COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68860 JOHN SEKERAK, ET AL. : : : PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : ST. LUKES HOSPITAL, ET AL. : OPINION : : DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: MAY 20, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court, No. CV-234601. JUDGMENT: DISMISSED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiffs-Appellants: David I. Pomerantz, Esq. Pomerantz and Pomerantz 20676 Southgate Park Boulevard Suite 103 Maple Heights, OH 44137 For Defendants-Appellees: George M. Moscarino, Esq. Frank R. Osborne, Esq. Arter & Hadden 1100 Huntington Building 925 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, OH 44115-1475 -2- DAVID T. MATIA, P.J.: John Sekerak, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, appeal from the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CV- 234601, in which the trial court granted a motion for directed verdict in favor of St. Luke's Hospital and Dr. Mark Peters, M.D., defendants-appellees. Plaintiffs-appellants assign two errors for this court's review. For the following reasons, this court finds that plaintiffs- appellants' appeal should be dismissed. I. THE FACTS On June 25, 1991, John Sekerak, plaintiff-appellant, was admitted to Marymount Hospital complaining of chest pain. He was transferred that day to St. Luke's Hospital, defendant-appellee, where a number of tests were done which revealed that plaintiff- appellant was suffering from three blocked coronary arteries. A triple by-pass operation was performed. The operation proved successful and, after a short stay in the hospital, plaintiff- appellant was discharged on July 2, 1991. One day later, John Sekerak, plaintiff-appellant, developed severe pain in the big toe on his right foot. This development caused plaintiff-appellant to return to St. Luke's Hospital, defendant-appellee, for further treatment. Plaintiff-appellant was treated by Dr. Mark Peters, defendant-appellee, a new resident at the hospital, and Dr. Mercedes Dullum, M.D. and Dr. James Thornton, M.D., both vascular surgeons on staff at the hospital. -3- At this time, it was determined that a blood clot had apparently broken free from the site of John Sekerak's, plaintiff-appellant's, heart surgery and lodged the popliteal artery behind plaintiff- appellant's right knee depriving the lower leg and foot of the necessary blood supply. Surgery was performed in an attempt to alleviate the problem by removing the clot material. The surgery proved to be unsuccessful as did subsequent surgical procedures. This condition ultimately led to the above-the-knee amputation of plaintiff-appellant's right leg. On June 30, 1992, John and Sally Sekerak, plaintiffs- appellants, filed an amended complaint for medical malpractice and loss of consortium arising out of the above-the-knee amputation of John Sekerak's, plaintiff-appellant's, right leg. After a number of defendants were voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs-appellants, the case proceeded to trial against Dr. Mercedes Dullum, M.D., Dr. James Thornton, M.D., St. Luke's Hospital and Dr. Mark Peters, M.D. Prior to trial, the court granted an oral motion in limine made by the defense prohibiting introduction of evidence relating to an alleged attempt to obfuscate defendants' negligent conduct through an alleged cover-up relating to diagnostic medical records. At the close of all the evidence, the defense moved for a directed verdict pursuant to Civ.R. 50(A). The trial court granted the motion for directed verdict as it related to St. Luke's Hospital and Dr. Mark Peters, based upon plaintiffs-appellants' failure to establish proximate cause. The motion for directed verdict was denied as to Dr. Dullum and Dr. Thornton. -4- Thereafter, plaintiffs-appellants' claims against Dr. Dullum and Dr. Thornton were submitted to the jury which returned a verdict against both doctors, jointly and severally, in the amount of $2,000,000. Judgment was then entered in that amount. On April 10, 1995, plaintiffs-appellants and Dr. Dullum and Dr. Thornton entered into a settlement agreement whereby the defendant doctors agreed to pay $1,650,000 in full satisfaction of the judgment. A satisfaction of judgment was filed with the trial court which stated: Now come plaintiffs, JOHN SEKERAK and SALLY SEKERAK, and their attorney, David I. Pomerantz, and hereby acknowledge full satisfaction of the judgment entered on March 22, 1995, against JAMES C. THORNTON, M.D. and MERCEDES DULLUM, M.D. On April 18, 1995, plaintiffs-appellants filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court which directed a verdict in favor of St. Luke's Hospital and Dr. Mark Peters, defendants-appellees. On November 20, 1995, defendants-appellees filed a motion to dismiss this appeal as moot since the judgment against Dr. Dullum and Dr. Thornton had been fully satisfied. Defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss was based upon Seifert v. Borroughs (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 108 in which the Ohio Supreme Court, when faced with extremely similar factual circumstances, held: *** The law of Ohio is well-settled that an injured party is entitled to only one satisfaction for his injuries, "and that receipt of full compensation from one of several persons whose concurrent acts of negligence are the basis of a suit for -5- damages for personal injuries releases all." (Emphasis added.) Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker (1930), 122 Ohio St. 582, 589, 173 N.E. 194, 196; see, also, id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. More particularly, we have held that "in an action to recover damages *** claimed to have been caused by *** two defendants [where] the amount of damages sustained is determined by the jury ***, the payment of such amount and receipt thereof by the plaintiff, releases both defendants." (Emphasis added.) Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Nickel (1929), 120 Ohio St. 133, 165 N.E. 719, at paragraph two of the syllabus. The same rule applies to the tender and acceptance of a compromise amount, which is followed by the trial court's journal entry that the judgment is satisfied. Gholson v. Savin (1941), 137 Ohio St. 551, 19 O.O. 309, 31 N.E.2d 858, 139 A.L.R. 75. Id. at 110. As in Seifert, supra, the question before the court is whether the underlying judgment represented an award of damages for all of plaintiff-appellant's injuries or for only an allocable part of them. If the award is for all plaintiff-appellant's injuries, then the entry of the satisfaction of judgment will have completely compensated him. In the alternative, if the award was for a discernable part of plaintiff-appellant's injuries, then he was not fully compensated and would therefore be able to pursue his appeal. In the case sub judice, a review of plaintiffs- appellants' amended complaint demonstrates that the damages requested were based upon the amputation of John Sekerak's, plaintiff-appellant's, right leg. Paragraph five of the amended complaint states: -6- 5. Defendants negligently treated and cared for Plaintiff, resulting in surgical, above-the-knee amputation of Plaintiff's right leg. Clearly, plaintiffs-appellants sued the defendants as joint tortfeasors, seeking identical damages from all. In addition, it is apparent from plaintiffs-appellants' closing argument that it was plaintiffs-appellants' assertion that the doctors' negligence was in fact the proximate cause of all injuries at issue. Accordingly, the jury award must be considered as a determination of plaintiffs-appellants' entitlement to damages for the above-the-knee amputation of John Sekerak's, plaintiff- appellant's, right leg. Therefore, as in Seifert, supra, a full satisfaction of the adjudicated amount entered as a matter of record against two defendants releases all remaining defendants whose alleged negligent conduct contributed to the personal injuries. See also Darwish v. Harman (1992), 91 Ohio App.3d 630, 633; Haendiges v. Haendiges (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 720. For the foregoing reasons, John Sekerak, et al., plaintiffs- appellants', appeal is hereby dismissed as moot. Appeal dismissed. -7- This appeal is dismissed. It is, therefore, considered that said appellees recover of appellants their costs herein taxed. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Common Pleas Court directing said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. TERRENCE O'DONNELL, J. and TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, J., CONCUR. DAVID T. MATIA PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate .