COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68889 STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION JASON WALKER : : Defendant-appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OF DECISION : APRIL 25, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Criminal appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. 316931 JUDGMENT : Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT Stephanie Tubbs-Jones, Esq. Valerie R. Arbie, Esq. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 1200 West Third Street, N.W. By: Robert Glickman, Esq. 100 Lakeside Place Assistant Prosecuting Atty. Cleveland, Ohio 44113 The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- HARPER, J.: Defendant-appellant, Jason Walker, appeals from his conviction for felonious assault following a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County. Appellant submits errors relating to the admissibility and weight of the evidence. A careful review of the record compels affirmance. Carol Hyman met appellant in December 1992 while working at Meridia Huron Hospital ("Huron"). Hyman, a registered nurse, worked the evening shift at the hospital and appellant worked in the hospital's housekeeping department. The couple subsequently dated and eventually became engaged in March 1993. Appellant's employment at Huron was terminated in November 1993. Along with the termination, appellant was advised not to visit the hospital grounds. Hyman purchased and later moved into her new home located at 17011 Walden Avenue, Cleveland Heights, Ohio in April 1994. She refused to provide appellant with a set of keys to the house because they were having "major difficulties" at the time. According to Hyman, her relationship with appellant ended about a month later on May 23, 1994. She described at trial the events that led to the break-up, including a physical struggle for a necklace and her engagement ring. Hyman admitted that she and appellant attempted thereafter to discuss their problems, even meeting with a minister in early June. However, it was this meeting that reinforced Hyman's decision to end the engagement. Hyman related this decision to appellant, and -3- her desire to remain his friend. Appellant responded that he did not want to be Hyman's friend alone. Hyman spotted appellant at various times and locations for the period of June 8 to 16, 1994. Hyman never reported any of the early meetings to the authorities, but the events of June 16, 1994 led to appellant's indictment and ultimate conviction. Hyman testified that as she walked in Huron's garage on June 8, she saw appellant driving around in his car. Even though he was driving alongside her at one point, he did not say anything to her. Hyman observed appellant standing in the back of her house later that evening. Hyman telephoned her mother, and then appellant's aunt, Helen Richardson ("Mrs. Richardson"), to inquire as to appellant's whereabouts. Appellant lived at 3222 East Overlook in Cleveland Heights with Mrs. Richardson, his uncle and his cousins. Appellant telephoned Hyman just after she spoke with Mrs. Richardson, who was unable to find appellant. When Hyman mentioned the events of the evening, i.e., the driving in the garage and the standing outside her home, appellant denied these activities. He then asked Hyman whether she believed he was stalking her. On June 10, 1994, Hyman arrived home just after midnight and telephoned her sister from the den. Hyman heard, while on the phone, what she described as a branch crackling outside the window. She compared the sound to the sound made when someone is walking by the window outside. Hyman, after telling her sister about the -4- events of June 8, stated that appellant reminded her of the type of people seen on the crime show America's Most Wanted. About ten minutes after her conversation with her sister, Hyman received a call from appellant. Appellant specifically asked Hyman whether she thought he was the type of person who would appear on one of "those TV shows," and, moreover, the type of person who would hurt her. Appellant explained that he was able to hear Hyman's conversation with her sister by using a "scanner" located in a friend's home when questioned by Hyman as to how he knew the content of their conversation. Hyman testified that on June 12, 1994, she spotted appellant's vehicle behind her as she drove near the intersection of Mayfield Road and Superior Avenue. Appellant followed her briefly, then turned onto his street. Hyman testified that an earlier conversation with appellant as to how he would "kill her" if he ever saw her with another man, prompted her to try and find him. In other words, since Hyman's uncle was in the car with her at the time, Hyman feared that appellant would think the uncle was "another man." Hyman's attempt to find appellant to introduce him to her uncle was unsuccessful. Hyman, therefore, proceeded to a D.I.Y. Warehouse to purchase materials for home repairs. Appellant was in the store at the time, but he neither approached nor spoke with Hyman. On June 14, 1994, appellant telephoned Hyman between 1:30 and 1:45 a.m. from a pay phone down the street. He first asked Hyman -5- why she did not answer the door. Appellant then asked her to join him for a walk, but Hyman declined the offer. Hyman testified that she left Huron on June 16, 1994 at exactly 11:30 p.m. Though her routine from June 8 included stopping at her mother's home on the way, so that her mother could see her safely home by following her, Hyman chose to proceed straight home on this date. As usual, Hyman backed into her garage, noting it to be 11:53 a.m. She remained in the car for a few minutes, listening to a favorite song, and gathering