COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69020 STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION KENNETH L. SNORTON : : Defendant-appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OF DECISION : MAY 9, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Criminal appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. 258571 JUDGMENT : Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Stephanie Tubbs-Jones Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Laurence R. Snyder, Esq. By: Sherry F. McCreary One Erieview Plaza, Suite 450 Assistant Prosecuting Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Attorney The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- HARPER, P.J.: Defendant-appellant, Kenneth Snorton, was indicted by the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury on October 15, 1990 for one count of aggravated burglary, R.C. 2911.11, and one count of felonious assault, R.C. 2903.11, with violence specifications. Appellant initially pleaded not guilty to the charges on October 25, 1990, but withdrew those pleas on November 19, 1990. Appellant then pled guilty to burglary, a lesser included offense under count one, and felonious assault as charged in count two. The trial court sentenced appellant on December 6, 1990 to two concurrent terms of five to fifteen years. This delayed appeal followed with appellant claiming as error: The lower court erred when it accepted Appellant's plea of guilty when the court failed to make a determination that appellant had an understanding of the nature of the charges against him as required by Crim.R. 11(c)(2)(a) [sic] and Amendment V to the Constitution of the United States (Tr. 3-8). Appellant submits in his sole assignment of error that his pleas were not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered because the trial court failed to ascertain whether he fully understood the nature of the charges against him prior to the acceptance of the pleas as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). Appellant contends that the trial court could not determine his understanding of the charges from the totality of the circumstances because "[a]t best, the information supplied to the defendant can be described as the bare minimum under 'ordinary circumstances.'" -3- He argues that since he was in "substantial physical pain" and was "on medication" from a gunshot wound, "extraordinary circumstances" existed which rendered insufficient the trial court's "bare bones inquiry" into his understanding under the criminal rule. Crim.R. 11(C)(2), which deals with a trial court's acceptance of a plea of guilty to a felony offense, reads in pertinent part: (2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and: *** (a) Determining that he is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that he is not eligible for probation. *** A reviewing court must find that the trial court did not substantially comply with Crim.R. 11(C) prior to vacating a defendant's guilty plea. State v. Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, citing State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 92-93. A trial court substantially complies with the rule where under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant subjectively understands the rights he is waiving and the consequences of the plea. Id. A defendant must also demonstrate a prejudicial effect when arguing that he did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily enter a guilty plea. Id. In the present case, the trial court directly addressed appellant about the plea agreement at the plea hearing. See, State v. Caudill (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 342, paragraph two of the -4- syllabus. The court noting that appellant suffered from a gunshot wound to his face, asked him whether it hurt to speak, to which he responded, "Yes. I can't move my jaw too much." Appellant then responded affirmatively to the trial court's inquiry about his understanding of the plea agreement: THE COURT: Again, you won't be required to do much talking during the course of the plea hearing. But keep in mind if there is anything you don't understand, we can stop and you can talk to your lawyer or submit any questions to me in writing. You understood everything that I said about the plea bargain, did you not? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. The trial court moreover recognized that appellant was under medication for the facial injury. Appellant responded that the medication was not a problem when questioned by the court. Finally, after advising appellant as to the rights he would be waiving if he proceeded with his pleas, the trial court asked appellant whether he discussed the charges with defense counsel, and understood them. Appellant responded, "Yes." Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) does not require a detailed recitation of the elements of charges offenses. State v. Swift (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 407, 412; State v. Gibson (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 146, 147; State v. Rainey (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 441, 442; State v. Zeda (1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 66524, unreported. The totality of the circumstances could allow a trial court to determine that a defendant understands the charges against him or her. Id. "In other words, under some circumstances, the trial court may be justified in concluding that a defendant has drawn an understanding -5- from sources other than the lips of the trial court." Rainey, 442, citing State v. Moore (Feb. 5, 1981), Franklin App. No. 80AP-643, unreported; State v. Kimble (Aug. 23, 1979), Franklin App. No. 79AP-71, unreported. See, also, Riggins v. McMackin (C.A.6, 1991), 945 F.2d 790; State v. Russell (Feb. 23, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 66959, unreported. In the present case, the record contains evidence in support of the trial court's conclusion that appellant understood the nature of the charges even though he was not advised as to the element of the offenses. Here, as in Rainey, appellant entered a plea of guilty to a lesser included offense in count one. Appellant when specifically questioned by the court, responded that he discussed the charges with his counsel, and understood them. Appellant moreover expressed his understanding of the penalties as outlined earlier by the court. Appellant neither denied the charges nor indicated any confusion over them or the possible penalties even when the trial court informed him that, considering his injury, he could stop the proceedings at any time to submit questions in writing. Finally, appellant related to the court that he was satisfied with his counsel's representation. This court finds, when looking at the totality of the circumstances, that the trial court had sufficient reason to determine appellant made his pleas voluntarily, and with an understanding of the nature of the charges. The trial court, therefore, did not err in accepting his pleas of guilty. Rainey; State v. Clark (Mar. 22, 1995), Jefferson App. No. 93-J-11, -6- unreported; State v. Slover (Mar. 17, 1995), Lucas App. No. L-93- 320, unreported; Zeda, supra; see, also, State v. Corethers (Mar. 30, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67510, unreported. Furthermore, as previously set forth, appellant needs to demonstrate a prejudicial effect in order to obtain a vacating of his pleas. See, Nero and Stewart, supra. Since he made his pleas in order to obtain a reduction of the charge of aggravated burglary, appellant cannot demonstrate this "prejudicial effect." See, State v. McClutcheon (Dec. 8, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 66538, unreported; State v. Pandolph (Oct. 20, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 67166, unreported. Appellant's assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. TIMOTHY McMONAGLE, J., CONCUR JOHN T. PATTON, J., CONCUR PRESIDING JUDGE SARA J. HARPER N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza-tion, .