COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68941 IN THE MATTER OF JOHN SMITH, : JOURNAL ENTRY A Minor : and : OPINION Appellant : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : OCTOBER 10, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Criminal appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Juvenile Division : Case No. 9500357 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For appellee : STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES Cuyahoga County Prosecutor MICHAEL P. DONNELLY, Assistant Justice Center, Courts Tower 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For appellant : JAMES A. DRAPER Cuyahoga County Public Defender ROBERT M. INGERSOLL, Assistant 100 Lakeside Place 1200 West Third Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1513 TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, J.: Appellant John Smith appeals from his adjudication of delin- quency alleging that sufficient evidence does not support the finding for aggravated burglary, R.C. 2911.11, and for theft, R.C. 2913.02(A)(1). For the reasons stated below, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the juvenile court. The record reflects that the Cleveland police filed a com- plaint on January 13, 1995 alleging John Smith to be a delinquent child. The complaint alleged that he violated R.C. 2923.122 (possession of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance in a school), R.C.2923.12 (carrying a concealed weapon) and R.C. 2925.37 (pos- sessing counterfeit controlled substance). On January 17, 1995, a second complaint was filed against John Smith alleging that he violated R.C. 2911.11 (aggravated burglary), a felony of the first degree if committed by an adult, and R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), theft (value $300 to $5,000), a felony of the fourth degree if committed by an adult. On February 21, 1995, a delinquency hearing was held on the aggravated burglary and theft charges. The judge found John Smith to be a delinquent child pursuant to the charges brought against him. Subsequent to that determination, John Smith then admitted to the charges against him for the possession of a weapon in school, - 3 - carrying a concealed weapon and possession of a counterfeit controlled substance and further admitted to being a probation violator in a previous case. He was committed to the Ohio Department of Youth Services for a minimum of twelve months, with an additional six months to run consecutively. At the hearing, in support of its case against John Smith, the state presented testimony from Officer Meel, the arresting officer, John Blanchard, the witness, and Dewey Williams, the victim, as to the events on December 8, 1994. The defense presented John Smith, who testified on his own behalf. John Blanchard, the witness to the events, testified that he lives on Dove Avenue, across the street from the home of the victim, Dewey Williams. It was light on the morning of December 8, 1994, when the events occurred. Blanchard knew Smith and recognized him that day. Blanchard was sitting in the window of his home when he observed John Smith walk up to the porch of Williams's house three or four times. The last time Smith walked up onto the porch, Blanchard heard breaking glass, and he called 9- 1-1. On cross-examination, Blanchard testified that he was unable to see Smith break the window because a tree blocked his view. Although Blanchard did not see Smith break the window, he knew that Smith was on the porch when the window was broken because he had not come off the porch. Blanchard testified that nobody else was on the porch at that time. - 4 - Officer Meel of the Cleveland Police Department testified that he and his partner responded to a "Code One" assignment, a break- in in progress, at 10901 Dove Ave on December 8, 1994. He arrived at the scene within three minutes of the call. Upon arrival at the scene, he notice the bottom pane of the front window was broken. As he was getting ready to enter the home, he and his partner heard yelling from the side of the house. They went around the side of the house, where he saw Mr. Franklin detaining the juvenile, John Smith. The witness, Franklin, told the police that Smith had broken out the front window and entered the home. Smith was handcuffed and put into the zone car. Officer Meel and his partner found the back door of the house open and Williams's VCR sitting on the back porch and put the VCR in the kitchen. The police found VCR tapes in Smith's coat and found one or two tapes, which Smith tried to kick under the front seat, on the floor of the police car. The officer testified that the victim, Dewey Williams, told the police that Smith did not have permission to be in his house or to take his property. The victim, Dewey Williams, testified that at the time of the burglary, he was visiting a friend down the street. He was called back to his house by a neighbor because someone had broken into his house. Upon inspection of his house, Williams saw his drawers were open, his front window was broken, his back door was open and his VCR was in the kitchen. He knew Smith previously and spoke to Smith while he was in the police car. Williams testified that he - 5 - had not given Smith permission to enter his house, to break the window or to take his VCR and tapes. He valued his VCR and the tapes at about $355 in total. The state rested, and the defense called John Smith, who testified on his own behalf. Smith gave his version of the events of the morning of December 8, 1994. He testified that when he got out of school that morning, he went to Dewey Williams's house to buy marijuana. He first knocked on the front door, but when no one answered, he went to the back door. He did not notice that it was open. He went to the front again, but he did not notice that the front window was broken. He testified that he went up to the front door three times. At one point, he went across the street to buy cigarettes but came back and knocked on the front door again. When