COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68596 CHARLES FAZIO & ASSOCIATES INC., : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION KENNETH E. MIESEN, ET AL., : : Defendants-Appellants : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : APRIL 25, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Common Pleas Court : Case No. 236824 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: Douglas A. King 34 South Main Street Chagrin Falls, Ohio 44022 For defendants-appellants: Robert E. Matyjasik MITTENDORF & LASKO 24441 Detroit Road Suite 300 Westlake, Ohio 44145 -2- NAHRA, J.: Defendants-appellants Kenneth E. Miesen and Jane B. Miesen appeal from the trial court order which denied their motion to vacate or to modify an arbitration award in favor of plaintiff- appellee Charles Fazio & Associates. In early 1988, appellants purchased a home in Rocky River, Ohio which they intended to have extensively remodeled. Appellee is an architectural firm which had been recommended to appellants by some friends. At the time of the purchase of the home, appellant Kenneth Miesen contacted Charles Fazio, the principal of appellee, regarding the project. The two men thereafter had several discussions. Early in these discussions, Charles Fazio presented Miesen with an architectural plan Miesen liked. Fazio also presented Miesen with a form which indicated the firm could provide two types of architectural services. The first type entailed only a "standard hourly billing rate." Under this heading was set forth the hourly fees for the employees appellee used on a project, viz: 1) the principal; 2) other registered architects; and 3) a draftsman. The form further indicated that with this type of service, "authorized engineers (sic) services" would be billed "at cost," "out-of-pocket expenses" such as "blue printing" would be billed "at cost," and "land surveys will be quoted on a per job basis, depending on the scope of the project." The second type of service was labeled "full service," was for construction projects "from $50,000 to $100,000" and stated that -3- the fee for "new construction," would be "8% of Construction Cost" whereas the fee for "renovation" or additions would be "15% of Construction Cost." Both Miesen and Fazio were aware that because of the extensiveness of the proposed renovation of the house, the construction cost of the Miesen project would be well over fifty thousand dollars. However, Miesen was unwilling to pay fifteen percent to Fazio. Therefore, other figures were proposed and debated. The figure most often mentioned was seven and one-half percent of "construction cost." While Miesen and Fazio continued to try to come to some agreement on the fee for Fazio's proposed architectural services, Miesen requested Fazio recommend a general contractor for the project. Fazio recommended Ben Schraegel, with whom he had worked in the past. Miesen eventually negotiated a separate contract with Schraegel for the actual construction work. The work commenced in April 1988. From April 1988 to September 1988, while the remodeling was in progress, appellee sent monthly invoices to Miesen. The invoices specified hourly work done by Fazio and other architects and draftsmen on the project along with out-of-pocket expenses incurred for the preceding month. Miesen paid each of these invoices in full. In October 1988, Miesen paid only a portion of the invoice amount billed to him by appellee. In November 1988, Miesen again paid only a portion of the invoice amount. Both balances were carried forward to the next month's invoice. Fazio contacted -4- Miesen about the matter; Miesen indicated his belief that appellee had received enough payment for services rendered on the project. Appellee completed its work on the project by April 1989. That month, appellee sent Miesen an invoice which reflected the final hours of work done by Fazio and a draftsman, along with the unpaid balance carried forward from the previous invoices. The total amount due appellee from appellants was stated on the invoice to be $7,238.50. The parties thereafter continued to dispute the amount of payment which appellants owed appellee. Ultimately, on August 10, 1992, appellee filed an action against appellants in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee's complaint alleged two claims for relief. The first stated appellants were "indebted to [appellee] in an amount equal to 7 1/2% of the construction costs incurred" in the project, which costs were "in excess of $400,000.00." Appellee prayed for "an . . . accounting and payment of the balance due." The second claim for relief was on the account; thus, appellee demanded "Judgment . . . in an amount of at least $7,238.50, together with interest, costs expended, and attorney's fees." Appellants responded with an answer denying the pertinent allegations of the complaint, and a counterclaim, which was later amended. In their amended counterclaim, appellants alleged appellee had been overpaid by $3,306.00; appellants prayed for judgment "in the sum of $3,933.25 together with . . . interest . -5- . . ." Appellee later answered the counterclaim with a denial of its allegations. Discovery proceeded in the action. After several pretrials, the trial court issued a judgment entry which stated in