any court-ordered deviation from the applicable worksheet and the basic child support schedule must be entered by the court in its journal and must include findings of fact to support such determination." Grimm, 65 Ohio St.3d at 143. In the case sub judice, however, the court failed to explicitly explain the reasons for the deviation in amount of the support obligation. Accordingly, CSEA's second and third assignments of error are well taken. We reverse and remand the decision of the court for a recalculation by the juvenile court of the amount of child support owed by the appellee. - 8 - III. In its fourth assignment of error, CSEA asserts that the trial court erred in not issuing a separate order regarding health insurance. R.C. 3113.217(C) states the following: In any action or proceeding in which a child support order is issued or modified * * * the court also shall issue a separate order that includes all of the following: (1) A requirement that the obligor under the child support order obtain health insurance coverage for the children who are the subject of the child support order * * *. In the case sub judice, the trial court failed to issue a separate order in accordance with the requirements set forth in R.C. 3113.217 (C)(1) through (13). "This failure by the trial court to comply with the demands required by R.C. 3113.217 is plain error." Lozada, 102 Ohio App.3d at 458. Accordingly, CSEA's fourth assignment of error is well taken. We therefore reverse and remand the cause to juvenile court to issue a separate order to obtain health insurance pursuant to R.C. 3113.217. This cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. - 9 - This cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Journal Entry and Opinion. It is, therefore, considered that said appellants recover of said appellee their costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. LEO M. SPELLACY, CHIEF JUSTICE JAMES M. PORTER, JUDGE TIMOTHY E. MCMONAGLE, JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time .