COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68935 : ACCELERATED DOCKET STATE OF OHIO : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellee : : and -vs- : : OPINION EARL JOHNSON : : Defendant-Appellant : PER CURIAM : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : NOVEMBER 30, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Criminal appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CR-317,256 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : __________________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: STEPHANIE TUBBS-JONES Cuyahoga County Prosecutor KESTRA SMITH-CRUTCHER, Ass't. Justice Center, Courts Tower 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For defendant-appellant: STUART H. LIPPE Attorney at Law 526 Superior Avenue 930 Leader Building Cleveland, Ohio 44114 - 2 - PER CURIAM: This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas stemming from a plea of no contest to an indictment charging defendant-appellant, Earl Johnson, with trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03 and possession of criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24. Appellant timely appeals the trial court's order over- ruling his motion to suppress evidence. He raises the following sole assignment of error for this court's review: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE. In reviewing the trial court's ruling on appellant's motion to suppress, we are duty bound to review the record and to inde- pendently determine whether, as a matter of law, the trial court erred in applying the substantive law to the facts of this case. State v. Klein (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 486, 488; State v. Gordon (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 334. The facts available to this court from which to make this determination are contained in the transcript of the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress. The testimony of the lone witness who appeared at the hearing, Detective George Deli, an eighteen-year veteran of the Cleveland Police Department, reveals the following information: At approximately 4:00 p.m., on - 3 - October 4, 1994, Det. Deli and his partner were on routine patrol in an area known for high drug activity when they observed a vehicle double parked on the side of the road with its motor running. The officers exited their patrol car and approached the vehicle with the intention of telling the driver to move his vehicle. As Det. Deli got closer to the vehicle, however, he could see appellant, whom he knew to have a long history of narcotic arrests which included an arrest for carrying a firearm, sitting in the vehicle's driver's seat. Det. Deli also observed that the passenger was holding an open container of beer. Upon reaching the vehicle, Det. Deli instructed appellant to step out of the vehicle. Fearing that appellant could be armed, Det. Deli then conducted a protective search of appellant's outer clothing. While conducting the search, Det. Deli felt an object in appellant's groin area which he suspected was drugs. He immediately suspended his search and asked appellant if the object he felt was heroin. Appellant admitted to Det. Deli that he did indeed have heroin in his groin area. He then voluntarily retrieved eight packets of heroin from inside his pants and gave them to Det. Deli. Based on the above facts, appellant contends that his motion to suppress should have been granted because the protective search for weapons was conducted in violation of his rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081. - 4 - The United States Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977), 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331, held that a police officer may order a motorist to get out of a car, which has been properly stopped for a traffic violation, even without sus-picion of criminal activity. See, also, State v. Evans (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 405. A Mimms order, however, does not automatically bestow upon the police officer the authority to conduct a protective search for weapons. Id. at 408. A limited protective search of a person for concealed weapons, in the absence of probable cause and a warrant, is justified only when the officer reasonably believes that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range may be armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; see, also, State v. Evans, supra, 67 Ohio St.3d at 414; State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177, paragraph two of the syllabus. "This limited protective search--permitted without a warrant and on the basis of reasonable sus-picion less than probable cause--is not meant to discover evidence of crime, but must be strictly `limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the offi-cer or others nearby.'" Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993), 113 S.Ct. 2130, citing Terry, supra, at 26. See, also, Adams v. Williams (1972), 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, 617. Appellant has not challenged the finding made by the trial court that the police were justified under Terry in stopping him; - 5 - thus, the dispositive issue before this court is whether the officer who conducted the protective search was acting within the lawful bounds marked by Terry when, after ordering appellant out of his vehicle, he conducted a protective search. In other words, whether, based on the totality of circumstances, the officer had a reasonable basis for believing that appellant could be armed and presently dangerous to himself or to others. Terry v. Ohio, supra. See, also, State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86; State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177, paragraph two of the syl-labus. "The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always `the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.'" Mimms, supra, 434 U.S. at 108- 109, 98 S.Ct. at 332, 54 L.Ed.2d at 335, quoting Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 19. The transcript of the suppression hearing reveals that the officer's actions were motivated by a concern for his own safety, as well as for that of his partner. The officer testified that he was concerned about safety for two reasons: first, because he knew that appellant had a long history of narcotic arrests which included an arrest for carrying a firearm; and second, because the area in which the car was located was an area known for its high drug activity in which weapons were prevalent, and it had been his experience that persons involved in drug trafficking often carry firearms. These combined circumstances permitted the officer to reasonably believe that appellant might be armed and - 6 - dangerous. See State v. Evans, supra; State v. Bobo, supra. In these circumstances, any person of reasonable caution would have likely conducted the protective search. As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra at 110: We think it too plain for argument that the State's proffered justification--the safety of the officer--is both legitimate and weigh- ty. "Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties." Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 23, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 44 Ohio Ops.2d 383. *** In- deed, it appears "that a significant percent- age of murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops." Id., at 234 n. 5, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 94 S.Ct. 467, 66 Ohio Ops.2d 202. For the foregoing reasons, appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the court of common pleas is affirmed. - 7 - This cause is affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. SARA J. HARPER, PRESIDING JUDGE JAMES M. PORTER, JUDGE TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, .