pertinent part: Parties agree to Binding Arbitration . . . . [T]his case to be Arbitrated as agreed and (sic) to be selected by the parties. The record reflects the arbitration was held on November 30, 1994. Appellants engaged the services of a court reporter for the proceedings. On December 7, 1994, the arbitrators issued their report and award, which stated as follows: Now, this 30th day of November, 1994, pursuant to Order of this Court, the undersigned having been named arbitrators by agreement of the parties, do hereby certify that we have administered an oath or affirmation to each other, that we have heard the evidence and allegations of the parties, and have justly and equitably tried all the matters in dispute which have been submitted to us, and have determined the matters in controversy, and do therefore make the following AWARD: In favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $7,238.50 plus interest from April 12, 1989 in the amount of $4,065.45. We further find in favor of Plaintiff on Defendant's Amended Counterclaim. (Underscoring in original; emphasis added.) That same day, appellants filed in the trial court a motion "to vacate" and/or "to modify" the report and award. Appellants argued that pursuant to R.C. 2711.10(D), the decision of the arbitrators to award appellee $7,238.50 was "beyond the scope of the arbitrators' authority," and, further, that the award to -6- appellee of $4,065.45 in interest was "wholly inconsistent with the pleadings and the facts, arbitrary, capricious, and against the manifest weight of the evidence." In support of their argument, appellants asserted appellee had withdrawn its second claim for relief prior to the arbitration proceedings. On January 12, 1995, appellee filed a motion pursuant to R.C. 2711.09 to confirm the award. Appellants responded with a brief in opposition. Thereafter, in a judgment entry dated January 27, 1995 but not filed until January 30, 1995, the trial court denied appellants' motion but granted appellee's motion. The entry stated the order was "final." Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal in this court from the foregoing judgment entry. On February 23, 1995, apparently recognizing the incompleteness of the January order, the trial court issued a judgment entry nunc pro tunc, stating as follows: After thorough review and consideration of pleadings filed in the within action, and other documentation and factual information available to the Court, it is hereby ordered that [appellee's] Motion to Vacate or Modify the Award of Arbitrators is denied. [Appellants'] Motion to Confirm the Report and Award of Arbitrators is granted. Accordingly, judgment is entered in favor of the [appellee] and against the [appellants], jointly and severally, in accord with the terms of the arbitration award and in the amount of $11,303.95. Judgment shall issue and interest shall accrue effective January 27, 1995. Said judgment shall be final. (Emphasis added.) This court later permitted appellants to amend their original notice of appeal to perfect an appeal from the nunc pro tunc -7- judgment entry. Prior to addressing the merits of appellants' appeal, however, a jurisdictional issue raised at oral argument must first be addressed. There was a question concerning the trial court's authority to issue the nunc pro tunc judgment entry of February 23, 1995 since an appeal had already been filed in this court. This court concludes the action was proper. Initially, it must be noted that the trial court's January order, although purporting to be "final," was insufficient since it failed to state the substance of the arbitration award. Although the order indicated the arbitrators' award was confirmed, the necessary specifics of the award were not set forth in the judgment entry. See, e.g., Civ.R. 54(B); Millies v. Millies (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 43; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. BPS Co. (1982), 4 Ohio App.3d 3; cf., Rogoff v. King (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 438. The trial court, apparently recognizing this mistake, later issued the nunc pro tunc order to supply the omissions, viz., that judgment had been rendered for appellee on its complaint, that the amount of the judgment was the total of $7,238.50 and the interest computed on that amount from April 12, 1989 to the date of the arbitrators' decision on November 30, 1994, and that appellee was also awarded judgment on appellants' counterclaim. Since a perusal of the February 23, 1995 order reveals it merely set forth with greater specificity what the trial court's January order had already established, and did not change the amount of the judgment, it was proper. See, e.g., McKay v. McKay (1985), 24 Ohio App.3d -8- 74; Roth v. Roth (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 768; App.R. 4(C). By issuing the subsequent nunc pro tunc entry, the trial court was not making a new legal decision on the case but was merely correcting a 1 "blunder in execution" of the earlier order of judgment. Kuehn v. Kuehn (1988), 55 Ohio App.3d 245; cf., Musca v. Chagrin Falls (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 192. Furthermore, assuming arguendo the January order was final, since the trial court corrected the record only to more fully set forth the judgment appealed from rather than to change it substantively, the trial court's action was within its jurisdiction. Buckles v. Buckles (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 118; Yee v. Erie Cty. Sheriff's Dept. (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 43; App.R. 9(E); cf., State v. Calvert (Mar. 4, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 64416, unreported. Thus, this court would be elevating form over substance to hold at this point in the proceedings the trial court's action was improper. 