some personal belongings--her purse, a lunch cooler and a plastic grocery bag containing a plant. She then exited the car. A flood light was located on Hyman's house, just above the den window. It shone on the back yard. Two other flood lights, one above the kitchen window, illuminated the driveway. Hyman testified that as she walked to her house, she saw appellant coming toward her from the left. Appellant grabbed her, "punched" her in the left side, and then ran away. Hyman retrieved from her purse a can of mace that was given to her by her mother after her first "chance" encounters with appellant. She then dropped the rest of the items in her possession. Hyman at first did not know the full extent of her injuries, but later realized that appellant stabbed her. She testified that she walked down her driveway, screaming, and headed to her neighbor's house across the street. A neighbor heard the screams and called 9-1-1. Emergency vehicles responded and transported -6- Hyman to St. Luke's Hospital where she underwent numerous surgeries for a stab wound to the stomach. Celena Powell, Hyman's neighbor, testified that after she called 9-1-1, she went outside and observed Hyman laying on a neighbor's driveway across the street. Hyman only spoke about her keys and requested that someone call her mother. Powell testified further that the only car on the street at the time resembled an Olds '98 and was gray in color. The vehicle, driven by a black male, stopped at the driveway for about a minute while Hyman was still on the driveway, and then headed toward Lee Road when she was being placed in the emergency vehicle. Charles Eastridge, a city of Cleveland patrol officer in the Fourth District, testified that he received a "person down" call at approximately 12:20 a.m. on June 17, 1994. He responded to 17008 Walden Avenue about eight minutes later, but the victim was already taken to the hospital. Eastridge observed a large pool of blood on the sidewalk in front of 17008 Walden Avenue, and some blood- soaked clothing. He also obtained appellant's name as a suspect, and his address, from Hyman's mother who also arrived at the scene after Hyman was taken to the hospital. Eastridge relayed appellant's name and address to dispatch and requested dispatch to contact the Cleveland Heights Police Department. Hyman's mother, Joan Hyman ("Mrs. Hyman"), testified that she telephoned appellant from St. Luke's on June 17, 1994 at 1:55 a.m. She testified further that without any indication from her, -7- appellant stated that he just heard about Hyman's stabbing from a Marilyn Matlock. Mrs. Hyman returned to Hyman's home on June 17, 1994. Hyman's keys, lunch cooler and plant were discovered on the Powells' lawn even though these items, as testified to by Mrs. Hyman, were not in the vicinity when first searched in the early morning hours. A blade without a handle was also discovered; the blade carried the name, "Pro-Cut." Hyman was unequivocal in identifying appellant as her attacker. She first told the emergency room doctor that appellant was her attacker, and a police officer the next day. The attacker's clothing, and the manner it was worn, his manner of walking and running, and other observable physical movements and characteristics triggered the identification. Hyman testified that appellant wore a hospital-issued uniform as a member of the hospital staff. The uniform consisted of olive green pants and a shirt. Hyman testified that appellant did not return the uniforms issued to him after his discharge because he was pursuing reinstatement through arbitration. She testified further that appellant wore the pants as civilian clothes. Hyman testified that the pants, which were close-fitting, bunched up in appellant's crotch area because of his build. On the night of July 16, when she turned to face her attacker, Hyman immediately recognized the attacker as appellant because of the fit of his pants. She testified as follows in this regard: -8- So I turned to face him and *** at this point the light from the back of the den was hitting him from the chest down to around, above his knees. And that's when I recognized it to be him. The minute I saw him I knew it was him. [I] knew it was him because, that is when I saw he was wearing the green hospital pants. And the manner in which it fit him in the crotch. *** Hyman's testimony continued with her comparison of the attacker's physical movements and characteristics with those of appellant. Specifically, she described appellant and her attacker as both walking and running pigeon-toed. Hyman also recognized her attacker as appellant when the attacker initially grabbed her because the movement resembled the bear hugs frequently given to her by appellant. She acknowledged that her attacker wore a mask that only exposed his eyes, forehead, and the area below his lip. However, Hyman testified that the eyes, forehead, and goatee and beard were those of appellant. Defense counsel attempted to discredit Hyman's identification of appellant during cross-examination by focusing on the briefness of the encounter. She reacted to this line of questioning in her re-direct examination as follows: [T]he characteristic of Jason was something that was very familiar to me. I know this man intimately. I know him inside out, upside down. So, therefore, when I saw him in my yard that night it did not take any ponderance on my part to recognize it to be him. I recognized him instantaneously. I did not have to sit back and think about it. So these characteristics of his they are very specific to Jason and that I know of him. Hyman's first contact with appellant after the June 16, 1994 incident occurred on July 13, 1994. Mrs. Richardson telephoned -9- Mrs. Hyman's house on this date to inquire about Hyman's condition. Hyman answered the telephone as she was visiting her mother at the time. She testified that Mrs. Richardson did not respond when Hyman asked her why appellant did not visit her in the hospital, but related that appellant was at work at the time of the incident. According to Hyman, she was frustrated with the police department's efforts in its investigation of the stabbing. She consequently decided to telephone appellant on July 14, 1994 to clarify Mrs. Richardson's statements to her. Although Mrs. Hyman hampered Hyman's efforts during the first call by hanging up on appellant, Hyman later paged appellant and he returned the page. Hyman recorded a majority of her conversation with appellant, including appellant's statement that his aunt incorrectly thought that he was at work at the time of the incident. Rather, according to appellant, he was at home because he had no transportation. Appellant moreover told Hyman that he was on the telephone with a female friend from midnight until about 2:30 or 3:00 a.m. Appellant also excused his absence from the hospital--neither Hyman's mother nor the hospital staff would allow his presence. Mrs. Hyman denied that she ever told appellant he could not visit Hyman, but admitted that she told him he would pay for what he did to her. Hyman testified that the police were not interested in listening to the tape, or in reading her transcription of the tape's contents. Hyman next saw appellant at the joint Christmas party for Huron and Meridia Hillcrest Hospital, held at Landerhaven Party -10- Center in early December 1994. She described at trial how appellant was playing a "cat and mouse" game throughout the evening. Hyman first spoke with appellant at about 11:00 p.m. at which time he denied hurting her and communicated his suspicion that he was a victim of a frame-up. She also danced with appellant later that evening, in her words, to get him to leave her alone. Deltonio Williams, appellant's cousin, testified that he and appellant were employed as "ramp agents" at the airport. On June 16, 1994, Williams recalled that he spoke with appellant for approximately twenty minutes between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m. Another cousin of appellant's, Marietta Richardson ("Marietta"), testified that when she went to bed on June 16, 1994 at 11:50 p.m., appellant was on the telephone with Jacqueline McQuarter, his new girlfriend. Mrs. Richardson likewise testified that she saw appellant on the telephone that evening at midnight or just after midnight. Marietta testified further that appellant's vehicle, a gray Olds '88, was "down that whole entire week." The only cars available to appellant were those of her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Richardson, a cranberry-colored station wagon and a black Olds '88. Mrs. Richardson confirmed this portion of her daughter's testimony. She also recalled that appellant did not ask for the keys to either vehicle that evening. Finally, Marietta testified that she overheard the conver- sation between Mrs. Richardson and Hyman on July 13, 1994. According to her, Mrs. Richardson never told Hyman that appellant -11- was at work on June 16, 1994. Mrs. Richardson testified to this effect as well. Mrs. Richardson testified further that someone called on June 17, 1994 at about 10:00 a.m. to speak with appellant. She observed appellant's reaction to the call, testifying that he paced, cried, and appeared devastated. Finally, Mrs. Richardson testified that Detective Clarence Sanders came to her house sometime after June 16, 1994. The detective looked through her utensils. She stated that her cutlery set was complete, and was not "Pro-Cut." Det. Sanders confirmed this testimony. Marilyn Matlock, appellant's supervisor during his employment at the hospital, testified that she heard about Hyman's stabbing when she arrived at work on June 17, 1994. Also hearing that appellant was a suspect, she telephoned him at about 10:00 a.m. that day. Matlock testified that appellant seemed shocked by both the news of the stabbing and his suspect status. She also told him that Hyman was taken to either Mt. Sinai or St. Luke's. Tuesday Gibson and Brenda Britton, both Huron personnel, testified that they went to the December 1994 Christmas party with appellant and another man. Appellant was invited by a Hillcrest employee. Gibson and Britton observed appellant's lengthy conversation with Hyman and their two slow dances. Both witnesses testified that there was no friction between Hyman and appellant and no resistance on behalf of Hyman. -12- Britton testified further that she participated in a three- way telephone conversation with Gibson and appellant on the morning of June 17, 1994. This phone call occurred after appellant received the call from Matlock. According to Britton, appellant appeared shocked about the news. The events of June 16, 1994 led to appellant's December 7, 1994 indictment for one count of felonious assualt, R.C. 2903.11, with two violence specifications. Trial by jury commenced on March 20, 1995, with the jury subsequently returning a verdict of guilty. The trial court thereafter sentenced appellant to an indefinite term of seven to fifteen years. This appeal followed with appellant claiming as error: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN IT PERMITTED TESTIMONY BY THE VICTIM OF THE DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE ATTACK BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY WAS IRRELEVANT AND MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN PROBATIVE, RESULTING IN THE DENIAL OF A FAIR TRIAL. THE VERDICT FINDING JASON WALKER GUILTY OF FELONIOUS