COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69270 : ACCELERATED DOCKET STANLEY J. BARNEY : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellee : : and -vs- : : OPINION : JOSEPH L. FORTUNA, ET AL. : PER CURIAM : Defendants-Appellants : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT DECEMBER 14, 1995 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. 253515 JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendants-Appellants: STANLEY J. BARNEY, Pro Se PETER ONYSKO, ESQ. 5312 Fleet Avenue 1208 Standard Building Cleveland, Ohio 44105 1370 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- PER CURIAM: In this accelerated appeal, defendant-appellant, Joseph Fortuna, appeals the dismissal of his motion for sanctions against plaintiff-appellee, Stanley Barney. Fortuna assigns the following error for our review: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING A HEARING ON APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT IN VIOLATION OF THE APPELLATE COURT MANDATE REQUIRING SUCH HEARING. After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we reverse the decision of the trial court. The apposite facts follow. Stanley Barney planted poplar trees along the property line between his property and adjoining property belonging to Joseph Fortuna. Fortuna owned and operated a funeral home on his property. Fortuna hired an independent contractor to build an addition to the funeral home along the property line. In order to pour the concrete footer necessary to support the walls of the addition, the contractor had to cut the roots of Barney's poplar trees, which were encroaching upon Fortuna's property. Sometime later, during a violent winter storm, the trees whose roots were cut fell over into Fortuna's yard. Thereafter, the contractor's workmen cut up the trees and hauled them away. On June 11, 1993, Barney sued Fortuna in trespass for wrongfully cutting down the trees. The case was dismissed, reinstated, voluntarily dismissed, and then refiled. The case was referred to arbitration where Barney was awarded $2000.00. Fortuna -3- appealed to the court of common pleas. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Fortuna. Fortuna filed a motion for sanctions against Barney under Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51. The motion was denied without a hearing. On appeal, this court held that the trial court erred in denying Fortuna's motion for attorney fees under R.C. 2323.51 without first holding a hearing. Barney v. Fortuna (January 30, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67429, unreported. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court again denied the motion for attorney fees and dismissed the case with prejudice. The trial court cited this court's ruling in Pisani v. Pisani (February 7, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67599, which held that a hearing on a R.C. 2323.51 motion for attorney fees is mandatory only when sanctions are imposed. This appeal followed. The issue raised by Fortuna's assignment of error is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for sanctions without a hearing. While we understand the trial court's decision to apply Pisani, we must reverse the trial court's ruling. At the time this court decided the initial appeal of Barney and remanded the case to the trial court, we held that a hearing was required on all R.C. 2323.51 motions for sanctions. In Pisani, we reached a different conclusion, holding that a hearing was only required when the motion for sanctions was granted. In Pisani, we recognized the existence of an inconsistency between the decisions of our court and those of our sister appellate courts and expressed an intent to -4- decide future cases in accordance with Pisani. However, Pisani did not overrule our prior decisions and, therefore, had no effect on the Barney case. In Dallas v. Stern (May 15, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67830, unreported at 4, we recognized that a trial court may ignore the ruling of a court of appeals in the event of an intervening Supreme Court case that reached a different result. However, the trial court has no such authority to ignore a court of appeals mandate where the intervening case is issued not by a superior court, but by the same court that ordered the remand. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case for a hearing on the R.C. 2323.51 motion for sanctions. Judgment reversed and remanded. -5- It is, therefore, considered that said Appellants recover of said Appellee their costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, PRESIDING JUDGE TERRENCE O'DONNELL, JUDGE DIANE KARPINSKI, JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- .