COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68965 DUSAN ZLOJUTRO, ET AL. : : Plaintiff-appellees : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION STEPHEN M. BEHM, ET AL. : : Defendant-appellants : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : FEBRUARY 1, 1996 OF DECISION : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CV-2344035 JUDGMENT : REVERSED AND REMANDED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellees: For defendant-appellants: DAVID PAUL BRADLEY, ESQ. WILLIAM P. FARRALL, ESQ. THOMAS J. ESCOVAR, ESQ. CLIFFORD C. MASCH, ESQ. Steuer, Escovar & Berk Reminger & Reminger 55 Public Square, #1828 The 113 St. Clair Bldg., #700 Cleveland, OH 44113 Cleveland, OH 44114 LYNN A. LAZZARO, ESQ. Meyers, Hentemann, Schneider & Rea 815 Superior Avenue, #2121 Cleveland, OH 44114 - 2 - PATTON, J. Plaintiff Dusan Zlojutro brought this negligence action against defendant Steven Behm, alleging defendant negligently failed to yield the right-of-way at a traffic intersection. The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred by directing a verdict in plaintiff's favor, on grounds that defendant presented no evidence to counter plaintiff's contention that the controlling traffic signal was yellow, giving plaintiff the right-of-way through the intersection. The collision occurred in the city of Cleveland at the intersection of Ridge and Plainfield Roads. Each party blamed the other for causing the collision. Plaintiff and his brother were travelling north, in the right- hand lanes of Ridge Road, approaching the traffic signal at the intersection with Plainfield Road. They testified the traffic signal turned yellow as they entered the intersection. Because of their proximity to the intersection, plaintiff did not believe he had the opportunity to stop safely and decided to proceed through the intersection. As they went through the intersection, a pickup truck in the left-hand, southbound lanes of Ridge Road pulled into traffic while making a left turn onto Plainfield Road. The truck crossed through the intersection and struck plaintiff's car. Defendant testified he had been proceeding south on Ridge Road and intended to make a left turn onto Plainfield Road, but heavy traffic prevented him from making the turn. He waited through a - 3 - red signal, stating he remained on Ridge Road and had not entered the intersection. Defendant again waited through the green signal because of traffic. As the signal turned yellow, defendant pulled into the intersection under the traffic signal and waited for two to three seconds for traffic to clear. He saw an opening in traffic, looked either way down Plainfield Road, and proceeded to make his left turn across the northbound lanes of Ridge Road. As he did so, he saw plaintiff's vehicle coming at him and realized plaintiff was not going to stop at the signal. Defendant tried to accelerate through the intersection but failed to avoid a collision. The trial court directed the verdict at the close of evidence because the evidence merely showed defendant "assumed the signal was a particular color. He assumed that the plaintiff was going to stop ***." Civ. R. 50 provides in relevant part: * * * (4) When a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue. When considering a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must neither consider the weight of the evidence nor the credibility of the witnesses because the motion does not present - 4 - factual issues, but a question of law. O'Day v. Webb (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 215, paragraph three of the syllabus; Strother v. Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 284; Ruta v. Brechenridge- Remy Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 66, 68. In his assignments of error, defendant maintains that although his position in the intersection prevented him from seeing the traffic signal, the jury could reasonably infer the traffic signal had turned to red in the few seconds it took him to enter the intersection and wait for several other vehicles to clear the intersection before starting his turn. We find the trial judge erred by directing a verdict in plaintiff's favor because the evidence, construed most strongly in defendant's behalf, could cause reasonable minds to differ as to who caused the accident. The trial court noted defendant assumed the traffic signal turned red. We agree there is a substantive difference between an "assumption" and an "inference," but in this case defendant did not ask the jury to make an assumption. An assumption is the supposition that something is true. An inference is passing from one proposition assumed to be true to another proposition whose truth is believed to follow from the former. Ayers v. Woodard (1957), 166 Ohio St. 138, 145. It would be an assumption had defendant, without more, simply stated the signal was red. But his testimony created the inference the signal was red from other facts he placed in evidence. - 5 - Although defendant did not see whether the traffic signal had turned from yellow to red, he testified he did not move into the intersection until the signal had changed to yellow. Two to three seconds elapsed while other vehicles cleared the intersection. Defendant looked both ways down Plainfield Road and proceeded to turn. Viewed most favorably for defendant, these facts could allow reasonable minds to differ on the question whether the traffic signal turned red before he made his turn onto Plainfield Road. See Solon v. Botros (Aug. 24, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67511, unreported at 5. Accordingly, we sustain the first assignment of error and remand for a new trial. The remaining assignments are moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Reversed and remanded. - 6 - This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is, therefore, considered that said appellants recover of said appellees their costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DAVID T. MATIA, P.J., TERRENCE O'DONNELL, J., CONCUR JUDGE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, .