ASSAULT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE UPON WHICH A TRIER OF FACT COULD REASONABLY CONCLUDE THAT THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSES HAD BEEN PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. Appellant filed a motion in limine wherein he requested that the state be prohibited from introducing "stalking" type activities at trial. He basically argued that his alleged activities on June 8, 10, 12 and 14, 1994 were inadmissible under Evid.R. 404(B), or otherwise, bore no probative value in establishing that he committed the offense on June 16, 1994. The state countered that the activities did not amount to "other acts," but constituted a -13- pattern of conduct that culminated in the physical attack on Hyman. The state also argued that even under Evid.R. 404(B), a description of appellant's "chance" meetings with Hyman prior to June 16, 1994, would be admissible under the rule. The trial court denied appellant's motion. Appellant, in his first assignment of error, launches a multi- level attack at the trial court's decision which allowed the state to introduce the events of June 8, 10, 12, and 14, 1994 through Hyman's testimony. Appellant first argues that the testimony was prohibited under Evid.R. 401 and 402 because the events, which were non-violent chance encounters, failed to prove that appellant was Hyman's attacker, and were only introduced to inflame the passions of the jury. Second, he submits that even if the evidence was relevant, it was inadmissible under Evid.R. 403(A) because the incident dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury outweighed its probative value. The state initially suggests that appellant's first assignment is not reviewable on appeal because the motion in limine and accompanying arguments only concerned Evid.R. 404(B). A review of defense counsel's argument with regard to the motion reveals no reference to Evid.R. 401, 402 and 403, or arguments relating to the dangers caused by the admission of relevant, but prejudicial, evidence. Additionally, counsel did not object at trial to Hyman's testimony about the events at issue, and, therefore, did not present a relevancy argument at that time. -14- The state is correct in its assertion that this court should not review appellant's first assignment, but for a reason other than the content of appellant's arguments. "A denial of a motion in limine does not preserve error for review. A proper objection must be raised at trial to preserve error." State v. Brown (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 305, paragraph three of the syllabus. See State v. Cherukuri (1992), 79 Ohio App.3d 228. Under Brown and the circumstances of the present case as set forth supra, this court is under no obligation to review appellant's first assignment. Assuming arguendo the reviewability of appellant's first assignment of error, the state's initial position is that the testimony at issue does not fall under Evid.R. 404(B), the "other acts" rule, because it merely demonstrates appellant's course of conduct. The state alternatively argues that if the testimony falls under the rule, it was admissible to show motive, opportunity, preparation, knowledge and identity. A reading of any of the cases dealing with "course of conduct" or the "setting" of a case confirms that this type of testimony is clearly "other acts" evidence that must fall under an exception in order to be admitted at trial. See, e.g., State v. Kelly (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 320; State v. Hill (1987), 37 Ohio App.3d 372; State v. White-Barnes (May 9, 1995), Ross App. No. 93 CA 1994, unreported; State v. Miller (Oct. 14, 1993), Meigs App. No. 92 CA 496, unreported; State v. Boyd (July 1, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 62853, unreported; State v. Philpot (Feb. 22, 1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 56596, unreported. Assuming further that the testimony fails to pass the relevancy -15- requirements contained in Evid.R. 401 and 402, and that it does not relate to an enumerated matter in Evid.R. 404(B), the admission of it at trial amounted to harmless error. In making a harmless error analysis under Crim.R. 52(A), any error will be deemed harmless if it did not affect an accused's substantial rights. "Where there is no reasonable possibility that unlawful testimony contributed to a conviction, the error is harmless and therefore will not be grounds for reversal." State v. Brown (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 482, 485, citing State v. Lytle (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 391, paragraph three of the syllabus, vacated on other grounds, (1978), 438 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3135, 57 L.Ed.2d 1154. A reviewing court, therefore, when determining whether an error in the admission of evidence is harmless, must find there is no reasonable probability that the evidence may have contributed to the defendant's conviction. See State v. Johnson (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 332. In appellant's second assignment of error, he questions the weight of the evidence in support of his conviction for felonious assault. This court's review of the record, infra, demonstrates **the strength of the state's case against appellant without the challenged testimony. Under these circumstances, we conclude that even if the testimony was inadmissible under Evid.R. 402 or 404(B), there is no reasonable probability that it contributed to his conviction. Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. The defense's position in this case was that if Hyman was not afraid enough to contact the police from June 8, 1994 to June 14, -16- 1994 about her sightings of appellant, and she interacted with him after the brutal attack, appellant could not be the attacker. Appellant's manifest weight argument centers on Hyman's credibility in this respect and the obvious inconsistencies between the state's case and his defense as to his whereabouts on June 16, 1994 just before midnight. In State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, the court set forth the test to be utilized when addressing the issue of manifest weight of the evidence. The court stated: [T]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. *** (Citations omitted.) Id., 175. See Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652. Moreover, this court "'may weigh evidence only to determine whether it is of sufficient probative force to support a finding of guilt.'" State v. Hawkins (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 339, 344, quoting State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 33. Therefore, it must be stressed that the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are issues properly left to the trier of fact. State v. Grant (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 465, 476; State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, paragraph one of the syllabus. The trier of fact is entitled to believe or disbelieve the testimony of either the state's witnesses and/or those of the defense. State v. Antill -17- (1964), 176 Ohio St. 61, 67; State v. Harriston (1989), 63 Ohio App.3d 58, 63. Appellant first proposes that Hyman's testimony regarding her fear of him was incredible. The incredibility flows from Hyman's efforts to remain in contact with appellant despite the "chance" meetings, e.g., when she wanted to introduce her uncle to appellant and when she talked and danced with him at the Christmas party. As to the first instance of "incredible" conduct, Hyman testified that she wanted to introduce her uncle to appellant because she remembered how appellant stated he would kill her if he ever saw her with another man. The introduction was meant to inform appellant that the uncle was not the "other man." As to the second instance of "incredible" conduct, Hyman testified that she spoke and danced with appellant at the Christmas party to appease him, and nothing more. Additionally, Hyman testified as to how she changed her route home after work so that her mother could follow her, and also, she started to carry a can of mace with her as a result of her sightings of appellant. Her other testimony, if believed by the jury, coincides with her testimony that she feared appellant. Appellant next takes issue with the state's evidence that he was Hyman's attacker. He argues that the testimony of Marietta and Mrs. Richardson fully contradicted that of the state with regard to appellant's whereabouts and his access to a car on June 16, 1994. It was fully within the jury's prerogative to accept Hyman's identification of appellant as her attacker over the testimony of -18- the Richardsons that appellant was home at the time of the attack. This is purely a credibility question left to the determination of the trier of fact. Antill; Harriston. Pertaining to the inconsistencies about appellant's vehicle, there was no evidence that appellant drove to Hyman's home on June 16, 1994. Appellant lived two blocks from Hyman and, inferen- tially, could have walked to her home. Hyman herself testified that her attacker ran through her neighbors' yards after the attack. Though the state offered testimony through Celena Powell that she observed a vehicle resembling that of appellant's on the night in question, she did not identify him as the driver of the vehicle. There are, therefore, no inconsistencies between the state's testimony and that of appellant's witnesses with regard to the car. As stated supra, the jury was free to reject the testimony that appellant was home by at least midnight. Appellant's third argument regarding the weight of the state's evidence focuses on Hyman's identification of him as her attacker. He boldly asserts that, "[t]he identity of the assailant was not proved at trial. *** It was [Hyman's] fear that Mr. Walker was stalking her that formed the basis of her belief that he was the person who stabbed her, not an ability to observe the assailant." The record clearly demonstrates the weakness of appellant's argument about Hyman's identification. First, floodlights on Hyman's home lit the backyard and the driveway. Second, Hyman testified that it did not take any conjecture on her part to recognize appellant, a man she knew inside and out, as her -19- attacker. She not only recognized how his pants fit, but his walk, his run, his way of grabbing her, and the visible portions of his face. Defense counsel's attempts to shake her testimony only made her more articulate in her description as to how she identified appellant. Any reasonable trier of fact, in light of the foregoing evidence, could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant caused serious physical harm to Hyman on June 16, 1994. The jury, therefore, did not lose its way in rendering a guilty verdict to the charged offense of felonious assault, R.C. 2911.03(A), and appellant's conviction is thus not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Martin. This court reaches this conclusion with full confidence that appellant's conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence without the "stalking" testimony. Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. -20- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DAVID T. MATIA, J., AND ANN DYKE, J., CONCUR. PRESIDING JUDGE SARA J. HARPER N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza-tion, .