COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 68879 KENNETH TALMON : ACCELERATED DOCKET : Plaintiff : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION QUICK AIR FREIGHT, INC., ET AL. : : Defendant-Appellee : PER CURIAM : : [Appeal by Bureau of Workers' : Compensation and The Industrial : Commission of Ohio : : Defendants-Appellants] : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION OCTOBER 5, 1995 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas Case No. 252493 JUDGMENT Reversed and vacated DATE OF JOURNALIZATION APPEARANCES: For Defendant-Appellee For Defendants-Appellants Bureau Quick Air Freight, Inc.: of Workers' Compensation and The Industrial Commission of Ohio: COREY V. CROGNALE, ESQ. 41 South High Street BETTY D. MONTGOMERY 26th Floor Attorney General of Ohio Columbus, Ohio 43215 JAMES P. MANCINO, Assistant Attorney General DOUG S. MUSICK, Assistant Attorney General Worker's Compensation Section State Office Bldg., 12th Floor 615 West Superior Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1899 - 2 - PER CURIAM: This appeal is before the Court on the accelerated docket pursuant to App. R. 11.1 and Loc. App. R. 25. Appellants Bureau of Workers' Compensation and the Industrial Commission of Ohio appeal from an order of the trial court taxing to the Bureau as costs the defendant-appellee/employer's expenses of taking the depositions of the claimant and a terminal manager. We find the court erred in taxing the items as costs and reverse and vacate the order respecting same. This case involves a workers' compensation matter wherein the alleged employee/claimant Kenneth Talmon sought participation in the state fund for benefits. The alleged employer, Quick Air Freight, Inc. denied Talmon was an employee and asserted that he was an independent contractor not covered by the workers' compensation act. The Industrial Commission of Ohio agreed with Quick Air Freight and denied compensation to the claimant. The claimant appealed this decision to the lower court pursuant to R.C. 4123.519. After a jury trial, the claimant was found not eligible to participate in the workers' compensation fund because he was an independent contractor, not an employee. A judgment was entered to that effect. Thereafter, Quick Air Freight filed a motion to tax its expenses of taking the depositions of the claimant ($632.65) and Quick Air Freight's terminal manager ($138.93). - 3 - The Bureau opposed the motion on the ground that these were merely expenses of discovery and not costs as defined by R.C. 4123.512(D). The trial court granted Quick Air Freight's motion and taxed as costs the deposition expenses in the sum of $831.58. A notice of appeal therefrom was duly filed. No appellee's brief has been filed herein. The Bureau's sole assignment of error states as follows: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING QUICK'S MOTION TO TAX COSTS PURSUANT TO O.R.C. 4123.512. Civ. R. 54(D) grants the trial court discretion to order that the prevailing party bear all or part of his or her own costs. Vance v. Roedersheimer (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 552, 555. Civ. R. 54(D) states as follows: Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute or in these rules, costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs. The Court made clear in Vance that "costs" mean traditional statutory costs. Citing Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 50 the court stated: "This court has consistently limited the categories of expenses which qualify as 'costs.' 'Costs, in the sense the word is generally used in this state, may be defined as being the statutory fees to which officers, witnesses, jurors and others are entitled for their services in an action *** and which the statutes authorize to be taxed and included in the judgment ***. *** Costs did not necessarily cover all of the expenses and they were distinguishable from fees and disbursements. They are allowed only by authority of statute ***.'" State, ex rel. Commrs. of Franklin County v. Guilbert (1907), 77 Ohio St. 333, 338-339 [83 N.E. 80, 81], quoted, in part, with approval in Benda v. Fana (1967), 10 - 4 - Ohio St.2d 259, 262-263 [39 O.O.2d 410, 413, 227 N.E.2d 197, 200-201]. "Today, we reaffirm the principle that '[t]he subject of costs is one entirely of statutory allowance and control.'" [Cases omitted.] Id. at 555. Therefore, the award of costs is entirely statutory. State ex rel. Williams v. Colasurd (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 642, 643. Following this principle, this district has held that the cost of traditional depositions may not be taxed as costs. Wiltsie v. Teamor (1993), 89 Ohio App. 3d 380, 387-388. R.C. 4123.512 does not authorize a charge of costs for the depositions for which the appellee sought recovery. R.C. 4123.512(D) states in pertinent part as follows: Any party may file with the clerk prior to the trial of the action a deposition of any physician taken in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Code, which deposition may be read in the trial of the action even though the physician is a resident of or subject to service in the county in which the trial is had. The bureau of workers' compensation shall pay the cost of the deposition filed in court and of copies of the deposition for each party from the surplus fund and charge the costs thereof against the unsuccessful party if the claimant's right to participate or continue to participate is finally sustained or established in the appeal. The statute provides that the cost of the deposition of a physician may be charged to the Bureau of Workers' Compensation. It does not authorize the charging as costs of traditional deposition expenses for taking the deposition of the claimant or the employer's terminal manager. The doctrine of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius would imply that since the - 5 - statute specifically authorizes deposition costs of the physician to be taxed, but makes no mention of other deposition expenses, the intent must be that other deposition costs are excluded. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Comm. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 171, 175 ("As a general rule of statutory construction, the specific mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another"). See, also, State ex rel. Paluf v. Feneli (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 138, 143; Vincent v. Zanesville (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 30, 33; Wray v. Wymer (1991), 77 Ohio St.3d 122, 132. Neither the claimant, Kenneth Talmon, nor Kay Robin, the employer's terminal manager, are physicians under the terms of the statute providing for the costs of depositions. The expenses of taking their depositions falls under the general rule and cannot be taxed to the Bureau. The Bureau's assignment of error is sustained. The order taxing the deposition costs to the Bureau is reversed and vacated. - 6 - It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee its costs herein taxed. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, PRESIDING JUDGE JAMES M. PORTER, JUDGE TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which .