1 Civ.R. 60(A) provides: RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER (A) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. -9- For the foregoing reasons, this court perceives no jurisdictional bar to consideration of the merits of appellants' appeal. Appellants present three assignments of error for review. They are all related, therefore, they are addressed together as follows: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANTS' MOTION TO VACATE THE ARBITRATION AWARD AND IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S APPLICATION TO CONFIRM BECAUSE THE AWARD OF DAMAGES WAS UNLAWFUL, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. [Record, Report and Award of Arbitrators, doc. #000027 (Appendix A); Journal Entry, Case Status Form, doc. #000033 (Appendix B)] II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANTS' MOTION TO MODIFY THE ARBITRATION AWARD AND IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S APPLICATION TO CONFIRM BECAUSE THE AWARD OF INTEREST FROM APRIL 12, 1989 WAS UNLAWFUL, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. [Record, Report and Award of Arbitrators, doc. #00027 (Appendix A); Journal Entry, Case Status Form, doc. #00033 (Appendix B)] III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANTS IN THE SUM OF $11,303.95 WITH INTEREST FROM JANUARY 27, 1995 BECAUSE SAID JUDGMENT CONSTITUTES AN AWARD OF INTEREST UPON INTEREST WHICH IS NOT PERMISSIBLE PURSUANT TO O.R.C. 1343.03. [Record, Report and Award of Arbitrators, doc. #000027 (Appendix A); Judgment Entry Nunc Pro Tunc, doc. #00036 (Appendix C)] Appellants argue the trial court improperly confirmed the arbitrators' award because it was "fatally defective" in several respects. -10- 2 Relying on R.C. 2711.10(D), they first contend the initial award of damages in the amount of $7,238.50 demonstrates the arbitrators "exceeded" or "imperfectly executed" their powers. They also assert the matter of interest was neither submitted to the arbitrators nor permissibly computed, therefore, the trial court should have at least modified the award to delete that amount 3 pursuant to R.C. 2711.11(B). This court does not agree. 2 R.C. 2711.10 states: 2711.10 Court may vacate award. In any of the following cases, the court of common pleas shall make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration if: (A) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means. (B) There was evidence (sic) partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators, or any of them. (C) The arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. (D) The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. (Emphasis added.) 3 R.C. 2711.11 provides: 2711.11 Court may modify award. In any of the following cases, the court of common pleas in the county where an award was made in an arbitration proceeding shall make an order modifying or -11- It is well-settled that the jurisdiction of courts in the area of arbitration and arbitration awards is limited. See, e.g., Findley City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Findley Edn. Assn. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 129; Warren Education Assoc. v. Warren City Board of Education (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 170. Judicial intervention in this area is statutorily restricted by R.C. Sections 2711.09, 2711.10 and 2711.11. These sections give the court the power to vacate or modify an arbitration award only on certain enumerated grounds. For example, with regard to the basis that R.C. 2711.10 provides for vacating an arbitration award, this court has cautioned that judicial review of the matter must be "very narrow." Cuyahoga Community College v. Dist. 925, Serv. Emp. Internatl. Union AFL- CIO (1988), 42 Ohio App.3d 166 at 170. Furthermore, the Ohio Supreme Court has declared: correcting the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration if: (A) There was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award; (B) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matters submitted; (C) The award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy. The order shall modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties. (Emphasis added.) -12- The whole purpose of arbitration would be undermined if courts had broad authority to vacate an arbitrator's award. Thus, this court has stated, "[i]t is the policy of the law to favor and encourage arbitration and every reasonable intendment will be indulged to give effect to such proceedings and to favor the regularity and integrity of the arbitrator's acts." Campbell v. Automatic Die & Products Co. (1954), 162 Ohio St. 321, 329 [55 O.O. 195]. Indeed, this court has held that "[a] mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an arbitration award, which permits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for vacating the award when such award draws its essence from a[n] . . . agreement." Goodyear v. Local Union No. 200 (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 516 [71 O.O.2d 509], paragraph one of the syllabus. An arbitrator's award draws its essence from a[n] . . . agreement when there is a rational nexus between the agreement and the award, and where the award is not arbitrary, capricious or unlawful. