COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68938 IN RE: RICKY MEREDITH : : Appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY : AND : OPINION : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : FEBRUARY 22, 1996 OF DECISION : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Juvenile Court : Case No. 9414890 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For appellant: For appellee: ROBERT R. CLARICO, ESQ. KAREN L. JOHNSON, ESQ. Assistant Public Defender Assistant County Prosecutor 100 Lakeside Place 8th Floor, Justice Center 1200 West Third Street 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113 Cleveland, OH 44113 - 2 - PATTON, J. Appellant-juvenile Ricky Meredith appeals an adjudication of delinquency in connection with a felonious assault committed in a beating given to the victim, Mitchell White. In this appeal, he complains the juvenile court erred in its determination since (a) the state presented no evidence to show the victim suffered serious physical harm, (b) the state failed to demonstrate he participated in the attack, and (c) the state failed to establish he possessed the necessary culpable mental state to commit the offense. The evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing established White, a Bedford Heights High School student, desired to join the Folks gang. White understood the gang's initiation procedure required him to fight his way into the gang by squaring off against several current members. White testified he and four gang members left Bedford Heights High School and walked across the street to a nearby church parking lot. The appellant-juvenile accompanied the group on his bicycle. White lined up against an opposing member. As he charged forward to fight, he was struck in the head from behind. He fell to the ground and was pummeled and kicked repeatedly. His position on the ground prevented him from seeing who struck the blows, but he did testify he was hit by more than two members. The attack left White dazed and bloodied. He returned home and his mother, a registered nurse, found him cut and bruised on the back of his head. His eyes were glassy; his face swollen. The - 3 - mother said White suffered "cauliflower ear," a condition where his ear had swelled to twice its normal size. White's parents immediately took him to the emergency room of the local hospital. The hospital treated White's lacerations and released him into his mother's care, but placed him on a twenty-four watch for a concus- sion. The following day, the mother found White had difficulty awaking, so she again took him to the hospital. A CT scan was conducted, but the results are not in the record. The day after White suffered his injuries, the Bedford Heights Police Department assigned a detective to investigate White's injuries. The detective noticed the footprint of a shoe imprinted on White's face and took photographs to document White's injuries. The detective later testified he had been assigned to patrol an area near the high school on the day of the attack and noticed a group of five individuals walking to the church parking lot, with the appellant-juvenile riding along side them. The detective learned the beating occurred about fifteen minutes after he saw the youths enter the church parking lot. The appellant-juvenile first argues there is insufficient evidence to show White suffered serious physical harm as an element of felonious assault. R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) states no person shall knowingly cause serious physical harm to another. R.C. 2901.01(E) provides: (E) "Serious physical harm to persons" means any of the following: * * * - 4 - (4) Any physical harm which involves some permanent disfigurement, or which involves some temporary, serious disfigurement; (5) Any physical harm which involves acute pain of such duration as to result in substantial suffering, or which involves any degree of prolonged or intractable pain. Evidence that the accused attempted to inflict any one of the results described in R.C. 2901.01(E)(1)-(5) is sufficient to establish the aggravating element of felonious assault. State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 169, 172. We find the state presented sufficient evidence from which the juvenile court could find White suffered a temporary, serious dis- figurement or physical harm involving acute pain of such duration as to result in substantial suffering. As a result of the assault, White suffered cuts, bruises and a cauliflower. White's injuries were so severe they left him dazed, prompting his mother, a health care professional, to seek immediate medical attention. Although the hospital did not keep him overnight, White's physician apparently believed White might have suffered a concussion and placed him on a twenty-four hour watch. When White had difficulty awaking the following morning, a CT scan was performed, presumably to check for possible neurological damage. The mother also testified White suffered a cauliflower ear, a swollen face and bruises over his body. This is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the serious physical harm element of felonious assault. See State v. Winston (1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 154; State v. Rushing (Sept. 30, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 62688, unreported; State v. Davis (Feb. - 5 - 15, 1989), Summit App. No. 13664, unreported. Moreover, we have previously held that "where injuries to the victim are serious enough to cause him to seek medical treatment, a jury may reasonably infer that the force exerted on the victim caused serious physical harm." State v. Walker (June 18, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 52391, unreported at 10. The appellant-juvenile cites our recent decision in State v. Ivey (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 249, as authority for the proposition that the injuries White sustained were not sufficient to establish the serious physical harm element. In Ivey, a father had been convicted of child endangerment under R.C. 2919.22 in connection with corporal punishment he had administered to his ten year old child. We reversed the Ivey's conviction, finding a bruised eyelid, bruises, welts and lacerations caused by a belt whipping on a child's buttocks and lower legs did not cause the child serious physical harm or threaten a substantial risk of same as defined by R.C. 2901.01(E). Id. at 255-256. Ivey can be distinguished on its facts. The primary dif- ference here is White's injuries required medical attention. The blows to his head were so severe they left White with a substantial risk of a concussion and the lingering effects prompted the medical authorities to conduct a CT scan. Conversely, the boy in Ivey was "examined and released without medication or orders to return for a checkup. The impact of his whipping was disciplinary and transi- tory." Id. at 256. Moreover, a child abuse specialist stated the - 6 - evidence "did not show the child was excessively punished." Id. 253. We conclude the trial judge could reasonably find White's injuries were extensive enough that they subjected White to serious physical harm sufficient to prove the appellant-juvenile committed felonious assault. The appellant-juvenile next argues the evidence failed to prove he took part in or aided in the gang initiation. He claims White could not positively state that he struck or kicked White. A person may be an accomplice if he aids or abets another in committing the offense while acting with the same culpability required for the commission of the offense. R.C. 2923.03; State v. Coleman (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 286, paragraph two of the syllabus. Mere association with one who perpetrates a crime does not demonstrate complicity; however; participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense is committed. State v. Cartellone (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 145, 150; State v. Parker (Aug. 1, 1991), Cuyahoga App. No. 58860, unreported at 3-4. While White could not positively state whether the appellant- juvenile struck him, there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court concluded that the appellant-juvenile's presence, companionship and conduct indicated his complicity in the offense. It is uncontroverted the appellant-juvenile is a member of the Folks gang and was seen riding his bicycle along side the group of - 7 - four youths. The Bedford Heights detective saw the appellant- juvenile confer with the four youths shortly before the attack. When asked to list the individuals who took part in the assault, another gang member named the appellant-juvenile. We find this evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the state, is sufficient to show the appellant-juvenile's complicity in the assault. Finally, the appellant-juvenile argues the state failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate he acted knowingly in causing White's injuries. He maintains the evidence merely shows he acted recklessly, not knowing his conduct would cause the alleged result. "A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist." R.C. 2901.22(B). The testimony in the record supports the trial court's conclusion that the appellant-juvenile knew his participation in the assault would probably cause serious physical harm to White. White testified he had been struck repeatedly on his head and face. The detective testified White had been kicked in the face with such force that a shoeprint remained embedded on White's face the day after the attack. Accordingly, the assignment of error is overruled. - 8 - Judgment affirmed. - 9 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Juvenile Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. BLACKMON, P.J. DAVID T. MATIA, J., CONCUR JUDGE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, .