nobody answered, he went to the back door. When he got to the back door, he saw two people run out. The VCR and the tapes were sitting on the back porch. He put the tapes into his pocket so that he could take them to Williams at his girlfriend's house. He said he never touched the VCR. On cross-examination, Smith testified that the people who ran out of the back door were two "fiends," indicating that they were crack smokers, dressed all in black, whom he had never seen before. Smith stated that he did not tell Dewey Williams or the police about the "fiends" the day of the burglary because he figured he would just take the blame. He stated that he does not want to take the blame now because he did not commit the burglary. - 6 - The defense rested. The juvenile court found John Smith delinquent on both counts of the complaint heard before it. John Smith timely appealed his delinquency adjudication on the aggra- vated burglary and the theft charges. Appellant raises the following sole assignment of error for our review: JOHN SMITH HAS BEEN DEPRIVED OF HIS LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY HIS JUVENILE ADJUDICATION, AS SAID ADJUDICATION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIM DELINQUENT. Appellant contends that his adjudication of delinquency was not supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically, appellant argues that his explanation of the events was as reasonable as the state's theory of the case, thereby undermining the state's cir- cumstantial case. As a result, appellant argues, the state's case was not supported by sufficient evidence for the trial court to have found him delinquent. We do not agree. An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence submitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259. - 7 - Further, a reviewing court will not reverse a verdict where there is substantial evidence upon which the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that all the elements of an offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 169. This same standard applies in juvenile proceedings. In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1. The appellant, John Smith, was found delinquent of R.C. 2911.11, aggravated burglary, which, if committed by an adult, is a felony of the first degree, and R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), theft of property valued at $355, which, if committed by an adult, is a felony of the fourth degree. The elements of the crimes with which the defendant was charged are as follows: R.C. 2911.11(A)(3), Aggravated Burglary, states in pertinent part: (A) No person, by force, stealth, or decep- tion, shall trespass in an occupied structure, as defined in section 2909.01 of the revised code, or in a separately secured or separately occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit therein any theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the revised code, or any felony, when any of the following apply: * * * (3) The occupied structure involved is the permanent or temporary habitation of any person, in which at the time any person is present or likely to be pres- ent. R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), Theft, states in pertinent part: - 8 - (A) No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services in any of the following ways: (1) Without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent; * * * (B) *** [I]f the value of the property or services stolen is three hundred dollars or more and is less than five thousand dollars, *** a violation of this section is theft, a felony of the fourth degree *** The state presented credible testimony at the hearing from three witnesses. The evidence presented showed that John Smith went onto the porch of the home of Dewey Williams and, while Smith was on the porch, the front window of the house was broken and the breaking glass was heard by the witness, who immediately called the police. Smith did not return down the front porch steps. Within minutes, the police arrived on the scene and found John Smith with video tapes on his person. The back door of Williams's house was open, and Williams's VCR was sitting on the back steps. The state presented evidence that Smith did not have permission to take Williams's possessions and that the value of the items was about $355.00. Appellant's theory of his innocence which he presented in his defense was that the burglary of Williams's home was committed by two crack "fiends," who ran out of the back door of Williams's house, leaving the VCR and tapes on the back porch. Appellant retrieved the tapes to return them to Williams, who was at his - 9 - girlfriend's house. We do not find the appellant's theory of innocence so compelling as to raise a reasonable doubt as to the totality of the evidence. The evidence, when examined in the light most favorable to the state, as required by State v. Bridgeman (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 261, was sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that John Smith trespassed into an occupied structure by force, stealth or deception for the purpose of committing a felony or stealing when the structure was someone's home. The state presented evidence that the value of the property taken without permission was over $300 but less than $5000.00. After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found each of the essential elements of the crimes charged proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court below. - 10 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is termi- nated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, P.J. and PATRICIA BLACKMON, J. CONCUR JUDGE TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 27. This decision will be journalized and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R. 22(E), unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the court's decision. The time period for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court's announcement of decision by the .