COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69029, 69030 and 69031 : STATE OF OHIO : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellee : : and -vs- : : OPINION : KEENAN WYNN GREEN : : Defendant-Appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT MAY 16, 1996 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court Case Nos. CR-280123 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: ROGER KRAMER, ESQ. WILLIAM T. MCGINTY, ESQ. Assistant County Prosecutor McGinty,Gibbons & Hilow Co. 8th Floor Justice Center 1375 E. Ninth St., #1920 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.: Defendant-appellant, Keenan Wynn Green, appeals his conviction for two counts of burglary and assigns the following error for our review: KEENAN GREEN'S PLEA OF GUILTY WAS NOT VOLUNTARY. THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE PLEA AS OHIO CRIMINAL RULE 11(C) WAS NOT FOLLOWED. Having reviewed the record of the proceedings and the legal arguments presented by the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The apposite facts follow. In three separate cases, Green was charged with two counts of aggravated burglary with aggravated felony specifications, one count of burglary, and one count of theft with a violence specification. At a pre-trial hearing on June 10, 1992, Green entered guilty pleas to two counts of burglary, and the remaining charges were dismissed by the prosecutor under a plea agreement. Before accepting the guilty plea, the trial court discussed the plea with Green. During that discussion the following exchange took place: THE COURT: Are you taking any medication of any kind in jail? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: What do you take? THE DEFENDANT: I don't know what they give. MR. DOYLE: He has an injury to his arm, Your Honor, but I guess they have not given him any medication recently, is that correct? THE DEFENDANT: (Nodding affirmatively.) THE COURT: Are you thinking clearly this morning? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: You're not thinking clearly? THE DEFENDANT: No. -3- THE COURT: What is it that you're not thinking clearly about? THE DEFENDANT: I don't know what's going on. THE COURT: Well, okay then tomorrow we'll start a trial and then we'll go from there. You understand trial, right? THE DEFENDANT: (Nodding negatively.) THE COURT: Okay. MR. DOYLE: Can I have a moment, Your Honor? THE COURT: Sure. (Thereupon, a discussion was had off the record.) THE COURT: Mr. Doyle. MR. DOYLE: Keenan and I have discussed it. I believe he does understand the proceedings and THE COURT: He's just a little confused by what I was saying. Is that correct, Mr. Green? In fact you just went through a similar proceeding to this in front of Judge Calabrese, right? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: How long ago was that? THE DEFENDANT: May. THE COURT: May of what year? THE DEFENDANT: '92. THE COURT: Of '92? A month ago. What's so confusing about my proceeding? Maybe I should get Calabrese down here to do it, right? You understood that one, right? This is the same thing, just three more cases. He just had one, that's all. You understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Okay, are we ready to proceed now? You have discussed this with your lawyer? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Do you understand now what we're doing here this morning? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Do you understand what we're doing is taking a plea to an amended indictment as offered by the prosecutor's office? Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Is everything cleared up now since you had a discussion with your lawyer? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Okay, you find the proceeding remarkably the same as Judge Calabrese's, right? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Okay, all right. Now we're on track. Are you satisfied with the representation Mr. Doyle has given you? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. -4- After the trial court determined Green understood the proceedings, it advised Green of his constitutional rights. Green acknowledged he understood those rights and understood he was waiving them. Specifically, he acknowledged understanding the effects of his guilty plea, the charges against him, and their possible penalties. Additionally, he explained to the court the factual circumstances under which he was arrested. Finally, in response to the trial court's question, Green indicated he understood the proceeding, and his pleas were voluntary. The trial court accepted Green's guilty pleas, and the discussion continued regarding the facts and circumstances of his arrests. Thereafter, Green was sentenced concurrently to 5 to 15 years on each count. This appeal followed. In his sole assignment of error, Green argues his plea was not voluntary; therefore, it was not in compliance with Crim.R. 11(C). Crim.R. 11(C) provides: *** (2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a pleas of guilty or a pleas of no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and: (a) Determining that he is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that he is not eligible for probation. *** The standard for reviewing whether or not the trial court accepted a plea in compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) is a de novo standard of review. It requires an appellate court to review the totality of the circumstances and determine whether the plea -5- hearing was in substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C). E.g. State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 92-93. Substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) requires the trial court to engage the defendant on the record in a "reasonably intelligible" dialogue. See, e.g., State v. Ballard (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 473. Green asserts his guilty plea was not voluntary because he said he was not thinking clearly. A trial court may determine the defendant understands his plea by considering the surrounding circumstances "*** such as recitations of discussions between the defendant and his attorney." See State v. Swift (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 407, 411, 412. However, if a defendant states he does not understand the plea hearing or a portion of the plea hearing, then the "*** [trial] court must 'clear-up' any confusion on the part of the defendant before it can accept a guilty plea." Id. at 413. See, also, State v. Funk (Oct. 22, 1976), Medina App. No. 1499, unreported. Nash v. Israel (C.A. 7, 1983), 707 F.2d 298. In this case, the trial court engaged Green in a "reasonably intelligible" dialogue. The court questioned Green about his medication and determined he was not on medication. When Green said he did not know what was going on, the court responded by telling Green he would go to trial tomorrow. Thereafter, Green's lawyer, off the record, apparently cleared-up Green's confusion. When the court questioned Green again on the record, Green responded he understood what was happening. Consequently, this court concludes Green voluntarily entered a plea to the charges. -6- Likewise, if the substance of Green's argument is the trial court failed to clear-up Green's confusion, then we disagree. When Green concluded his conversation with his lawyer, he returned on the record and said, "he understood the proceedings." Thereafter, the trial court explained the proceedings were similar to the one he had experienced before Judge Calabrese. Green responded "he understood." The trial court then proceeded to explain Green's rights and accept his plea. Under the totality of the circumstances, the comparison was sufficient to resolve any of Green's confusion. The best witness of this fact is Green himself, who acknowledged he understood the comparison. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C), and Green's plea was voluntary. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that Appellee recover of Appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PORTER, J., and MCMONAGLE, J., CONCUR. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- .