COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68763 : LAURA A, VASILAKIS : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellee : : and -vs- : : OPINION : PHILLIP J. VASILAKIS : : Defendant-Appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT JUNE 20, 1996 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Domestic Relations Division of Common Pleas Court Case No. D-179804 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: RICHARD D. MESSERMAN, ESQ. LORETTA A. COYNE, ESQ. 1940 Huntington Building P. O. Box 309 925 Euclid Avenue 303 East Bagley Road Cleveland, Ohio 44115 Berea, Ohio 44107 -2- PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P. J.: Defendant-appellant, Philip J. Vasilakis, appeals from the denial of a motion to vacate certain provisions in an agreed judgment entry he entered into with plaintiff-appellee, Laura A. Vasilakis before the Domestic Relations Division of the court of common pleas. His sole assignment of error is as follows: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN OVERRULING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO VACATE BECAUSE THE APPELLANT MET ALL THE ELEMENTS OF GTE AUTOMATIC ELECTRIC V. ARC INDUSTRIES, INC. Having reviewed the record of the proceedings and the legal arguments presented by the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The apposite facts follow. In July of 1993, the parties appeared at a hearing before a trial court referee to resolve all post-divorce decree motions. During the hearing, the parties agreed to the attorney's fees, the guardian ad litem, and court costs. However, the agreement was not finalized. Thereafter, on October 17, 1994, the parties entered into a signed agreed judgment entry before the trial court, which provided for a change in visitation and a change in counseling sessions. Additionally, Philip Vasilakis agreed to pay $3,000 of the attorney fees of Laura Vasilakis, 75% of the guardian ad litem fees, $1,090 for wife's counseling bills, and all court costs. In the process of negotiating this agreement and making changes to resolve outstanding issues, the parties signed or initialed the agreed judgment in twenty-two separate places. -3- Subsequently, Philip Vasilakis moved to vacate the attorney fees, guardian ad litem fees, counseling bills, and court costs. A hearing was held on the motion. During the hearing, Philip Vasilakis testified he did not know the amount of any of the fees or costs; he did not read the agreed judgment entry and "just signed it to get out of there." This he did because his attorney told him, "this was the best we could do." After the hearing, the trial court denied the motion and found no evidence of duress, coercion, or mental incompetence. This appeal followed. In his sole assignment of error, Philip Vasilakis argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to vacate. His motion to vacate urges the fee amounts in each of these categories were arrived at arbitrarily. He argues no hearing was held to determine their reasonableness and, as such, the motion to vacate should have been granted. We disagree. The standard for reviewing a Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate is whether the trial court abused its discretion. GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v. ARC Industries (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146. In order to prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion a movant must demonstrate the party has a meritorious defense or claim, the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B), and the motion is timely made. Civ.R. 60(B) provides: *** On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; *** or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.*** -4- "Since the movant has the burden of proof, he must present sufficient factual information to warrant a hearing on the motion." Adomeit v. Baltimore (1974), 39 Ohio App.2d 97, 103. If the material submitted by the parties clearly establishes the movant is entitled to relief, then the motion should be granted. Id. at 104. In this case, there is no dispute the motion was timely. The issues now before this court are whether Philip Vasilakis had a meritorious defense and whether he was entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) or (5). In determining whether Philip Vasilakis had a meritorious defense, this court must first establish what constitutes such a defense in this case. Upon review of a domestic relations court decision to award fees and costs, an appellate court must consider, among other things, the reasonableness of the fees. Dodenhoff v. Dodenhoff (Aug. 25, 1994), Cuyahoga App.No. 66100, unreported. However, where the parties to a divorce or separation enter into settlement through an agreed judgment entry, the law of contract applies. Dubinsky v. Dubinsky (Mar. 9, 1995), Cuyahoga App.No. 66439, 66440. See, also, Spercel v. Sterling Industries, Inc. (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 36. Contracts, including settlement agree- ments, do not have to be fair and equitable to be binding and enforceable, so long as they are not procured by fraud, duress, overreaching or undue influence. Walther v. Walther (April 5, 1995), Hamilton App.Nos. C-930681, C-940028, unreported. See, also, Mack v. Polson Rubber Co. (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 34. In Walther, the court concluded as follows: -5- Thus, when the parties enter into an in- court settlement agreement, so long as the court is satisfied that it was not procured by fraud, duress, overreaching or under influence, the court has the discretion to accept it without finding it to be fair and equitable. Settlement agreements are favored in the law. Where the parties enter into a settlement agreement in the presence of the court, such an agreement constitutes a binding contract. Spercel. Neither a change of heart nor poor legal advice is a ground to set aside a settlement agreement. A party may not unilaterally repudiate a binding settlement agreement. Spercel. In the absence of fraud, duress, overreaching or undue influence, or of a factual dispute over the existence of terms in the agreement, the court may adopt the settlement as its judgment. In this case, the payment of fees, bills, and costs was ordered under an agreed judgment entry executed by the parties and approved by the court, and, as such, raises a contract dispute. Therefore, a meritorious defense to the agreed judgment entry between Philip and Laura Vasilakis would not involve a question about the reasonableness of the fees, but would involve whether the agreement was procured by some unlawful or unconscionable means. Philip Vasilakis testified he never received any information concerning the amounts of the fees, bills, and costs. He claims he signed the agreement on the advice of his attorney and later realized he was given "poor advice." Nonetheless, no evidence was presented that would suggest the existence of fraud, duress, overreaching, or undue influence in the execution of the agreed judgment entry. In fact, the record would suggest the opposite was true; the parties met several times to negotiate the terms of their agreement and in the process of reaching the agreement made changes -6- and signed or initialled the agreement on twenty-two separate occasions. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a factual dispute over the existence of terms in the agreement. A review of the entire record demonstrates the parties made a binding and enforceable agreement. Bad advice from counsel and haste are not meritorious defenses to the enforceability of the contract Philip Vasilakis signed or initialled twenty-two times. See Walther, supra. See, also, Ohio Savings Bank v. Sabatino (July 7, 1993), Summit App. No. 15991, unreported (held Civ.R. 60(B)(1) does not provide relief for litigants who are careless or ignorant). Thus, Philip Vasilakis failed to prove he had a meritorious defense to the enforcement of the agreed judgment entry in question. Because Philip Vasilakis lacked a meritorious defense, his motion to vacate the agreed judgment was without merit, and the issue of whether he was entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) or (5) is moot. Accordingly, we find the trial court properly denied the motion to vacate. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that Appellee recover of Appellant her costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Domestic Relations Division of Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. KARPINSKI, J., and PATTON, J., CONCUR. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- .