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation v. Mahoning Cty. TMR Edn. Assn. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 80 at 83-84. (Emphasis added.) A review of the judgment entry of arbitration reveals it clearly stated the parties were submitting this case to "binding" arbitration. The agreement to submit the case to "binding" arbitration meant: "* * * [B]oth parties agreed that they would abide by the decision rendered by the board of arbitrators * * * ." Huffman v. Valletto (1984), 15 Ohio App.3d 61, 63. (Emphasis added.) The judgment entry indicated no limitation on the scope of the arbitrators' authority to decide the case. Moreover, the arbitration award itself stated the arbitrators had heard the "allegations of the parties," "tried all the matters in dispute," and "determined the matters in controversy." Thus, since the -13- parties had agreed to submit the whole case to arbitration, this was "agreement" of the parties the trial court was to protect with the authority arrogated to it by R.C. 2711.10 and R.C. 2711.11. See, e.g., Queen City Lodge No. 69 Fraternal Order of Police, Hamilton Cty., Ohio, Inc. v. Cincinnati (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 403; Napoleon Steel Contr., Inc. v. Monarch Constr. Co. (1982), 3 Ohio App.3d 410; cf., State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Blevins (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 165. Appellants, however, attempted to confuse this issue in the trial court by arguing in their motion to vacate that the arbitration award showed no "rational nexus" to the underlying contract for architectural services. To support this argument, they cited certain portions of the transcript of the arbitration proceedings. In so doing, it is apparent appellants were actually presenting an argument based upon the weight of the evidence. This court has stated the following in the context of judicial review of an arbitration award: The fact that the common pleas court may have arrived at a different conclusion than did the arbitrator is immaterial. The common pleas court does not balance the equities, weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Warren Edn. Assn. v. Warren City Bd. of Edn., supra; Sparks v. Barnett (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 448, 605 N.E.2d 408. Instead, a common pleas court is bound by an arbitrator's factual findings and serves only as a mechanism to enforce the arbitrator's award. Warren Edn. Assn. v. Warren City Bd. of Edn., supra; Lockhart v. Am. Res. Inc. Co., supra, 2 Ohio App.3d at 101, 2 OBR at 114, 440 N.E.2d at 1213. Motor Wheel Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 45, 52. (Emphasis added.) See, also, Goodyear Tire & -14- Rubber Co. v. Local Union 200 (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 516; Cleveland v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 8 (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 755; Russo v. Chittick (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 101; Lynch v. Holcomb (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 223. Apparently realizing the foregoing principle of law limited the trial court's authority in this area, appellants also argued some matters in dispute were not actually submitted to the arbitrators for decision. Specifically, appellants first asserted the award was improper pursuant to R.C. 2711.10(D) because appellee "withdrew" its second claim for relief, which was based upon the account. Appellants presented no evidence in the form of an affidavit or otherwise to support this assertion. Napoleon Steel Contr., Inc. v. Monarch Constr. Co., supra. Moreover, the transcript of the arbitration hearing indicates appellants' account with appellee was the subject of much of the testimony given by both Fazio and Kenneth Miesen. See, e.g., Motor Wheel Corp.v . Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra; cf., Marra Constructors v. Cleveland Metroparks Sys. (1993), 82 Ohio App.3d 557. Certainly, the arbitrators were presented with enough evidence to conclude appellee was entitled to prevail on its claim appellants still owed money to it for architectural services rendered. Appellants also asserted the arbitrators were not presented with the issue of awarding appellee interest on the unpaid balance of the account, thus, R.C. 2711.11(B) permitted the trial court to modify the award. Once again, however, the record reveals -15- appellee's complaint contained the specific prayer for an award of general interest on the account. R.C. 1343.03(A) provides: 1343.03 Interest when rate not stipulated. (A) In cases other than those provided for in sections 1343.01 and 1343.02 of the Revised Code, when money becomes due and payable upon any bond, bill, note, or other instrument of writing, upon any book account, upon any settlement between parties, upon all verbal contracts entered into, and upon all judgments, decrees, and orders of any judicial tribunal for the payment of money arising out of tortious conduct or a contract or other transaction, the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum, and no more, unless a written contract provides a different rate of interest in relation to the money that becomes due and payable, in which case the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate provided in that contract. (Emphasis added.) It is apparent, therefore, that as long as the amount owed is clear, this statute permits the award of interest on a debt from the time it is due and payable. Tony Zumbo & Son Constr. Co. v. Dept. of Transportation (1984), 22 Ohio App.3d 141; Braverman v. Spriggs (1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 58. The running of such interest on a debt cannot be delayed by a debtor merely because he denies owing the debt; only where the amount is unliquidated, i.e., uncertain, is the award of such interest improper. Id. As a corollary to this statement of law, it has been held the creditor may put forward alternative theories of recovery without necessarily causing the amount owed to become unliquidated. Tony Zumbo & Son Constr. Co. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra. -16- Furthermore, where there is no evidence that the computation of the debt or its accuracy and reasonableness was disputed, an award of interest on the claim from the date it is due and owing is proper. Nursing Staff of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Sherman (1984), 13 Ohio App.3d 328. In this case, in addition to claiming it was owed seven and one-half percent of the construction costs, appellee also sent invoices to appellants, requesting payment on an account for amounts due and owing for services rendered. At the arbitration hearing, Miesen disputed owing the total amount but never expressed dissatisfaction with appellee's work and never disputed either the accuracy or the reasonableness of the debt as reflected on the final invoice. Therefore, the arbitrators could reasonably find the amount due appellee from appellants was a liquidated debt subject to the award of interest pursuant to R.C. 1343.03(A). Napoleon Steel Contr., Inc. v. Monarch Constr. Co. supra; see, also, Cleveland Neighborhood Health Serv., Inc. v. St. Clair Builders, Inc. (1989), 64 Ohio App.3d 639. Thereafter, the trial court was entitled to both confirm the award and award interest on the judgment thus entered. Id., Hosford v. Automatic Control Systems, Inc. (1984), 14 Ohio App.3d 118; Hellmuth, Obata & Kassenbauam v. Ratner (1984), 21 Ohio App.3d 104; Marra Constructors, Inc. v. Cleveland Metroparks Sys., supra; cf., Davidson v. Bucklew (1992), 90 Ohio App.3d 328. When disputing parties agree to submit their controversy to binding arbitration, they agree to accept the result, even if it is legally or factually wrong. Goodyear v. -17- Local Union No. 200 (1975), 42 Ohio St. 2d 516, 620 [71 O.O.2d 509]; Lockhart v. American Res. Ins. Co. (1981), 2 Ohio App. 3d 99, 102-103. If the parties could challenge an arbitration decision on the ground that the arbitrators erroneously decided legal or factual issues, no arbitration would be binding. Binding arbitration precludes judicial review unless the arbitrators were corrupt or committed gross procedural improprieties. R.C. 2711.10. Huffman v. Valletto, supra, at 63. In spite of appellants' arguments to the contrary, a review of the record in this case demonstrates there was a rational nexus between the agreement to arbitrate the dispute and the award and the arbitrators were neither corrupt nor committed gross procedural improprieties. Cuyahoga Community College v. District 25, Serv. Emp. Internatl. Union AFL-CIO, supra. Having made this determination, judicial review of this case was properly at an end. Findley City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Findley Edn. Assn., supra. Appellants failed to provide evidence that any ground existed to either vacate or modify the award in this case. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying appellants' motion. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Local Union 200, supra; Sparks v. Barnett (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 448; Russo v. Chittick, supra. Accordingly, appellants' assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. -18- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. MATIA, DAVID T., P.J., CONCURS. PATTON, J., DISSENTS. (See attached Dissenting Opinion.) JOSEPH J. NAHRA JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68596 CHARLES FAZIO & ASSOCIATES, : INC. : : DISSENTING Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION KENNETH E. MIESEN, ET AL., : : Defendant-appellants : : DATE APRIL 25, 1996 PATTON, J., DISSENTING: I respectfully dissent from any action taken on the merits because we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The record demonstrates the only judgment properly before us fails to specify the amount of judgment; therefore, it is not final. After the arbitration panel released its award, the homeowner filed a motion to vacate or modify the award, and the architect filed a cross-motion to confirm the award. By journal entry dated January 30, 1995, the trial court stated: "Defendants' Motion to Vacate or Modify (filed 12-7-94) is denied. Motion to confirm Report & Award of Arbitrators (filed 1-12-95) is granted." The homeowner filed a notice of appeal on February 21, 1995. Two days later, on February 23, 1995, the trial court issued the following nunc pro tunc judgment entry: -2- "After thorough review and consideration of the pleadings filed in the within action, and other documentation and factual information available to the Court, it is hereby ordered that Defendant's Motion to Vacate or Modify the Award of Arbitrators is denied. Plaintiff's Motion to Confirm the Report and Award of Arbitrators is granted. Accordingly, judgment is entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants, jointly and severally, in accord with the terms of the arbitration award and in the amount of $11,303.95. Judgment shall issue and interest shall accrue effective January 27, 1995. Said judgment shall be final." The trial court's February 23, 1995 nunc pro tunc entry, made after jurisdiction vested with this court on February 21, 1995, made a substantive change in the January 30, 1995 judgment entry and is therefore void. An order that makes a finding of liability but reserves the question of damages is interlocutory in nature and not a final appealable order. See Mayfred Co. v. Bedford Heights (1980), 70 Ohio App.2d 1, 2-3; Summit Petroleum v. K.S.T. Oil & gas Co, Inc. (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 468, 470. Clearly, the January 30, 1995 judgment entry did not constitute a final appealable order because it failed to include an amount of judgment. The majority's assertion that the February 23, 1995 order merely set forth with greater specificity what the January 30, 1995 order established is groundless. The fact is, the February 23, 1995 order did not establish any damages. With no damages awarded in the first instance, the trial court could not nunc pro tunc "set forth with greater specificity" a damage award by setting an amount for the first time in a journal entry. -3- The trial court could not correct its original omission of damages, as it apparently intended, by issuing a nunc pro tunc entry two days after jurisdiction in this case vested with this court. The notice of appeal filed on February 21, 1995 vested jurisdiction exclusively with this court. The trial court could only undertake action that did not interfere with our authority to review the judgment on appeal. Yee v. Erie Cty. Sheriff's Dept. (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 43, 44; Majnaric v. Majnaric (1975), 46 Ohio App.2d 157; State v. Calvert (Mar. 4, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 64416, unreported. The nunc pro tunc did not constitute a Civ.R. 60(A) correction of a clerical error. Civ.R. 60(A) permits the court to correct clerical mistakes at any time, but prohibits correction of substantive mistakes. See Kuehn v. Kuehn (1988), 55 Ohio App.3d 245, 247; Musca v. Chagrin Falls (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 192. Changing the amount of a judgment is deemed a substantive change in the judgment and prohibited under Civ.R. 60(A). See Albertson v. Ryder (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 765, 770; Merkly v. Schneider (June 8, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 68334, unreported at 3. Finally, the majority's suggestion that an appeal from the January 30, 1995 order would not be final pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B) does not support its position. To be sure, this court lacks jurisdiction to reach the merits of non-final orders under Civ.R. 54(B), but we still retain exclusive jurisdiction during the pendency of the appeal. In other words, the notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to take action in aid of -4- the case while we decide if we have jurisdiction to hear the merits of an appeal. Hence, a nunc pro tunc order, made after a notice of appeal has been filed, even from a non-final order, is ineffective until this court states that it does not have jurisdiction over the matter. I realize the trial court intended to confirm the award of the arbitration panel, but we must be mindful that the trial court speaks through its journal and the January 30, 1995 order did not specify an amount of damages. We simply have no authority to presume a trial court's intent from a silent journal entry. This may seem to be a harsh result under the circumstances, but we cannot waive jurisdictional requirements for any reason. The concept of jurisdiction is well-defined in order to place parties on equal footing as to proper procedure. Every time we waive or overlook jurisdictional requirements for appeals solely to reach what we perceive to be a fair result, we diminish the force of those requirements and confuse what should be a precise area of the law. Accordingly, I believe the February 23, 1995 nunc pro tunc is invalid. Furthermore, I would find the January 30, 1995 order is not final because it failed to include an amount for damages. Because R.C. 2505.02 limits our jurisdiction to final orders, I .